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ABSTRACT PAGE
Web browsing has become an integral part of our lives, and we use browsers to perform
many important activities almost everyday and everywhere. However, due to the
vulnerabilities in Web browsers and Web applications and also due to Web users' lack of
security knowledge, browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Enhancing Web browsing
security is therefore of great need and importance.
This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through exploring
and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have
systematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie
management, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public
computers. We have proposed new approaches to address these problems, and built
unique systems to validate our approaches.
To manage HTTP cookies, we have proposed an approach to automatically validate the
usefulness of HTTP cookies at the client-side on behalf of users. By automatically
removing useless cookies, our approach helps a user to strike an appropriate balance
between maximizing usability and minimizing security risks. To protect against phishing
attacks, we have proposed an approach to transparently feed a relatively large number of
bogus credentials into a suspected phishing site. Using those bogus credentials, our
approach conceals victims' real credentials and enables a legitimate website to identify
stolen credentials in a timely manner. To identify insecure JavaScript practices, we have
proposed an execution-based measurement approach and performed a large-scale
measurement study. Our work sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and
especially reveals the severity and nature of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic
generation practices on the Web. To achieve secure and convenient Web browsing on
untrusted public computers, we have proposed a simple approach that enables an
extended browser on a mobile device and a regular browser on a public computer to
collaboratively support a Web session. A user can securely perform sensitive interactions
on the mobile device and conveniently perform other browsing interactions on the public
computer.
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Enhancing Web Browsing Security

Chapter 1

Introduction

Web-centric computing is a significant trend in computing, and Web browsing has become an integral part of our lives. People use browsers to perform many important activities
such as banking, shopping, and bill-paying; they also use browsers to search, communicate,
and collaborate, as well as to teach, learn, and entertain. Meanwhile, Web browsers have
evolved dramatically since the invention of the first Web client in 1990 [186]. Web browsers
are no longer simple HTML document renderers; they have increasingly become the dominant platform for both current and future end-user applications. This fascinating trend
manifests the need and importance of providing modern Web browsers with higher security
assurance and better functionality.

1.1

Motivation and Concentration

Traditionally, attackers mainly focused on directly breaking into Web servers to acquire
sensitive information or damage the systems. However, in recent years, Web browsers have
2

3
gained increasing popularity as new attack vectors for launching various severe attacks such
as drive-by download, cross-site scripting, phishing, privacy, and even large-scale denial
of service attacks. Browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Meanwhile, Internet security
threat trends [159] show that malicious activities have increasingly become Web-based,
attackers are more and more targeting end users, the online underground economy has
matured, and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attacking techniques. Enhancing
Web browsing security is therefore of great need and importance, and it has also become
much more challenging than before.
This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through exploring and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have systematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie management, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public computers. These problems are real-world important problems that are closely related to a few top
cyber security threats. For example, all the four problems are tightly related to the threat
of online identity theft, which is the greatest fear for Internet users [159, 174]. For another
example, the problem of insecure JavaScript practices is also tightly related to cross-site
scripting, which is the number one Web application vulnerability of all time [33, 190, 193].
In studying these four Web browsing security problems, we have carefully surveyed
state-of-art solutions in literature and also carefully experimented with state-of-practice
security features in modern Web browsers. We have made important observations and
proposed novel approaches to address these problems. We have also built unique browserbased software systems to validate our approaches. In the next section, we briefly introduce
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these four Web browsing security problems and our contributions. We detail the motivation,
design, implementation, and evaluation of each work in the following four Chapters 2, 3, 4,
and 5, respectively.

1.2

Contributions

The contributions of this dissertation include an automatic HTTP cookie management
system, a transparent phishing protection system, a large-scale measurement of insecure
JavaScript practices on the Web, and a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk
browsing.

1.2.1

Automatic HTTP Cookie Management

HTTP cookies are designed and widely used to provide many beneficial features such as
maintaining session state and enabling web page personalization. However, despite their
importance and usefulness, HTTP cookies have raised significant user privacy and security
concerns. This is because HTTP cookies can be used to monitor users' browsing habits, and
possibly to associate what you have looked at with who you are. Moreover, stolen cookies
may also incur severe security problems; for example, they can be used to impersonate other
users and to gain access to session-protected services and resources.
Through a systematic study of HTTP cookie management on modern Web browsers
and a large-scale measurement of cookie usage on over five thousand websites, we made the
observation that handling first-party persistent cookies is .the most challenging problem in
HTTP cookie management. First-party persistent cookies are stored on the hard disk of a
user's computer until they expire or are deleted by a user. Websites often set a long lifetime
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for first-party persistent cookies, thus leaving plenty of room for attackers to manipulate or
steal those cookies. Unfortunately, modern Web browsers only provide very limited cookie
management support, and often require users to manually define policies.
To address this problem, we designed CookiePicker [126, 127], a system that can automatically verify the usefulness of first-party persistent cookies at the client-side. CookiePicker identifies those cookies that can cause perceivable changes on a webpage as useful,
while simply classifying the rest as useless. Useless cookies will be finally removed from the
browser to reduce potential security and privacy risks. CookiePicker therefore helps users
achieve the maximum benefit brought by cookies, while minimizing the potential risks. We
implemented CookiePicker as an extension to the Firefox Web browser, and evaluated its
efficacy and overhead through live experiments. The experimental results indicate that
CookiePicker can automatically make high-accuracy cookie usage decisions with very low
running overhead. We detail this work in Chapter 2.

1.2.2

Transparent Phishing Protection

Phishing is one of the most common Internet frauds, and it has caused serious damages
to Internet users ranging from denied account access to substantial financial loss. While it
seems that phishing is so simple, it is a very challenging problem because it is a third-wave
semantic attack that targets the way humans assign meaning to content [182]. It is also
important to note that phishing is not far away from us. For example, according to the
IT Administration of our university, phishing targets William and Mary online accounts
as well. Individuals on our campus frequently became the victims of phishing attacks,
and serious consequences have occurred. Many anti-phishing mechanisms focus on helping
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users verify whether a website is genuine. They endeavor to prevent users from being
tricked into revealing their credentials to phishing sites. Nevertheless, prevention-based
approaches alone are insufficient to shield vulnerable users from "biting the bait" and defeat
phishers because human users are the weakest link in the security chain. The ever-increasing
prevalence and severity of phishing attacks clearly indicate that anti-phishing is still a
daunting challenge.
Two observations motivated us to explore a quite different approach. First, currently,
it is trivial for phishers to verify their collected credentials. The majority of credentials
collected by a phishing site are victims' real credentials. Meanwhile, when phishers go to a
legitimate site to verify their collected credentials, it is very hard for the legitimate site to
differentiate phishers' credential verification activities from users' regular login activities.
Therefore, we had such a question: can we make it harder for phishers to verify their collected credentials? Second, browsers warn instead of block users' connections to suspected
phishing sites. Although remarkable advances in automatic phishing detection have been
achieved, false positives may still happen. Therefore, giving warnings and expecting users
to leave suspected phishing sites have become the most common actions taken by modern
browsers. However, usability studies have demonstrated that many users still ignore the
strong phishing warnings. Therefore, we had another question: can we leverage the power
of automatic phishing detection and can we effectively transform this power into the power
of automatic fraud protection?
With these observations and questions, we explored a quite different approach to protect
against phishing attacks with "bogus bites." We developed BogusBiter [122, 125], a unique
client-side anti-phishing tool, which transparently feeds a relatively large number of bogus
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credentials into a suspected phishing site. BogusBiter conceals a victim's real credential
among bogus credentials, and moreover, it enables a legitimate website to identify stolen
credentials in a timely manner. BogusBiter leverages the power of client-side automatic
phishing detection techniques, and it is complementary to existing preventive anti-phishing
approaches. Seamlessly integrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in
modern Web browsers, BogusBiter is transparent to users. We implemented BogusBiter as
an extension to the Firefox Web browser, and evaluated its efficacy through real experiments
on both phishing and legitimate websites.

Our experimental results indicate that it is

promising to use BogusBiter to transparently protect against phishing attacks. We detail
this work in Chapter 3.

1.2.3

Characterizing Insecure JavaScript Practices on the Web

JavaScript is an interpreted programming language widely used for client-side scripting.
JavaScript code embedded or included in webpages runs locally in a user's Web browser, and
it is mainly used by websites to enhance the interactivity and functionality of their webpages.
However, because JavaScript is equipped with a powerful and diverse set of capabilities in
modern Web browsers, it has also become the weapon of choice for attackers. Many severe
attacks such as drive-by-download, cross-site scripting, as well as the aforementioned cookie
stealing and phishing, are closely related to JavaScript. To a very large extent, JavaScript
has become a central battle ground of the Web security.
A great deal of attention has been paid to the JavaScript-related vulnerabilities that
could directly lead to security breaches. However, little attention has been given to the insecure practices of using JavaScript on legitimate websites. Similar to other insecure practices
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on legitimate websites such as using customers' social security numbers as their login IDs,
insecure JavaScript practices may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but they
could definitely cultivate the creation of new attack vectors and greatly increase the risks

of browser-based attacks.
This observation motivated us to identify insecure JavaScript practices on legitimate
websites, to analyze their severity, and to highlight their risks. To achieve this goal, we
devised an execution-based measurement approach [123]. The key idea of this approach is
to first use an instrumented Web browser to non-intrusively obtain JavaScript execution
information on different websites, and then use an offline analysis toolkit to sufficiently
analyze the collected trace information. Using our instrumentation framework and analysis
toolkit, we performed the first large-scale measurement study of the insecure JavaScript
practices on the Web. Our focus is on the insecure practices of JavaScript inclusion and
dynamic generation, and we examined their severity and nature on 6,805 unique websites.
Our measurement results reveal that insecure JavaScript practices are common at various websites: (1) at least 66.4% of the measured websites manifest the insecure practices
of including JavaScript files from external domains into the top-level documents of their
webpages; (2) over 44.4% of the measured websites use the dangerous eval() function to
dynamically generate and execute JavaScript code on their webpages; and (3) in JavaScript
dynamic generation, using the document.write() method and the innerHTML property is
much more popular than using the relatively secure technique of creating script elements
via DOM (Document Object Model) [191] methods. Our in-depth analysis indicates that
safe alternatives to those insecure JavaScript practices exist in common cases and ought to
be adopted by website developers and administrators for reducing potential security risks.
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We detail this work in Chapter 4.

1.2.4

Secure and Convenient Kiosk Browsing

Many kiosk environments such as airport lounges and hotel business centers provide people
with Internet-connected public computers to facilitate ubiquitous Web access. Those public
computers often have high-speed network connections. They are also convenient to use
because they normally have full-size keyboards and large displays. People who do not own
a computer or carry a laptop with them frequently use those public computers to browse the
Web. Unfortunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own
computers. Public computers are used by many people to run different applications and visit
various websites; therefore, it is very ,likely for them to be infected with malware. Simply
searching "public computer security" online, we can find numerous articles suggesting that
people should not use public computers to perform sensitive activities.
To secure kiosk computing environments, researchers have proposed a number of solutions. Many of those solutions focus on specific objectives such as securing application and
data access, securing user authentication and input, or verifying software integrity. However, those solutions cannot be easily adopted to secure an entire kiosk browsing session. A
few solutions do have the objective of securing an entire kiosk browsing session, but they
are very complex, not very secure, and not practical. They are very complex and not very
secure because they all use the browser on the untrusted public computer to directly access
remote Web servers. They are not practical because they often require support from extra
proxies or extra authentication and key-exchange processes.
We proposed SessionMagnifier [124], a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk
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browsing. The key idea of SessionMagnifier is to enable an extended browser on a mobile
device and a regular browser on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session.
This approach simply requires a SessionMagnifier browser extension to be installed on a
trusted mobile device. No third-party proxy is needed, no Web server modification is needed,
and no installation or configuration on the untrusted public computer is needed. A user
can securely perform sensitive interactions on the mobile device and conveniently perform
other browsing interactions on the public computer. We implemented SessionMagnifier for
Mozilla's Fennec mobile browser and evaluated it on a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet. The
evaluation and analysis demonstrate that SessionMagnifier is simple, secure, and usable.
We detail this work in Chapter 5. During the process of developing SessionMagnifier, we
realized that the technique we invented to solve this specific kiosk browsing problem could
be extended to build a simple and practical framework for real-time collaborative browsing.
Therefore, we made the decision to immediately build our RCB (Real-time Collaborative
Browsing) framework [121]. I do not include the RCB work [121] in this dissertation just
because it is not directly related to enhancing Web browsing security.

1.3

Organization

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the details of
our work on automatic HTTP cookie management. We describe a measurement study of
HTTP cookie usage on the Web, and then fully present our CookiePicker system. Chapter 3
presents the details of our work on transparent phishing protection. We present the design
and implementation of our BogusBiter system, and we also discuss its deployment and lim-
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itations. Chapter 4 presents the details of our work on characterizing insecure JavaScript
practices on the Web. We introduce our JavaScript measurement framework and analysis toolkit, and then completely present and analyze a large-scale measurement study of
insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web. Chapter 5
presents the details of our work on secure and convenient kiosk browsing. We present our
SessionMagnifier system and analyze its security and usability advantages in supporting
kiosk browsing. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and presents future work.

Chapter 2

Automatic HTTP Cookie
Management

In this chapter, we present our work on automatic HTTP cookie management. We
advocate that useless first-party persistent cookies should be removed from a user's browser,
so that potential security and privacy risks can be reduced. We present a pure client-side
solution that can automatically verify the usefulness of first-party persistent cookies on
behalf of a user. By removing those useless cookies, our solution can help a user achieve the
maximum benefit brought by HTTP cookies while minimizing the potential security and
privacy risks.

2.1

Motivation

HTTP Cookies, also known as Web cookies or just cookies, are small parcels of text sent by
a server to a Web browser and then sent back unchanged by the browser if it accesses that
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server again [155]. Cookies are originally designed to carry information between servers and
browsers so that a stateful session can be maintained within the stateless HTTP protocol.
For example, online shopping websites use cookies to keep track of a user's shopping basket.
Cookies make Web applications much easier to write, and thereby have gained a wide range
of usage since debut in 1995. In addition to maintaining session states, cookies have also
been widely used for personalizing, authenticating, and tracking user behaviors.
Despite their importance and usefulness, cookies have been of major concern for privacy.
As pointed out by Kristol in [63], the ability to monitor browsing habits, and possibly to
associate what you have looked at with who you are, is the heart of the privacy concern that
cookies raise. For example, a lawsuit alleged that DoubleClick Inc. used cookies to collect
Web users' personal information without their consent [14]. Moreover, vulnerabilities of
Web applications or Web browsers can be exploited by attackers to steal cookies directly,
leading to severe security and privacy problems [34, 47, 106, 107].
As the general public has become more aware of cookie privacy issues, a few privacy
options have been introduced into Web browsers to allow users to define detailed policies for
cookie usage either before or during visiting a website. However, these privacy options are
far from enough for users to fully utilize the convenience brought by cookies while limiting
the possible privacy and security risks. What makes it even worse is that most users do not
have a good understanding of cookies and often misuse or ignore these privacy options [39].
Using cookies can be both beneficial and harmful. The ideal cookie-usage decision for
a user is to enable and store useful cookies, but disable and delete harmful cookies. It has
long been a challenge to design effective cookie management schemes that can help users
make the ideal cookie-usage decision. On one hand, determining whether some cookies
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are harmful is almost impossible, because very few websites inform users how they use
cookies. Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [177] enables websites to express
their privacy practices but its usage is too low to be a practical solution. On the other
hand, determining whether some cookies are useful is possible, because a user can perceive
inconvenience or webpage differences if some useful cookies are disabled. For instance, if
some cookies are disabled, online shopping may be blocked or preference setting cannot take
into effect. However, current Web browsers only provide a method, which asks questions
and prompts options to users, for making decision on each incoming cookie. Such a method
is costly [74] and very inconvenient to users.
In this work, we first conduct a large-scale cookie measurement for investigating the
current cookie usage on various websites. Our major measurement findings show that the
pervasive usage of persistent cookies and their very long lifetimes clearly highlight the
demand for removing useless persistent cookies to reduce the potential privacy and security
risks.

Then we present CookiePicker, a system that automatically makes cookie usage

decisions on behalf o£ a Web user. CookiePicker enhances the cookie management for a
website by using two processes: a training process to mark cookie usefulness and a tuning
process to recover possible errors. CookiePicker uses two complementary algorithms to
effectively detect HTML page difference online, and we believe that these two algorithms
have the potential to be used by other online tools and applications. Based on the two
HTML page difference detection algorithms, CookiePicker identifies those cookies that cause
perceivable changes on a webpage as useful, while simply classifying the rest as useless.
Subsequently, CookiePicker enables useful cookies but disables useless cookies. All the
tasks are performed without user involvement or even notice.
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Although it is debatable whether defining useful cookies as those that lead to perceivable
changes in webpages retrieved is the best choice, so far this definition is the most reasonable
measure at the browser side and it is also used in [97]. The reasons mainly lie in that very
few websites tell users the intention of their cookie usage, P3P usage is still very low, and
many websites use cookies indiscriminately [9].
We implemented CookiePicker as a Firefox Web browser extension, and validated its efficacy through live experiments over a variety of websites. Our experimental results demonstrate the distinct features of CookiePicker, including (1) fully automatic decision making,
(2) high accuracy on decision making, and (3) very low running overhead.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the background of cookies. Section 2.3 shows our cookie measurement results. Section 2.4 describes
the design of CookiePicker. Section 2.5 details the two HTML page difference detection
algorithms used by CookiePicker. Section 2.6 presents the implementation of CookiePicker
and its performance evaluation. Section 2. 7 discusses the potential evasions against CookiePicker as well as some concerns about using CookiePicker. Section 2.8 reviews related
work, and finally, Section 2.9 summarizes this work.

2.2

Background

HTTP cookies allow an HTTP-based service to create stateful sessions that persist across
multiple HTTP transactions [76]. When a server receives an HTTP request from a client,
the server may include one or more Set-Cookie headers in its response to the client. The
client interprets the Set-Cookie response headers and accepts those cookies that do not
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violate its privacy and security rules. Later on, when the client sends a new request to the
original server, it will use the Cookie header to carry the cookies with the request [61].
In the Set-Cookie response header, each cookie begins with a NAME=VALUE pair, followed
by zero or more semi-colon-separated attribute-value pairs. The NAME=VALUE pair contains
the state information that a server attempts to store at the client side.

The optional

attributes Domain and Path specify the destination domain and the targeted URL path for
a cookie. The optional attribute Max-Age determines the lifetime of a cookie and a client
should discard the cookie after its lifetime expires.
In general, there are two different ways to classify cookies. Based on the origin and
destination, cookies can be classified into first-party cookies, which are created by the
website we are currently visiting; and third-party cookies, which are created by a website
other than the one we are currently visiting. Based on lifetime, cookies can be classified
into session cookies, which have zero lifetime and are stored in memory and deleted after
the close of the Web browser; and persistent cookies, which have non-zero lifetime and
are stored on a hard disk until they expire or are deleted by a user. A recent extensive
investigation of the use of first-party, third-party, session, and persistent cookies was carried
out by Tappenden and Miller [103].
Third-party cookies bring almost no benefit to Web users and have long been recognized
as a major threat to user privacy since 1996 [63]. Therefore, almost all the popular Web
browsers, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox, provide users with the
privacy options to disable third-party cookies. Although disabling third-party cookies is
a very good start to address privacy concerns, it only limits the profiling of users from
third-party cookies [63], but cannot prevent the profiling of users from first-party cookies.
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First-party cookies can be either session cookies or persistent cookies. First-party session
cookies are widely used for maintaining session states, and pose relatively low privacy or
security threats to users due to their short lifetime. Therefore, it is quite reasonable for a
user to enable first-party session cookies.
First-party persistent cookies, however, are double-edged swords. As we will show in
Section 2.3, first-party persistent cookies could stay on a user's disk for a few years if not
been removed. Some cookies perform useful roles such as setting preferences. Some cookies,
however, provide no benefit but pose serious privacy and security risks to users. For instance,
first-party persistent cookies can be used to track the user activity over time by the original
website, proxies, or even third-party services. Moreover, first-party persistent cookies could
be stolen or manipulated by three kinds of long-standing attacks: (1) cross-site scripting
(XSS) attacks that exploit Web applications' vulnerabilities [58, 106, 193], (2) attacks that
exploit Web browser vulnerabilities [15, 88, 107], and (3) attacks that could directly steal
and control cookies launched by various malware and browser hijackers such as malicious
browser extensions [57, 67, 94]. These attacks can easily bypass the same origin policy [180]
of modern Web browsers, which protects cookies stored by one origin from accessing by
a different origin. As an example, recently cookie-stolen related XSS vulnerabilities were
even found in Google's hosting services [195, 197]; and the flaws in Internet Explorer 7 and
Firefox could enable attackers to steal and manipulate cookies stored on a PC's hard drive
[196].
Disabling third-party cookies (both session and persistent) and enabling first-party session cookies have been supported by most Web browsers. The hardest problem in cookie
management is how to handle first-party persistent cookies. Currently Web browsers only
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Figure 2.1: Internet Explorer 7 advanced privacy settings.

have very limited functions such as automatically accepting or blocking all first-party persistent cookies, or prompting each of them to let users manually make decisions. Figure 2.1
shows the advanced privacy settings of Internet Explorer 7, in which the functions provided to control first-party persistent cookies are very cumbersome and impractical to use.
Therefore, the focus of this work is on first-party persistent cookies, that is, how to automatically manage the usage of first-party persistent cookies on behalf of a user

1

.

Instead

of directly addressing XSS and various Web browser vulnerabilities, CookiePicker reduces
cookie privacy and security risks by removing useless first-party cookies from a user's hard
disk. Here we assume that the hosting website is legitimate, since it is worthless to protect
the cookies of a malicious site.
1
The design of CookiePicker and its decision algorithms can be easily applied to other kinds of cookies
as well if needed.
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2.3

HTTP Cookie Measurement

To comprehensively understand the usage of HTTP cookies over the Internet, we conducted
a large-scale measurement study in December 2009. We chose over five thousand websites
from directory.google.com, an online website directory containing millions of websites categorized by topic. Then, we used a customized webpage retrieval tool wget [150] to identify
those websites that set cookies at client side. We only consider first-party cookies, including
both session cookies and persistent cookies, in this measurement study.

2.3.1

Website Selection and Crawling

Since there are numerous websites on the Internet, we select the websites for measurement
study based on the following two requirements: diversity and representativeness. As with
[79], the selection pool we use is directory.google.com, in which websites are organized into
hierarchical categories and listed in Google page-rank order indicating the relevance to the
classified category. There are fifteen top-level categories in directory.google.com. Our selection covers thirteen of them, except categories "world" and "regional". These two are
avoided due to the existence of many non-English websites. Since a top-level category has
multiple sub-categories which also have further sub-categories, each top-level category may
consist of hundreds of thousands of websites. Thus, we only choose the websites listed
in the top-level categories and their immediate sub-categories.

To select representative

websites, we filter out those websites with page-rank less than 0.25 2 • There may exist duplicate websites inside a category or between two categories. We first remove the duplicate
2

Page-rank value is between 0 and 1. The bigger, the more relevant.
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intra-category websites and then move all the duplicate inter-category websites into a new
category-"Multi-category". After filtering and removing, the total number of unique websites chosen for our study is 5,393. The number of websites in each category is listed in
Table 2.1, where the second column lists the total number of websites in the corresponding
category and the third column shows the number and percentage of the websites that set
cookies at client side. The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 2.1 show the number
of the websites that set only session cookies, only persistent cookies, and both session and
persistent cookies, respectively.
We instruct the customized wget to crawl the selected websites and save the corresponding cookies carried in the HTTP response headers. To simulate a user surfing the Web, we
turn on the recursive option in wget so that wget can recursively retrieve webpages. The
maximum depth of recursion level is set to two. We instruct wget to only save first-party
cookies. To avoid crawling being blocked or running too long, we use a random wait time
varied from zero to two seconds between consecutive retrievals, and limit the crawling time
on a single website within six minutes.

2.3.2

Measurement Results

After Web crawling, we found that 2,341 (43%) websites in total have set at least one firstparty cookie at client side. The average number of retrieved unique URLs per website for
these 2,341 websites is 538. The percentage of websites setting cookies in each category
varies from 33% to 63%, as shown in Table 2.1. These numbers are conservative since wget
cannot obtain the cookies set by the webpages that require a user login or carried by the
client-side JavaScript. Even so, the results clearly show the pervasive cookie usage among
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Category
Arts
Business
Computers
Games·
Health
Home
News
Recreation
Reference
Science
Shopping
Society
Sports
Multi-category
Total

Web
Sites
342
602
512
151
303
324
483
351
308
537
461
214
673
132
5,393

Cookies
113
265
190
51
148
157
176
173
134
215
290
78
287
64
2,341

(33%)
(44%)
(37%)
(34%)
(49%)
(48%)
(36%)
(49%)
(44%)
(40%)
(63%)
(36%)
(43%)
(48%)
(43%)

Session
Only
55
181
108
19
82
83
86
86
69
118
93
35
152
23
1,190

Persistent
Only
21
28
33
12
17
23
51
36
17
48
67
17
51
24
445

Both
37
56
49
20
49
51
39
51
48
49
130
26
84
17
706

Table 2.1: Statistics of the selected websites and their usage of HTTP cookies.
various types of websites.
For those websites that use cookies, we compute the CDFs (Cumulative Distribution
Functions) of the number of cookies, the number of session cookies, and the number of
persistent cookies per website, respectively, and draw them in Figure 2.2. Note that the
X-axis is in logarithmic scale. We are interested in these numbers because Web browsers
usually set limits on the total number of cookies and the number of cookies per domain,
in order to save memory and disk space on a user's computer. For example, the maximum
default number of cookies per domain and maximum number of total cookies are set to
50 and 1,000 respectively in Firefox. From Figure 2.2, we can see that about 99% of the
websites set less than 10 cookies at client side and none of them sets more than 40 cookies.
This indicates that all websites under study follow the basic rule that a website should not
set too many cookies to a client.
Web browsers usually also set limit on the size of a cookie, which is mainly determined
by the length of cookie value. For example, Firefox limits the length of a cookie NAME/VALUE
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Figure 2.2: CDFs of the number of all cookies, the number of session cookies, the number of

persistent cookies per website, respectively.
pair up to 4,096 bytes. Figure 2.3 depicts the CDFs of cookie size in bytes for all cookies,
session cookies, and persistent cookies, respectively. Around 94% of cookies are less than
100 bytes and none of them is greater than 4,096 bytes.
If cookie is enabled during browsing a website, the path of URL will determine what

cookies to be transmitted together with the HTTP request to server. If the Path attribute
of a cookie matches the prefix of the URL path, the cookie previously set will be sent
back. We examine the Path depth for cookies, session cookies, and persistent cookies,
respectively, and draw their CDFs in Figure 2.4. Surprisingly, near 90% of cookies have
root "/" as their Path attribute values, which implies that these cookies will be sent back
to the original websites for any URL requests to those sites. Although some cookies may
need to be sent back to the Web servers for any URL on the servers, the abnormally high
percentage suggests that the Path attributes of many cookies may not be appropriately
set. As a consequence of this inappropriate setting, many requests carry cookies that are
functionally unnecessary: the cookies neither affect responses nor make difference to server
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Figure 2.3: CDFs of cookie size in bytes for all cookies, session cookies, and persistent cookies,
respectively.

states. Wide-spread indiscriminate usage of cookies not only impedes many optimizations
such as content delivery optimizations studied in [9], but also increases the risk of cookie
stealing.
We are especially interested in the lifetime of persistent cookies, which can be calculated
from the cookie attribute Max-Age specified in the Set-Cookie HTTP response header. We
compute the lifetime for all persistent cookies and draw its CDF in Figure 2.5 (The X-axis
is log-scaled). There are a few hikes in the curve, among which the lifetimes corresponding
to one year (365 days) and 30 years are most evident. Clearly, over 60% of persistent
cookies are set to expire after one year or longer. We also found that seven websites set
their cookies to expire in year 9999, nearly eight thousand years from now! The mean and
median lifetimes of persistent cookies are 38 years and one year, respectively.
In summary, our major measurement findings show that cookie has been widely used by
websites. Although the simple cookie collection tool we used cannot retrieve the webpages
that require login and cannot acquire the cookies set by JavaScript, we still found that about
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respectively.
43% of the total selected websites use either session cookies, persistent cookies, or both.
Moreover, around 21% of the total selected websites use persistent cookies and the majority
of persistent cookies have their lifetimes longer than one year. Therefore, the pervasive
usage of persistent cookies and their very long lifetimes clearly highlight the demand for
removing those useless persistent cookies to reduce potential privacy risks.
We did a similar measurement study in December 2006 [126]. The procedure and tool
for selecting and crawling websites used in that study are the same as our current study.
Although we cannot. directly compare the results of two studies due to the differences of
websites and crawling paths, we found that the findings mentioned above hold in the 2006
study. For example, in the 2006 study, about 37% of the total (5,211) selected websites use
cookies and about 18% of the total selected websites use persistent cookies. Similarly, more
than 60% of persistent cookies have lifetimes longer than one year in the 2006 study.
Recently Tappenden and Miller [103] did an extensive study on cookie deployment and
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usage. Some of their study results have the similar implications as ours. For example, their
study shows that 67.4% (66,031) of the 98,006 websites use cookies and 83.8% (55,130) of
those 66,031 sites use first-party cookies. In addition, they observed that approximately
50.4% of all persistent cookies surveyed are set to live for over one year. The discrepancy in
numbers between their study and ours can be attributed to the differences in the sample set
and study methods. For example, they chose websites from Alexa while we chose websites
from Coogle directory; they instrumented Firefox browser while we instrumented wget.

2.4

CookiePicker Design

The design goal of CookiePicker is to effectively identify the useful cookies of a website,
and then disable the return of those useless cookies back to the website in the subsequent
requests and finally remove them. A webpage is automatically retrieved twice by enabling
and disabling some cookies.

If there are obvious differences between the two retrieved

results, we classify the cookies as useful; otherwise, we classify them as useless. CookiePicker
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Figure 2.6: HTTP requests/responses in a single webpage view.

enhances the cookie management for a website by two processes: forward cookie usefulness
marking and backward error recovery. We define these two processes and detail the design
of CookiePicker in the following.

Definition 1. FORward Cookie Usefulness Marking (FORCUM) is a training process, in
which CookiePicker determines cookie usefulness and marks certain cookies as useful for a
website.

Definition 2. Backward error recovery is a tuning process, in which wrong decisions made
by CookiePicker in the FORCUM process may be adjusted automatically or manually for a
website.

2.4.1

Regular and Hidden Requests

A typical webpage consists of a container page that is an HTML text file, and a set of
associated objects such as stylesheets, embedded images, scripts, and so on. When a user
browses a webpage, the HTTP request for the container page is first sent to the Web server.
Then, after receiving the corresponding HTTP response for the container page, the Web
browser analyzes the container page and issues a series of HTTP requests to the Web server
for downloading the objects associated with the container page. The HTTP requests and
responses associated with a single webpage view are depicted by the solid lines (1) and (2)
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Figure 2. 7: Data flow inside Gecko.

in Figure 2.6, respectively.
Webpage contents coming with the HTTP responses are passed into the Web browser
layout engine for processing. Figure 2. 7 depicts the data flow inside of Gecko [143], one
of the most popular Web browser layout engines used in all Mozilla-branded software and
its derivatives. When a webpage comes into Gecko, its container page is first parsed and
built into a tree. The structure of the tree follows the W3C Document Object Model
(DOM) [191], thus the tree is known as DOM tree. Next, the data from the DOM tree
are put into abstract boxes called frames by combining the information from stylesheets.
Finally, these frames and the associated Web objects are rendered and displayed on a user's
screen.
In order to identify the cookie usefulness for a webpage, CookiePicker compares two
versions of the same webpage: the first version is retrieved with cookies enabled and the
second version is retrieved with cookies disabled. The first version is readily available to
CookiePicker in the user's regular Web browsing window. CookiePicker only needs to retrieve the second version of the container page. Similar to Doppelganger [97], CookiePicker
utilizes the ever increasing client side spare bandwidth and computing power to run the
second version. However, unlike Doppelganger, CookiePicker neither maintains a fork window nor mirrors the whole user session. CookiePicker only retrieves the second version of
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the container page by sending a single hidden HTTP request. As shown in Figure 2.6, line
(3) is the extra hidden HTTP request sent by CookiePicker for the second version of the
container page, and line (4) represents the corresponding HTTP response. In the remainder
of the chapter, we simply refer the requests and responses, represented by the solid lines
(1) and (2) of Figure 2.6, as regular requests and responses; and refer the extra request and
response, represented by the dashed lines (3) and (4) of Figure 2.6, as the hidden request
and response.

2.4.2

Forward Cookie Usefulness Marking

As shown in Figure 2.8, the FORCUM process consists of five steps: regular request recording, hidden request sending, DOM tree extraction, cookie usefulness identification, and
cookie record marking.
When visiting a webpage, a user issues regular requests and then receives regular responses. At the first step, CookiePicker identifies the regular request for the container page
and saves a copy of its URI and header information. CookiePicker needs to filter out the
temporary redirection or replacement pages and locate the real initial container document
page.
At the second step, CookiePicker takes advantage of user's think time [69] to retrieve the
second copy of the container page, without causing any delay to the user's regular browsing.
Specifically, right after all the regular responses are received and the webpage is rendered
on the screen for display, CookiePicker issues the single hidden request for the second copy
of the container page. In the hidden request, CookiePicker uses the same URI as the saved
in the first step. It only modifies the "Cookie" field of the request header by removing a
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Figure 2.8: The five-step FORCUM process.
group of cookies, whose usefulness will be tested. The hidden request can be transmitted
in an asynchronous mode so that it will not block any regular browsing functions. Then,
upon the arrival of the hidden response, an event handler will be triggered to process it.
Note that the hidden request is only used to retrieve the container page, and the received
hidden response will not trigger any further requests for downloading the associated objects.
Retrieving the container page only induces very low overhead to CookiePicker.
At the third step, CookiePicker extracts the two DOM trees from the two versions of the
container page: one for the regular response and the other for the hidden response. We call
these two DOM trees the regular DOM tree and the hidden DOM tree, respectively. The
regular DOM tree has already been parsed by Web browser layout engine and is ready for
use by CookiePicker. The hidden DOM tree, however, needs to be built by CookiePicker;
and CookiePicker should build the hidden DOM tree using the same HTML parser of the
Web browser. This is because in practice HTML pages are often malformed. Using the
same HTML parser guarantees that the malformed HTML pages are treated as same as
before, while the DOM tree is being constructed.
At the fourth step, CookiePicker identifies cookie usefulness by comparing the differences
between the two versions of the container page, whose information is well represented in
the two DOM trees. To make a right cookie usefulness decision, CookiePicker uses two
complementary algorithms by considering both the internal structural difference and the
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external visual content difference between the two versions. Only when obvious structural
difference and visual content difference are detected, will CookiePicker decide that the
corresponding cookies that are disabled in the hidden request are useful. The two algorithms
will be detailed in Section 2.5.
At the fifth step, CookiePicker will mark the cookies that are classified as useful in the
Web browser's cookie jar. An extra field "useful" is introduced to each cookie record. At
the beginning of the FORCUM process, a false value is assigned to the "useful" field of
each cookie. In addition, any newly-emerged cookies set by a website are also assigned false
values to their "useful" fields. During the FORCUM process, the value of the field "useful"
can only be changed in one direction, that is, from "false" to "true" if some cookies are
classified as useful. Later on, when the values of the "useful" field for the existing cookies are
relatively stable for the website, those cookies that still have "false" values in their "useful"
fields will be treated as useless and will no longer be transmitted to the corresponding
website. Then, the FORCUM process can be turned off for a while; and it will be turned
on automatically if CookiePicker finds new cookies appeared in the HTTP responses or
manually by a user if the user wants to continue the training process.

2.4.3

Backward Error Recovery

In general, CookiePicker could make two kinds of errors in the FORCUM process. The first
kind of error is that useless cookies are misclassified as useful, thereby being continuously
sent out to a website. The second kind of error is that useful cookies are never identified
by CookiePicker during the training process, thereby being blocked from a website.
The first kind of error is solely due to the inaccuracy of CookiePicker in usefulness
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identification. Such an error will not cause any immediate trouble to a user, but leave
useless cookies increasing privacy risks. CookiePicker is required to make such errors as few
as possible so that a user's privacy risk is lowered. CookiePicker meets this requirement via
accurate decision algorithms.
The second kind of error is caused by either a wrong usefulness decision or the fact that
some cookies are only useful to certain webpages but have not yet been visited during the
FORCUM process. This kind of error will cause inconvenience to a user and must be fixed
by marking the corresponding cookies as useful. CookiePicker attempts to achieve a very
low rate on this kind of error, so that it does not cause any inconvenience to users. This
requirement is achieved by two means. On one hand, for those visited pages, the decision
algorithms of CookiePicker attempt to make sure that each useful persistent cookie can be
identified and marked as useful. On the other hand, since CookiePicker is designed with
very low running cost, a longer running period (or periodically running) of the FORCUM
process is affordable, thus training accuracy can be further improved.
CookiePicker provides a simple recovery button for backward error recovery in the tuning
process. In case a user notices some malfunctions or some strange behaviors on a webpage,
the cookies disabled by CookiePicker in this particular webpage view can be re-marked as
useful via a simple button click. Note that once the cookie set of a website becomes stable
after the training and tuning processes, those disabled useless cookies will be removed from
the Web browser's cookie jar. CookiePicker also provides an user interface, allowing a
user to view those useless cookies and confirm the deletion action. We will introduce this
interface in Section 2.6.
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2.5

HTML Page Difference Detection

In this section, we present two complementary mechanisms for online detecting the HTML
web page differences between the enabled and disabled cookie usages. In the first mechanism,
we propose a restricted version of Simple Tree Matching algorithm [117] to detect the HTML
document structure difference. In the second mechanism, we propose a context-aware visual
content extraction algorithm to detect the HTML page visual content difference. We call
these two mechanisms as Restricted Simple Tree Matching (RSTM) and Context-aware
Visual Content Extraction (CVCE), respectively. Intuitively, RSTM focuses on detecting
the internal HTML document structure difference, while CVCE focuses on detecting the
external visual content difference perceived by a user. In the following, we present these
two mechanisms and explain how they are complementarily used.

2.5.1

Restricted Simple Tree Matching

As mentioned in Section 2.4, in a user's Web browser, the content of an HTML webpage is
naturally parsed into a DOM tree before it is rendered on the screen for display. Therefore,
we resort to the classical measure of tree edit distance introduced by Tai [101] to quantify
the difference between two HTML webpages. Since the DOM tree parsed from the HTML
webpage is rooted (document node is the only root), labeled (each node has node name),
and ordered (the left-to-right order of sibling nodes is significant), we only consider rooted
labeled ordered tree. In the following, we will first review the tree edit distance problem;

then we will explain why we choose top-down distance and detail the RSTM algorithm;
and finally we will use Jaccard similarity coefficient to define the similarity metric of a
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normalized DOM tree.

2.5.1.1

Tree Edit Distance

For two rooted labeled ordered trees T and T', let ITI and IT'I denote the numbers of
nodes in trees T and T', and let T[i] and T'[j] denote the ith and jth preorder traversal
nodes in trees T and T', respectively. Tree edit distance is defined as the minimum cost
sequence of edit operations to transform T into T' [101]. The three edit operations used
in transformation include: inserting a node into a tree, deleting a node from a tree, and
changing one node of a tree into another node. Disregarding the order of the edit operations
being applied, the transformation from T to T' can be described by a mapping. The formal
definition of a mapping [101] is as follows:

Definition 3. A mapping from T toT' is defined by a triple (M, T, T'), where M is any
set of pairs of integers (i, j) satisfying:

(1}1 ~ i ~ ITI, 1 ~ j ~ IT'I
(2}For any two pairs (i1,]I) and (i2,j2) in M,
(a}i1 =i2 iffjl =j2;

(b}il < i2 iff )I < )2,·
(c)T[ii] is an ancestor (descendant) ofT[i2] iff

T'[jl] is an ancestor (descendant) ofT'[j2]·
Intuitively, condition (2a) ensures that each node of both trees appears at most once in
the mapping, and condition (2b) and (2c) ensure that the structural order is preserved in
the mapping.
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The algorithm presented by Tai [101] solves the tree edit distance problem in time
O(ITI·IT'I·IDI 2 ·ID'I 2 ), where IDI and ID'I are the maximum depths, respectively, ofT and
T'. Zhang et al. [130] further improved the result via a simple fast dynamic programming
algorithm in time O(ITI · IT'I · min{IDI, ILl} · min{ID'I, IL'I} ), where ILl and

1£'1

are the

numbers of leaves in T and T', respectively.
Since the solution of the generic tree edit distance problem has high time complexity,
researchers have investigated the constrained versions of the problem. By imposing conditions on the three edit operations mentioned above, a few different tree distance measures
have been proposed and studied in the literature: alignment distance [50], isolated subtree
distance [102], top-down distance [96, 117], and bottom-up distance [105]. The description
and comparison of these algorithms can be found in [10] and [105].

2.5.1.2

Top-Down Distance

Because RSTM belongs to the top-down distance approach, we review the definition of
top-down distance and explain why we choose this measure for our study.

Definition 4. A mapping (M, T, T') from T to T', is top-down if it satisfies the condition that for all i,j such that T[i] and T'[j] are not the roots, respectively, ofT and

T':
if pair (i,j) EM then (parent(i),parent(j)) EM.
The top-down distance problem was introduced by Selkow [96]. In [117], Yang presented
a O(ITI·IT'I) time-complexity top-down dynamic programming algorithm, which is named
as the Simple Tree Matching (STM) algorithm. As we mentioned earlier, our goal is to
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Algorithm: RSTM(A, B, level)
1. if the roots of tree A and tree B contain different symbols then
2.
return(O);
3.
endif
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

currentLevel =level+ 1;
if A and B are leaf or non-visible nodes or
currentLevel > maxLevel then
return(O);
endif
m = the number of first-level subtrees of A;
n = the number of first-level subtrees of B;
Initialization, M[i, OJ = 0 for i = 0, ... , m;
M[O, j] = 0 for j = 0, ... , n;
for i = 1 to m do
for j = 1 to n do
M[i, j] = max(M[i, j - 1], M[i- 1, j],
M[i- 1,j- 1] + W[i,j]);
where W[i,j] = RSTM(A;,Bj,currentLevel)
where A; and Bj are the ith and jth
first-level subtrees of A and B, respectively
endfor
endfor
return (M[m, n] + 1);

Figure 2.9: The restricted simple tree matching algorithm.

effectively detect noticeable HTML webpage difference between the enabled and disabled
cookie usages. The measure of top-down distance captures the key structure difference
between DOM trees in an accurate and efficient manner, and fits well to our requirement.
In fact, top-down distance has been successfully used in a few Web-related projects. For
example, Zhai and Liu [128] used it for extracting structured data from webpages; and Reis
et al. [89] applied it for automatic Web news extraction. In contrast, bottom-up distance
[105], although can be more efficient in time complexity (O(ITI

+ IT'I)), falls short of being

an accurate metric [104] and may produce a far from optimal result [4] for HTML DOM
tree comparison, in which most of the differences come from the leaf nodes.
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Figure 2.10: (a) Tree A, (b) Tree B.

2.5.1.3

Restricted Simple Tree Matching

Based on the original STM algorithm [117], Figure 2.9 illustrates RSTM, our restricted
version of STM algorithm. Other than lines 4 to 8 and one new parameter level, our RSTM
algorithm is similar to the original STM algorithm. Like the original STM algorithm, we
first compare the roots of two trees A and B. If their roots contain different symbols,
then A and B do not match at all. If their roots contain same symbols, we use dynamic
programming to recursively compute the number of pairs in a maximum matching between
trees A and B. Figure 2.10 gives two trees, in which each node is represented as a circle
with a single letter inside. According to the preorder traversal, the fourteen nodes in tree

A are named from Nl to N14, and the eight nodes in tree Bare named from N15 to N22.
The final result returned by STM algorithm or RSTM algorithm is the number of matching
pairs for a maximum matching. For example, STM algorithm will return "7" for the two
trees in Figure 2.10, and the seven matching pairs are {Nl,Nl5}, {N2,N16}, {N6,Nl8},
{N7,N19}, {N5,N17}, {Nll,N20}, and {N12,N22}.
There are two reasons why a new parameter level is introduced in RSTM. First, some
webpages are very dynamic. From the same website, even if a webpage is retrieved twice
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in a short time, there may exist some differences between the retrieved contents.

For

example, if we refresh Yahoo home page twice in a short time, we can often see some different
advertisements. For CookiePicker, such dynamics on a web page are just noises and should be
differentiated from the webpage changes caused by the enabled and disabled cookie usages.
The advertisement replacements on a webpage use different data items (e.g., images or texts)
but they often stay at the same location of a webpage's DOM tree. Data items are mainly
represented by lower level nodes of a DOM tree [129]. In contrast, the webpage changes
caused by enabling/disabling cookies may introduce structural dissimilarities at the upper
level of a DOM tree, especially when the theme of the page is changed. By using the new
parameter level, the RSTM algorithm restricts the top-down comparison between the two
trees to a certain maximum level. Therefore, equipped with the parameter level, RSTM not
only captures the key structure dissimilarity between DOM trees, but also reduces leaf-level
noises.
The second reason of introducing the new parameter level is that the

O(ITI · IT' I) time

complexity of STM is still too expensive to use online. Even with C++ implementation,
STM will spend more than one second in difference detection for some large webpages.
However, as shown in Section 2.6, the cost of the RSTM algorithm is low enough for online
detection.
The newly-added conditions at line 5 of the RSTM algorithm restrict that the mapping
counts only if the compared nodes are not leaves and have visual effects. More specifically,
all the comment nodes are excluded in that they have no visual effect on the displayed
webpage. Script nodes are also ignored because normally they do not contain any visual
elements either. Text content nodes, although very important, are also excluded due to
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the fact that they are leaf nodes (i.e., having no more structural information). Instead,
text content will be analyzed in our Context-aware Visual Content Extraction (CVCE)
mechanism.

2.5.1.4

Normalized Top-Down Distance Metric

Since the return result of RSTM (or STM) is the number of matching pairs for a maximum
matching, based on the Jaccard similarity coefficient that is given in Formula 2.1, we define
the normalized DOM tree similarity metric in Formula 2.2.
J(A B)= IAnBI

'

.

NTreeS~m(A,B,l)

=

IAUBI

RSTM(A,B,l)
N(A,l) +N(B,l)- RSTM(A,B,l)

(2.1)
(2.2)

The Jaccard similarity coefficient J(A, B) is defined as the ratio between the size of
the intersection and the size of the union of two sets. In the definition of our normalized
DOM tree similarity metric NTreeSim(A,B,l), RSTM(A,B,l) is the returned number of
matched pairs by calling RSTM on trees A and B for upper llevels. N(A, l) and N(B, l)
are the numbers of non-leaf visible nodes at upper l levels of trees A and B, respectively.
Actually N(A, l)

= RSTM(A,A, l) and N(B,l) = RSTM(B, B, l), but N(A, l) and N(B,l)

can be computed in O(n) time by simply preorder traversing the upper llevels of trees A
and B, respectively.

2.5.2

Context-aware Visual Content Extraction

The visual contents on a webpage can be generally classified into two groups: text contents
and image contents. Text contents are often displayed as headings, paragraphs, lists, table
items, links, and so on. Image contents are often embedded in a webpage in the form
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of icons, buttons, backgrounds, flashes, video clips, and so on. Our second mechanism
mainly uses text contents, instead of image contents, to detect the visual content difference
perceived by users. Two reasons motivate us to use text contents rather than image contents.
First, text contents provide the most important information on webpages. This is because
HTML mainly describes the structure of text-based information in a document, while image
contents often serve as supplements to text contents [154]. In practice, users can block the
loading of various images and browse webpages in text mode only. Second, the similarity
between images cannot be trivially compared, while text contents can be extracted and
compared easily as shown below.
On a webpage, each text content exists in a special context. Corresponding to the DOM
tree, the text content is a leaf node and its context is the path from the root to this leaf
node. For two webpages, by extracting and comparing their context-aware text contents
that are essential to users, we can effectively detect the noticeable HTML webpage difference
between the enabled and disabled cookie usages. Figure 2.11 depicts the recursive algorithm
to extract the text content.
The contentExtract algorithm traverses the whole DOM tree in preorder in time O(n).
During the preorder traversal, each non-noise text node is associated with its context,
resulting in a context-content string; and then the context-content string is added into set

S. The final return result is set S, which includes all the context-content strings. Note
that in lines 2 to 4, only those non-noise text nodes are qualified for the addition to set

S. Similar to [38], scripts, styles, obvious advertisement text, date and time strings, and
option text in dropdown lists (such as country list or language list) are regarded as noises.
Text nodes that contain no alphanumeric characters are also treated as noises. All these
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Algorithm: contentExtract(T, context)
1.
Initialization, S = 0; node= T.root; ,
2. if node is a non-noise text node then
3.
cText = context+SEPARATOR+node.value;
4.
S = S U {cText};
5. else if node is an element node then
6.
currentContext = context+":"+node.name;
7.
n = the number of first-level subtrees ofT;
8.
for j = 1 to n do
9.
S = SUcontentExtract(Ti, currentContext);
where Ti is the ith first-level subtrees ofT;
10.
endfor
11. endif
12. return (S);

Figure 2.11: The text content extraction algorithm.
checkings guarantee that we can extract a relatively concise context-content string set from
the DOM tree.
Assume S1 and S2 are two context-content string sets extracted from two DOM trees

A and B, respectively. To compare the difference between S1 and S2, again based on the
Jaccard similarity coefficient, we define the normalized context-content string set similarity
metric in Formula 2.3:

(2.3)
Formula 2.3 is a variation [52] of the original Jaccard similarity coefficient. The extra
added s on the numerator stands for the number of those context-content strings that
are not exactly same, while having the same context prefix, in S 1 and S 2 . Intuitively,
between two sets S1 and S2, Formula 2.3 disregards the difference caused by text content
replacement occurred in the same context, it only considers the difference caused by text
content appeared in each set's unique context. This minor modification is especially helpful
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in reducing the noises caused by advertisement text content and other dynamically changing
text contents.

2.5.3

Making Decision

As discussed above, to accurately identify useful cookies, CookiePicker has to differentiate
the HTML webpage differences caused by webpage dynamics from those caused by disabling
cookies. Assume that tree A is parsed from a webpage retrieved with cookies enabled and
tree B is parsed from the same webpage with cookies disabled. CookiePicker examines
these two trees by using both algorithms presented above. If the return results of NTreeSim
and NTextSim are less than two tunable thresholds, Threshl and Thresh2, respectively,
CookiePicker will make a decision that the difference is due to cookie usage. Figure 2.12
depicts the final decision algorithm.
Note that these two thresholds are internal to CookiePicker, so a regular user does not
need to know them. In our experiments (Section 2.6), we set the values of both thresholds to
0.85, and we found that no backward error recover is needed. We would like to recommend
this as a reference value for CookiePicker. However, it is possible to further tune these two
thresholds. For example, one approach is to self-adaptively adjust the thresholds based on
the number or frequency of a user's backward error recover actions. The bottom line is
that backward error recovery should not cause too much inconvenience to a user. Another
approach is to use site-specific thresholds so that the granularity of accuracy can be refined
to the site-level. In addition, it is also possible to allow users to share fine-tuned site-specific
thresholds.
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Algorithm: decision( A, B, l)
1. if NTreeSim(A, B, l) :S Thresh! and
2.
NTextSim(S 1 , S 2 ) :S Thresh2 then
3.
return the difference is caused by cookies;
4. else
5.
return the difference is caused by noises;
6. endif

Figure 2.12: CookiePicker decision algorithm.

2.6

System Evaluation

In this section, we first briefly describe the implementation of CookiePicker, and then we
validate its efficacy through two sets of live experiments.

2.6.1

Implementation

We implemented CookiePicker as a Firefox extension.

Being one of the most popular

Web browsers, Firefox is very extensible and allows programmers to add new features or
modify existing features. Our CookiePicker extension is implemented in about 200 lines of
XML user interface definition code, 1,600 lines of JavaScript code, and 600 lines of C++
code. JavaScript code is used for HTTP request/response monitoring and processing, as
well as cookies record management. The HTML page difference detection algorithms are
implemented in C++, because JavaScript version runs very slow. C++ code is compiled
into a shared library in the form of an XPCOM (Cross-Platform Component Object Mode)
component, which is accessible to JavaScript code. CookiePicker is a pure Firefox extension
and it does not make any change to the Firefox's source code.
We omit other details and only describe two key interfaces in CookiePicker's implementation: the interface to user and the XPCOM component interface. Figure 2.13 shows
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Information about the selected Cookie

Nama: lucky9
Content: 315:173

Domain: .ebay.com
Path: I
s~nd

For: Any type of connectton

Expi,.,s: 08ft.l712()1212:00:26 PM

Figure 2.13: CookiePicker user interface.

CookiePicker's main user interface. We port the code of a popular Firefox extension Cookie
Culler [140] and merge them into CookiePicker. Cookie Culler allows a user to access cookie
records and manually delete those cookies the user does not need to keep. By integrating
this interface, CookiePicker provides a user with the capability to easily view the decisions
made by CookiePicker and double check those useless cookies before they are finally removed from a browser's cookie jar. As shown in Figure 2.13, if a user wants, the user can
know that these three first-party persistent cookies from ebay.com have been automatically
marked as useless and will be deleted by CookiePicker. The user can also make corrections
to this result if necessary.
In the XPCOM component interface, two functions are defined as follows and they correspond to CookiePicker's two HTML page difference detection algorithms, respectively:

interface /CookiePickerComponent : ns/Supports {
float nTreeSim{in nsJDOMNode rNode, in nsiDOMNode hNode, in long l};
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float nTextSim{in nsiDOMNode rNode, in nsiDOMNode hNode};

}

These two functions are implemented in C++, and can be accessed by JavaScript code
via the ICookiePickerComponent component. For nTreeSim, its three input parameters
match exactly with those in Figure 2.12. For nTextSim, its definition here is a little bit
different from that in Figure 2.12, because the DOM trees are directly passed in and the
corresponding context-content string sets are extracted internally.

2.6.2

Evaluation

We installed CookiePicker on a Firefox version 1.5.0.8 Web browser 3 and designed two sets
of

experi~ents

to validate the effectiveness of CookiePicker in identifying the useful first-

party persistent cookies. The first set of experiments is to measure the overall effectiveness
of CookiePicker and its running time in a generic environment; while the second set of
experiments focuses on the websites whose persistent cookies are useful only, and examines
the identification accuracy of CookiePicker upon useful persistent cookies.

For all the

experiments, the regular browsing window enables the use of persistent cookies, while the
hidden request disables the use of persistent cookies by filtering them out from HTTP
request header. The two thresholds used in CookiePicker decision algorithm are both set
to 0.85, i.e., Threshl= Thresh2=0.85. The parameter l for NTreeSim algorithm is set to 5,
i.e., the top five level of DOM tree starting from the body HTML node will be compared by
3

Porting CookiePicker to recent Firefox versions is quite feasible because CookiePicker uses the standard
XPCOM mechanism of Firefox.

45
NTreeSim algorithm.

2.6.2.1

First Set of Experiments

From each of the 15 categories listed in Table 2.1, we randomly choose two websites that
use persistent cookies. Thus, in total there are 30 websites in the first set of experiments.
As listed in the first column of Table 2.2, these 30 websites are represented as 81 to 830 for
privacy concerns.
Inside each website, we first visit over 25 webpages to stabilize its persistent cookies
and the "useful" values of the persistence cookies, i.e, no more persistent cookies of the
website are marked as "useful" by CookiePicker afterwards. Then, we count the number
of persistent cookies set by the website and the number of persistent cookies marked as
useful by CookiePicker. These two numbers are shown in the second and third columns
of Table 2.2, respectively. Among the total 30 websites, the persistent cookies from five
websites (81,86,810,816,827) are marked as "useful" by CookiePicker, and the persistent
cookies from the rest of 30 websites are identified as "useless". In other words, CookiePicker
indicates that we can disable the persistent cookies in about 83.3% (25 out of 30) of testing
websites.

To further validate the testing result above, we check the uselessness of the

persistent cookies for those 25 websites through careful manual verification. We find that
blocking the persistent cookies of those 25 websites does not cause any problem to a user.
Therefore, none of the classified "useless" persistent cookies is useful, and no backward error
recovery is needed.
For those five websites that have some persistent cookies marked as "useful", we verify
the real usefulness of these cookies by blocking the use of them and then comparing the
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2
4
5
4
4
2
1
3
1
1
2
4
1
9
2
25
4
1
3
6
3
1
4
1
3
1
1
1
2
2
103

Marked
Useful
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
7

Real
Useful
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

Detection
Time(ms)
8.3
9.3
14.8
36.1
5.4
5.7
17.0
7.4
13.2
5.7
2.7
21.7
8.0
11.9
8.5
5.8
7.5
23.1
18.0
8.9
14.4
13.1
28.8
23.6
30.7
5.03
8.7
10.7
7.7
57.6
-

-

-

-

-

14.6

2,683.3

Website

Persistent

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
Total
Average

CookiePicker
Duration (ms)
1,821.6
5,020.2
1,427.5
9,066.2
698.9
1,437.5
3,373.2
2,624.4
1,415.4
1,141.2
941.3
2,309.9
614.9
1,122.4
948.0
455.9
11,426.3
4,056.9
3,860.5
3,841.6
936.1
993.3
2,430.1
2,381.1
550.1
611.6
597.5
10,104.1
1,387.1
2,905.6

Table 2.2: Online testing results for thirty websites (Sl to 830).

disabled version with a regular browsing window over 25 webpages in each website. The
result is shown in the fourth column of Table 2.2. We observe that three cookies from two
websites (86,816) are indeed useful. However, for the other three websites (81,810,827),
their persistent cookies are useless but are wrongly marked as "useful" by CookiePicker.
This is mainly due to the conservative threshold setting.

Currently the values of both

thresholds are set to 0.85, i.e., Threshl= Thresh2=0.85. The rationale behind the conservative threshold setting is that we prefer to have all useful persistent cookies be correctly
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identified, even at the cost of some useless cookies being misclassified as "useful". Thus,
the number of backward error recovery is minimized.
In Table 2.2, the fifth and sixth columns show the average running time of the detection
algorithms and the entire duration of CookiePicker, respectively. It is clear that the running
time of the page difference detection is very short with an average of 14.6 ms over the 30
websites. This detection time is roughly the extra CPU computation time introduced by
running the CookiePicker browser extension. The extra memory resource consumption
is also negligible because CookiePicker does not have a large memory requirement. The
average identification duration is 2,683.3 ms, which is reasonable short considering the fact
that the average think time of a user is about 10 seconds [69]. Note that websites 84, 817,
and 828 have abnormally high identification duration at about 10 seconds, which is mainly
caused by the slow responses from these websites.

2.6.2.2

Second Set of Experiments

Since only two websites in the first set of experiments have useful persistent cookies, we
attempt to further examine if CookiePicker can correctly identify each useful persistent
cookie in the second set of experiments.

Because the list of websites whose persistent

cookies are really useful to users does not exist, we have to locate such websites manually.
Again, we randomly choose 200 websites that use persistent cookies from the 15 categories
listed in Table 2.1. Note that the 30 websites chosen in the first set of experiments are not
included in these 200 websites. We manually scrutinize these 200 websites, and finally find
six websites whose persistent cookies are really useful to users, i.e., without cookies, users
would encounter some problems. Because the manual scrutiny is tedious, we cannot afford
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more effort to locate more such websites. The six websites are listed in the first column of
Table 2.3 and represented as Pl to P6 for privacy concerns.
In Table 2.3, the second column shows the number of the cookies marked as "useful" by
CookiePicker and the third column shows the number of the real useful cookies via manual
verification. We observe that for the six websites, all of their useful persistent cookies are
marked as "useful" by CookiePicker. This result indicates that CookiePicker seldom misses
the identification of a real useful cookie. On the other hand, for websites P5 and P6, some
useless persistent cookies are also marked as "useful" because they are sent out in the same
regular request with the real useful cookies. The fourth and fifth columns show the similarity
score computed by NTreeSim(A, B, 5) and NTextSim(S1, S2), respectively, on the web pages
that persistent cookies are useful. These similarity scores are far below 0.85, which is the
current value used for the two thresholds Threshl and Thresh2 in Figure 2.12. The usage
of these useful persistent cookies on each website is given at the sixth column. Websites
Pl, P4, and P6 use persistent cookies for user's preference setting. Websites P3 and P5 use
persistent cookies to properly create and sign up a new user. Website P2 uses persistent
cookie in a very unique way. Each user's persistent cookie corresponds to a specific subdirectory on the Web server, and the sub-directory stores the user's recent query results.
Thus, if the user visits the website again with the persistent cookie, recent query results
can be reused to improve query performance.
In summary, the above two sets of experiments show that by conservatively setting

Threshl and Thresh2 to 0.85, CookiePicker can safely disable and remove persistent cookies from about 83.3% of websites (25 out of the 30 websites that we intensively tested).
Meanwhile, all the useful persistent cookies are correctly identified by CookiePicker and no
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Website
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Average

Marked
Useful

9
5

Real
Useful
1
1
1
1
1
2

-

-

1
1
1
1

NTreeSim
(A,B,5)
0.311
0.459
0.667
0.250
0.226
0.593
0.418

NTextSim

Usage

(S1,S2)

0.609
0.765
0.623
0.158
0.253
0.719
0.521

Preference
Performance
Sign Up
Preference
Sign Up
Preference
-

Table 2.3: Online testing results for 6 websites (Pl to P6) that have useful persistent cookies.

backward error recovery is needed for all the 8 websites (S6,S16,Pl,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6) that
have useful persistent cookies. Misclassification happens only in 10% websites (3 out of 30),
on which useless persistent cookies are wrongly identified as useful.

2. 7

Discussions

In CookiePicker, useful cookies are defined as those that can cause perceivable changes
on a webpage, and as we discussed before this definition is probably the most reasonable
measure right now at the browser side. We assume that this measure is known to anyone who
wants to evade CookiePicker. In this section, we first identify possible evasion techniques,
and then we analyze potential evasion sources and explain why those evasion techniques
are not a serious concern to CookiePicker. Finally, we discuss some concerns about using
CookiePicker.

2.7.1

Possible Evasion Techniques

Since CookiePicker makes its decision based on HTML page difference detection, we identify
the following four possible techniques that could be used to evade CookiePicker:
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• random advertising: A website can serve more random advertisements to different
retrieves of a webpage in order to reduce the accuracy of CookiePicker's difference
detection algorithms.

• dynamic content rewriting: A website can identify CookiePicker's hidden request and
use JavaScript to dynamically rewrite webpage contents at the browser side.

• dramatic structure changing: A website can identify CookiePicker's hidden request
and intentionally generate structurally different response pages (even if with very
similar visual content).

• cookie root path abusing: A website can set attribute values of all its cookies as root
"/" to let all its cookies, no matter useful or useless, return back for every Web request.
For the random advertising evasion technique, indeed as shown in previous experimental results, CookiePicker's two difference detection algorithms can filter out the effects of
advertisements and webpage dynamics very well. Moreover, other advertisement removing
techniques such as those used in [178] can be integrated into CookiePicker to further improve the detection accuracy. The other three kinds of evasion techniques can be employed
by a website operator. However, as we discuss below, they will not pose a serious threat to
the usage of CookiePicker.

2.7.2

Evasion Sources

The evasion of CookiePicker will most likely come from two sources: website operators
who want to track user activities, and attackers who want to steal cookies. As stated in
Section 2.2, we assume that the hosting website is legitimate, since it is pointless to provide

51
cookie security and privacy services for a malicious website. For legitimate websites, if
some operators strongly insist to use first-party persistent cookies for tracking long-term
user behaviors, they can evade CookiePicker by detecting the hidden HTTP request and
m~nipulating

the hidden HTTP response using the evasion techniques mentioned above.

However, we argue that many website operators will not pay the effort and time to do
so, either because of the lack of interest to track long-term user behaviors in the first
place, or because of inaccuracy in cookie-based user behavior tracking, which has long been
recognized [194]. These website operators are either not aware of the possible privacy and
security risks of stolen first-party persistent cookies, or simply not willing to pay the cost
to renovate their systems. Our CookiePicker is a pure client-side solution that especially
aims to protect the users of these websites.
For third-party attackers, unless they compromise a legitimate website, it is very difficult
for them to use any of the above evasion techniques to manipulate the web pages sending back
to a user's browser and circumvent CookiePicker. Therefore, CookiePicker can effectively
identify and remove useless cookies stored by most legitimate websites on a user's hard
disk, and prevent them from being stolen by malicious attacks such as cross-site scripting
attacks.

2.7.3

Concerns about Using CookiePicker

One concern is that CookiePicker might reject third-party cookies in the case of HTTP
redirection (see Section 5.1.2 of [103]). However, this concern is invalid because CookiePicker
does not block (or even touch) third-party cookies by itself- decision regarding third-party
cookies is made completely by the Web browser based on users' preference setting. Similarly,
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whether a cookie is a first-party cookie of a website is also decided by the Web browser,
and CookiePicker makes its decision based on the browser's decision. Therefore, it does not
matter whether a website is using CDN (Content Delivery Network) or not.
Another concern is that CookiePicker may not work well on webpages that use Ajax
(Asynchronous JavaScript and XML). This concern is reasonable because Ajax requests
may use cookies and may also change webpage contents. Currently, CookiePicker only
sends hidden requests to retrieve container pages, as described in Section 2.4. But it is
possible to extend CookiePicker to evaluate the impact of cookies on Ajax requests, for
example, by asking CookiePicker to send out two Ajax requests (one with cookies and the
other without cookies) at the same time and then compare the response messages.

2.8

Related Work

RFC 2109 [61] specifies the way of using cookies to create a stateful session with HTTP
requests and responses. It is also the first document that raises the general public's awareness of cookie privacy problems. RFC 2965 [62] follows RFC 2109 by introducing two new
headers, Cookie2 request header and Set-Cookie2 response header. However, these two
new headers are not supported by the popular Web browsers such as Internet Explorer and
Firefox. RFC 2964 [76] focuses on the privacy and security of using HTTP cookies, and
identifies the specific usages of cookies that are either not recommended by the IETF or believed to be harmful. Fu's study [34] suggests that setting authenticators in cookies should
be very careful and especially persistent cookies should not be used to store authenticators.
Cookies not only can be retrieved and stored by the headers of HTTP requests and
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responses, but also can be read and written by client-side JavaScript. The same origin
policy [180] introduced in Netscape Navigator 2.0 prevents cookies and JavaScript in differ-

ent domains from interfering with each other. The successful fulfillment of the same origin
policy on cookies and JavaScript further invokes the enforcement of this policy on browser

cache and visited links [44]. Recently, in order to mitigate cross-site scripting attacks, Internet Explore also allows a cookie to be marked as "HttpOnly" in the Set-Cookie response
header, indicating that a cookie is "non-scriptable" and should not be revealed to client
applications [170].
Modern Web browsers have provided users with refined cookie privacy options. A user
can define detailed cookie policies for websites either before or during visiting these sites.
Commercial cookie management software such as Cookie Crusher [139] and CookiePal [141]
mainly rely on pop-ups to notify incoming cookies. However, the studies in [39] show that
such cookie privacy options and cookie management policies fail to be used in practice, due
mainly to the following two reasons: (1) these options are very confusing and cumbersome,
and (2) most users have no good understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of using
cookies. A few Firefox extensions such as Cookie Culler [140] and Permit Cookies [175],
although convenient to use, are just very simple add-ons for user to easily access privacy
preference settings or view cookies. Acumen system [37] can inform a user how many other
users accept certain cookies. However, the system does not protect the privacy of the user
itself. Moreover, many users' decisions could be wrong, resulting in negative reference.
Another interesting system is Privoxy [178] Web proxy.

It provides advanced filtering

capabilities for protecting privacy, modifying webpage data, managing cookies, controlling
access, and removing advertisement, banners, pop-ups and other obnoxious Internet junk.
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However, Privoxy is more useful for those sophisticated users who have the ability to finetune their installation.
Recently, the most noticeable research work in cookie management is Doppelganger
[97]. Doppelganger is a system for creating and enforcing fine-grained privacy-preserving
cookie policies. Doppelganger leverages client-side parallelism and uses a twin window to
mirror a user's Web session. If any difference is detected, Doppelganger will ask the user to
compare the main window and the fork window, and then, make a cookie policy decision.
Although taking a big step towards automatic cookie management, Doppelganger still has
a few obvious drawbacks. First, Doppelganger still heavily relies on the user's comparison
between the main window and the fork window to make a decision. Second, the cost of
its parallel mirroring mechanism is very high. This is because not only every user action
needs to be mirrored, but every HTTP request also needs to be duplicately sent back to
the Web server. Third, due to the high cost, a user may not be patient enough to have
a long training period, thus the policy decision accuracy cannot be guaranteed. Last but
not the least, Doppelganger only achieves website level cookie policy making. In contrast,
our CookiePicker works fully automatically without user involvement or even notice. It has
very low overhead, and hence, can be trained for a long period on a user's Web browser to
achieve high accuracy. CookiePicker achieves cookie-group level policy making, implying
that usefulness is identified for a group of cookies used in a webpage view.
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2.9

Summary

In this work, we conducted a large-scale cookie measurement, which highlights the demand
for effective cookie management. Then, we presented a system, called CookiePicker, to
automatically managing cookie usage setting on behalf of a user. Only one additional HTTP
request for the container page of a website, the hidden request, is generated for CookiePicker
to identify the usefulness of a cookie set. CookiePicker uses two complementary algorithms
to accurately detect the HTML page differences caused by enabling and disabling cookies.
CookiePicker classifies those cookies that cause perceivable changes on a webpage as useful,
and disable the rest as useless. We implemented CookiePicker as an extension to Firefox
and evaluated its efficacy through live experiments over various websites. By automatically
managing the usage of cookies, CookiePicker helps a user to strike an appropriate balance
between maximizing usability and minimizing security risks.

Chapter 3

Transparent Phishing Protection

In this chapter, we present our work on transparent phishing protection. Modern Web
browsers are often equipped with automatic phishing detection and warning mechanisms.
However, usability studies have demonstrated that many users still ignore the strong phishing warnings given by browsers and become victims. We present an approach that uses
bogus usernamefpassword credentials to protect against phishing attacks. Seamlessly integrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in modern Web browsers,
our approach properly leverages existing anti-phishing efforts and is capable of providing a
transparent protection to those most vulnerable users who still ignore the strong phishing
warnings.

3.1

Motivation

A phishing attack is typically carried out using an email or an instant message, in an attempt to lure recipients to a fake website to disclose personal credentials. Phishing attacks
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have seriously afflicted Internet users and financial institutions with identity thefts and
brand reputation damage. According to recent Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)
reports [137] and Gartner surveys [149], the number of phishing sites, the number of phishing victims, and the amount of financial losses stemming from phishing attacks have all
increased over the past few years.
To defend against phishing attacks, a number of countermeasures have been proposed
and developed. Server-side defenses employ SSL certificates, user-selected site images, and
other security indicators to help users verify the legitimacy of websites. Client-side defenses
equip Web browsers with automatic phishing detection features or add-ons to warn users
away from suspected phishing sites. However, recent usability studies have demonstrated
that neither server-side security indicators nor client-side toolbars and warnings are successful in preventing vulnerable users from being deceived [21, 20, 95, 111, 114, 23]. This is
mainly because (1) phishers can convincingly imitate the appearance of legitimate websites,
(2) users tend to ignore security indicators or warnings, and (3) users do not necessarily
interpret security cues appropriately. Educational defenses teach users to understand and
avoid phishing attacks [45, 64, 100]. However they cannot completely foil phishing attacks.
Takedown defenses exploit spams and suspicious URLs to discover and shut down newly
emerged phishing sites. However, the efficacy of this approach is limited, due to the ease of
setting up and the short online time of phishing sites, as well as the application of takedown
evasion methods by phishers [46, 77, 137, 165].
These different approaches are all preventive by nature. They endeavor to prevent users
from being tricked into revealing their credentials to phishing sites. Nevertheless, these
prevention-based approaches alone are insufficient to shield vulnerable users from "biting
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the bait" and defeat phishers, as human users are the weakest link in the security chain.
The ever-increasing prevalence and severity of phishing attacks clearly indicate that antiphishing is still a daunting challenge.
In response to this challenge, we have made two observations with respect to the acquisition of credentials by phishers and the automatic detection of phishing attacks on Web
browsers. First, currently the majority of those who have "bitten the bait" and fallen victim
to phishing attacks are real victims; thus, it is trivial for a phisher to verify the acquired
credentials and trade them for money. However, if we can supply phishing sites with a large
number of bogus credentials, we might be able to hide victims' real credentials among bogus
credentials and make it harder for phishers to succeed.
Second, although remarkable advances in client-side automatic phishing detection have
empowered Web browsers to identify the majority of phishing sites [17, 35, 68, 132, 148, 169],
the possible false positives (legitimate websites misclassified as phishing sites) make it hard
for Web browsers to directly block users' connections to suspected phishing sites. Thus,
issuing warnings and expecting users to leave a suspected phishing site have become the
most common actions employed by modern Web browsers. However, instead of just wishing
vulnerable users could make correct decisions, if we can effectively transform the power of
automatic phishing detection into the power of automatic fraud protection, we will take a
big step forward towards winning the battle against phishing.
In this work, we propose a new approach to protect against phishing attacks with "bogus
bites" on the basis of the two observations we have mentioned. The key feature of this
approach is to transparently feed a relatively large number of bogus credentials into a
suspected phishing site, rather than attempt to prevent vulnerable users from "biting the
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bait." These "bogus bites" conceal victims' real credentials among bogus credentials, and
enable legitimate websites to identify stolen credentials in a timely manner.

Based on

the concept of "bogus bites," we design and develop BogusBiter, a unique client-side antiphishing tool that is complementary to existing prevention-based mechanisms. Seamlessly
integrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in modern Web browsers,
BogusBiter is transparent to users.
At a user's Web browser, BogusBiter is turned on once a login webpage is classified as
a phishing page by a Web browser's built-in phishing detection component or a third-party
detection toolbar. For a victim who is beguiled into divulging a real credential, BogusBiter
hides the real credential among a set of automatically generated bogus credentials, and then
submits these credentials one by one to the phishing site. For a security-conscious user who
does not reveal a real credential, BogusBiter also generates a set of bogus credentials, and
then submits them to the phishing site in the same way as it does for a victim.
At the phishing site, a phisher will thus receive a much larger number of credentials than
before, but the overwhelming majority are bogus credentials fed by BogusBiter. Elaborating
bogus credential generation and submission mechanisms, BogusBiter makes it difficult for a
phisher to distinguish who are real victims and which are real credentials. The only effective
way for a phisher to sift out bogus credentials is to visit the legitimate website and verify
whatever credentials have been collected from the phishing site.
At the legitimate website, if the phisher assumes the burden of verifying all the collected
credentials to single out the real credentials, the unique design of bogus credential generation
will enable the legitimate site to identify victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner and
make it harder for a phisher to succeed. In other words, the bogus credential filtering
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process becomes the trigger for detecting stolen credentials at the legitimate website, and
hence, ironically, the phisher's attempt to bypass BogusBiter helps us to achieve automatic
fraud protection.
While leveraging the power of widely used client-side automatic phishing detection techniques, BogusBiter is not bound to any specific phishing detection scheme. Thus, BogusBiter can utilize the latest advances in phishing detection techniques such as blacklists and
heuristics to protect against a wide range of phishing attacks. Moreover, BogusBiter is incrementally deployable over the Internet, and the fraud protection enabled at a legitimate
website is independent of the deployment scale of BogusBiter. We implemented BogusBiter
as a Firefox Web browser extension and evaluated its efficacy through real experiments
over both phishing and legitimate websites. Our experimental results indicate that it is
promising to use BogusBiter to transparently protect against phishing attacks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the background of phishing attacks and the automatic phishing detection and warning mechanisms
in modern Web browsers. Section 3.3 details the design of BogusBiter. Section 3.4 describes
the implementation of BogusBiter. Section 3.5 evaluates the capability and performance
of BogusBiter. Section 3.6 discusses the deployment of BogusBiter and potential evasions
against BogusBiter. Section 3.7 reviews the related client-side anti-phishing research work,
and finally, Section 3.8 summarizes this work.
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Figure 3.1: (a) A phishing site designed to attack eBay users, (b) Firefox 2 phishing warning

mechanism.

3.2

Background

Figure 3.1(a) illustrates a phishing site designed to attack eBay users. In a typical scenario,
a user receives a spoofed email that appears to be sent from the real eBay, luring the user to
log into the phishing site. Once the user believes this site is the genuine eBay website and
logs in, the user's username/password credential is stolen. Passwords have increasingly been
targeted by harvesting attacks, as they protect online accounts with valuable assets [31].
While some phishing attacks may steal other types of credentials such as credit card numbers and social security numbers, the most common type of phishing attack attempts to
steal account numbers and passwords used for online banking [48]. Therefore, protecting a
user's username/password credential is the primary focus of many client-side anti-phishing
research work such as SpoofGuard [17], Dynamic Security Skins [19], AntiPhish [56], PwdHash [91], Web Wallet [115], and Passpet [119]. Our work also focuses on protecting a
user's username/password credential. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the terms
credential and username/password pair interchangeably.
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The potential threat of phishing or Web spoofing attacks was first uncovered by Felten
et al. [25]. Today, phishing is not merely about website forgery and email spoofing, it has
become a carefully planned and well structured multiphase effort to steal money. The life
cycle of a phishing attack consists of six phases: planning, setup, attack, collection, fraud &
abuse, and post attack, as defined by the Financial Services Technology Consortium [188].

Various techniques can be applied in these six phases to combat phishing. However, since
phishing sites can be easily set up and money laundering is still a difficult problem to curtail,
current research and industry efforts focus mainly on the attack phase, with the objective
of preventing users from submitting their credentials to phishing sites.
In contrast, the BogusBiter's protection against phishing attacks ranges from the attack
phase to the collection phase, and then to the fraud & abuse phase, covering the flow
of credentials. Specifically, BogusBiter retaliates against phishers with a large number of
bogus credentials in the attack phase, makes it hard for them to identify real credentials in
the collection phase, and detects their fraudulent activities in the fraud & abuse phase.
While distinct from preventive anti-phishing mechanisms, BogusBiter complements them
in a natural way. In particular, BogusBiter leverages the power of client-side automatic
phishing detection mechanisms and takes advantage of the state-of-practice phishing warning mechanisms in popular Web browsers to transparently protect vulnerable users.
Among automatic phishing detection mechanisms, two commonly used techniques are
blacklists and heuristics. Blacklist-based techniques generate close-to-zero false positives
and can detect most phishing attacks [68, 131, 146, 151]. For example, Ludl et al. [68]
demonstrated that blacklists provided by Google (used by Firefox 2) can recognize almost 90% of live phishing sites. However, because some phishing sites may not be added
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into blacklists and the so-called zero-day attacks may occur, researchers have proposed
various heuristic-based techniques to identify phishing sites in real time [17, 35, 68, 132].
These heuristic-based techniques have obtained very encouraging results. For example,
CANTINA, a content-based detection tool proposed by Zhang et al. [132] can identify 90%
of phishing pages with only 1% false positives. A URL-based classifier proposed by Garera et a]. [35] is another tool that can catch 95.8% of phishing pages with only 1.2% false
positives.
Currently, Firefox 2 primarily employs blacklist-based techniques while Internet Explorer (IE) 7 uses both kinds of techniques [148, 169]. Because BogusBiter's design is independent of any specific detection scheme, it can leverage advances in both blacklist-based
techniques and heuristic-based techniques to combat the majority of phishing attacks.
Regarding phishing site warning mechanisms, the state of practice is to make it mandatory for a user to respond to the active warning of a suspected phishing site. Figure 3.1 (b)
illustrates the warning given by Firefox 2 [148] after correctly identifying the example website in Figure 3.1(a) as a phishing site. A user is unable to enter the username and password
without first interacting with the warning page. If the user clicks the "Get me out of here!"
link, the user is redirected to a default page and is protected. Otherwise, if the user clicks
the "Ignore this warning" link, the warning page disappears and the user is exposed to the
risk of credential theft. A similar warning mechanism is also used in IE 7 [169].
Both Firefox 2 and IE 7 might choose such a active warning mechanism because: (1)
issuing warnings simply through browser-based security indicators such as the address bar,
the status bar, and various toolbars is ineffective [21, 20, 95, 111, 114, 23], and (2) directly
blocking users' connections to suspected phishing sites is unacceptable, due to inevitable
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false positives. Although using an active warning page represents current best practice, a
recent usability study conducted by Egelman et al. [23] demonstrates that overall about
21% of participants still ignore the IE 7 and Firefox 2 active phishing warnings and fall
for phishing attacks. Therefore, a crucial usability gap still exists in today's anti-phishing
ecosystem, and many users who are most vulnerable to phishing still cannot be protected.
Phishing attacks are very insidious, and so far there is no single silver bullet for completely defeating phishers. Comprehensive, multifaceted, and integrated approaches are
clearly needed in the anti-phishing ecosystem. BogusBiter fits into such an anti-phishing
ecosystem especially by aiming to fill the aforementioned usability gap. Properly leveraging
existing anti-phishing efforts, BogusBiter is capable of providing a transparent protection
to those most vulnerable users.

3.3

Design

In this section, we first give an overview on the design of BogusBiter, including the basic
working mechanism, the main design assumption, and the two key design objectives. We
then detail the offensive line and defensive line of BogusBiter.

3.3.1

Design Overview

BogusBiter is designed as either a new component or an extension to popular Web browsers
such as Firefox 2 or IE 7. It integrates seamlessly with phishing detection and warning
mechanisms of current Web browsers to protect vulnerable users against phishing attacks.
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3.3.1.1

How It Works

In the scenario without BogusBiter, when a phishing site is visited by users, only real
credentials are submitted by vulnerable users, and a phisher can easily verify the collected
credentials and trade them for money.
The basic idea of BogusBiter is very simple, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.

When a

login page is classified as a phishing page by a browser's built-in detection component or
a third-party detection toolbar, BogusBiter is triggered. At this point, BogusBiter will
perform differently based on a user's response to the browser's phishing warning page. For
a vulnerable user who clicks the "Ignore this warning" link and submits a real credential,
BogusBiter will intercept the victim's real credential, hide it among a set of S -1 generated
bogus credentials, and then submit the S credentials one by one to the phishing site within
a few milliseconds. For a security-conscious user who clicks the "Get me out of here!" link
on the warning page, BogusBiter will generate a set of S bogus credentials, and then feed
them one by one into the phishing site in the same way as it does for a vulnerable user.
These actions are completely transparent to both vulnerable and security-conscious users.
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The BogusBiter extensions installed on users' browsers make up the offensive line. Later
on, when a phisher verifies the collected credentials at the legitimate site, the defensive line
enabled by BogusBiter will help a legitimate site to detect victims' stolen credentials in a
timely manner.

3.3.1.2

Design Assumption

We assume that a phisher does not have a complete list of valid usernames for a targeted
legitimate website, and cannot directly query a targeted legitimate website for the validity of
a specific username. Although this assumption may not be strictly correct for email service
websites and community websites, it is generally true for financial institutions, which are
the main targets of phishing attacks. Financial institutions seldom have valid username
lists publicly accessible. Meanwhile, for a failed login attempt, websites often try to hide
whether the failure is due to an incorrect username or due to an incorrect password by
returning the same error message [12, 32], making it very hard to test the validity of a given
username.
Indeed, preventing the leakage of username validity information is necessary for protecting user privacy, guarding users from invasive advertising and phishing, and defending
against password guessing attacks. To enhance such a protection, the recent work by Bortz
et al. [12] recommends that the response time of HTTP requests should be carefully controlled by some websites to remove timing vulnerabilities. Florencio et al. [32] further
suggest that increasing username strength could be more beneficial than merely increasing
password strength.

67
3.3.1.3

Design Objectives

To be effective, BogusBiter has two key design objectives:

• offensive objective: BogusBiter should inject as many bogus credentials as possible
into a phishing site, thus well hiding victims' real credentials among bogus credentials.

• defensive objective: Given that a phisher is aware of BogusBiter and is willing to
assume the heavy burden of sifting out bogus credentials, BogusBiter should enable
a legitimate website to exploit the filtering process initiated by the phisher to detect
victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner.

3.3.2

Offensive Line

To achieve its offensive objective, BogusBiter should strive to meet the following three
requirements.

• Massiveness: The number of bogus credentials fed into a phishing site should be
large so that the overwhelming majority of credentials received by a phisher are bogus.

• Indiscernibility: Without the credential verification at the legitimate website, it
is extremely difficult for a phisher to deterministically discern, either at credential
submission time or afterwards, who are real victims and what are real credentials.

• Usability: The usage of BogusBiter at the client-side should not incur undue overhead or unwanted side effects, nor should it produce any security or privacy concerns.
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3.3.2.1

Massiveness

We use the real-to-all ratio-the ratio between the number of real credentials being collected and the total number of credentials being collected-to estimate how many bogus
credentials should be fed into a phishing site to hide victims' real credentials. In the scenario without BogusBiter, most or perhaps all credentials collected by a phisher are real
credentials submitted by victims, thus the real-to-all ratio is close to one. A phisher can
easily verify these credentials at the legitimate website, assess their values, and ultimately
use them to obtain money.
In the scenario of anti-phishing with BogusBiter (Figure 3.2), a phishing site receives
both real credentials and bogus credentials. Real credentials came from cheated users,
that is, users who visited the phishing site and meanwhile became victims by revealing
their credentials. The ratio between the number of cheated users and the total number of
phishing site visitors can be denoted as cheat-to-visit. This ratio is often used by researchers
to estimate the severity of phishing attacks. So if the total number of phishing site visitors
is N, the number of real credentials being collected at the phishing site becomes "N * cheatto-visit." Meanwhile, because BogusBiter submits a set of S credentials in each phishing
site visit (either by a cheated user or by a security-conscious user as explained in the design
overview), the total number of credentials being collected at the phishing site becomes
"N

* S."

Therefore, in the scenario of anti-phishing with BogusBiter, the real-to-all ratio

can be computed as:

cheat-~o-visit.

If all the phishing site visitors become victims, the cheat-to-visit ratio equals one. There-

fore, the upper bound of the real-to-all ratio is ~· However, the experiments conducted
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by Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz [47] demonstrate that even with the effects of modern antiphishing efforts, about 11 ± 3% of users will read a spoofed email, visit the phishing site, and
enter their login credentials. In addition, Garera et al. [35] found that on average, 8.24%
of users become victims after visiting phishing sites. If we use 10% as a realistic value for
the cheat-to-visit ratio, the real-to-all ratio becomes

rds.

Thus, if the value of the set size

Sis 10, a real credential will be hidden among 100 bogus credentials. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that the cheat-to-visit ratio will decrease in the long run due to technical
advances and educational efforts -

a trend that favors BogusBiter. Assuming that the

indiscernibility requirement is achievable, we now analyze the probability and the expected
number of tries for a phisher to single out a certain number of real credentials by verifying
them at the legitimate website. Since each set of S credentials is submitted by BogusBiter
from a user's browser within a few milliseconds, a phisher can easily group the collected
credentials by sets and verify them. If a set of S credentials is submitted from a victim's
browser, the real credential will be singled out by a phisher with an expected number of
8

t 1 tries.

However, because a phisher cannot discern which set includes a real credential,

the phisher has to verify all sets of the collected credentials in order to single out as many
real credentials as possible. Considering the very low cheat-to-visit ratio, without loss of
generality, we simplify our analysis by mixing together all sets of the collected credentials.
Let n be the total number of credentials collected at a phishing site, and m be the number
of real credentials revealed by victims. Let Xk be the discrete random variable representing
the number of tries performed by the phisher to single out k real credentials. Let Pr(Xk
be the probability of "Xk

= i"

and E[Xk] be the expectation of Xk. Intuitively, Pr(Xk

=

i)

= i)

is the probability that a phisher identifies the kth real credential until the ith try. That is,
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in the first i - 1 tries, the phisher has identified k - 1 real credentials; meanwhile, at the
ith

try, the phisher also identifies a real credential. Therefore, based on the definition of

= i)

the binomial coefficient, we can calculate Pr(Xk

and E[Xk] using Formula (3.1) and

Formula (3.2), respectively, where L.~;;;+k Pr(Xk = i) = 1 and k = 1, 2, ... , m.
(~__=-km)(k-1)

(i'_ 1 )

m- (k- 1)
.

n-(i-1)

(3.1)

n-m+k

L

i · Pr(Xk = i)

(3.2)

i=k

L

n-m+k
i=k

(n-m)(m )
(
)
k-1 . m - k - 1
(f-1)
n- (i- 1)

i . i-k

With the cheat-to-visit ratio set to 10%, Figure 3.3(a) illustrates the expected number
of tries for a phisher to single out one real credential, that is, E[X1 ]. The four curves
correspond to four different values of set size S. For example, if there are 6 real credentials
hidden among all the collected credentials, to single out one real credential, the expected
number of tries are 69 and 103, for set sizes 8 and 12, respectively. Figure 3.3(b) illustrates
the expected number of tries for a phisher to single out all real credentials. Similarly,
if there are 6 real credentials hidden among all the collected credentials, to single out
these 6 real credentials, the expected number of tries are 412 and 618, for set sizes 8 and
12, respectively. From this example, we can see that a set size of 8 can already allow
BogusBiter to feed a relatively large number of bogus credentials into a phishing site and
well hide victims' real credentials among bogus credentials. However, we should note that
such a hiding effect will never be enough to frustrate greedy phishers who intend to verify
all the collected credentials. Therefore, a defensive line enabled by BogusBiter is highly

71

160

-M-S=12
__._S .. 16

~;;;:-~
,liY~::r~r;:::o-··-4.::r··
60

40

{) .-{)-··f.)-···~·:r·-0·. ··E.r-+)

~

2500

2000

1500

···-t""\.· ·0-·· 1)---.f)· ·-·0 . ·;,

1000

7'

tf

20~a

a

8

a a a a a a a e a

8

8

a c
500

~~~--~--~~.--~!O~~~~Z--~14--~16~~1~8--=~~

~~~~~~~-.~~10--~1Z~~1~4--~16--~18--~~~

Number of Real Credentials

Number of Real Credentials

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3: Expected number of tries for a phisher to single out: (a) one real credential, (b) all
real credentials.
desirable (see Section 3.3.3).

3.3.2.2

Indiscernibility

The indiscernibility requirement is essential for BogusBiter to work. It has two implications:

(1) the submission actions initiated from victims' browsers should be very difficult to be
differentiated from the submission actions initiated from security-conscious users' browsers,
and (2) victims' real credentials should be very difficult to be differentiated from bogus
credentials generated by BogusBiter.
For a victim who ignores a browser's phishing warning, BogusBiter first intercepts the
credential submission HTTP request before it is sent out. Next, BogusBiter creates S- 1
bogus credentials based on the victim's real credential and spawns S -1 new HTTP requests
based on the original HTTP request. Each of the S- 1 spawned requests is exactly the
same as the original request, except for carrying a bogus credential instead of a real one.
Then, BogusBiter inserts the original HTTP request into the S - 1 spawned requests and
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sends out all the S requests within a few milliseconds. Finally, BogusBiter interprets and
properly processes the returned HTTP responses so that a phishing site cannot identify the
differences between the S submissions.
For a security-conscious user who accepts a browser's phishing warning, BogusBiter
first imitates a victim's behavior by entering a generated bogus credential into the phishing
page and submitting it.

Next, similar to the above case for a real victim, BogusBiter

intercepts this original HTTP request, spawns S- 1 new HTTP requests, and generates the
corresponding S - 1 bogus credentials as well. Finally, BogusBiter sends out the S requests
and processes the returned responses in the same way as it does for a victim, thereby making
it hard for a phisher to distinguish these submissions from those initiated from a victim's
browser.
As for bogus credential generation, BogusBiter uses the original credential as the template to generate the S - 1 bogus credentials. For a victim, the original credential is the
victim's real credential and thus is ready to use. For a security-conscious user, the automatically generated original credential should be similar to a human's real credential. In
current design, BogusBiter randomly generates a usernamefpassword pair as the original
credential. For the remaining S - 1 bogus credentials, a specific rule should be followed
to generate them so that neither a human nor a computer can easily discern which is the
original credential and which are the rest. We will present the rule used by BogusBiter in
Section 3.3.3.
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3.3.2.3

Usability

In terms of usability, the major advantage of BogusBiter is its transparency to users. Complementary to existing preventive anti-phishing approaches, BogusBiter automatically defends against phishing attacks without user involvement. Meanwhile, because BogusBiter
only needs to submit some extra bogus credentials to a suspected phishing site and does
not contact any third-party service, it will not cause any security or privacy problems.
The main usability concerns come from the scenario of a false positive (i.e., a legitimate
website is wrongly classified as a phishing site). While the occurrence of false positives is rare
for Firefox 2, IE 7, and recent detection techniques as mentioned in Section 3.2, BogusBiter
should eliminate or reduce the possible side effects on users' access to misclassified legitimate
websites.
The first side effect is that submitting a set of S login requests and waiting for responses
will induce an additional delay to users. To reduce the delay, BogusBiter sends out all the

S requests within a few milliseconds, so that the round-trip times of the S submissions
can be overlapped as much as possible. Accordingly, as long as the set size S is not too
large, the additional delay incurred by BogusBiter should be minimal and unobtrusive. Our
experimental results in Section 3.5 confirm that the additional delays are negligible.
The second side effect is that a user's real account may be locked because multiple
login requests are submitted from the user's browser to a legitimate website within a few
milliseconds. To defend against password guessing attacks, some websites may lock a user's
account for a period of time after several failed login attempts. However, because all the
usernames are different for the S login requests sent out by BogusBiter, the "account with
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many failed login attempts" alarm will not be triggered as discussed in [85]. Our experiments
on 20 legitimate websites confirm that account locking is not a concern for BogusBiter.
The third side effect is that a user may be asked to complete a CAPTCHA [3] test, for
the same reason that multiple login requests are submitted from the user's browser within a
few milliseconds. Some websites may resort to this mechanism to counter password guessing
attacks or denial of service attacks. However, in our legitimate site experiments where false
positives are assumed to occur, no CAPTCHA test is triggered if the set size S is not greater
than 10, and only two of the 20 websites ask a user to do a CAPTCHA test if the set size
Sis greater than 10.

3.3.3

Defensive Line

Simply requiring BogusBiter to meet the offensive objective is not sufficient. This is because
even if victims' real credentials are well hidden among bogus credentials, a phisher can still
visit the legitimate website to verify each of the collected credentials. Therefore, a defensive
line is highly desirable, and BogusBiter should enable a legitimate website to exploit the
verification process initiated (either manually or automatically) by the phisher to detect
victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner.

3.3.3.1

Working Mechanism

BogusBiter makes such a defensive line feasible by imposing a correlation requirement
upon the generation of the S - 1 bogus credentials. It is important that this correlation
requirement should not violate the indiscernibility requirement of credential generation,
that is, victims' real credentials should be very difficult to be differentiated from bogus
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credentials generated by BogusBiter.

• Correlation Requirement: Based on the original credential, a specific rule is applied to generate the S - 1 bogus credentials. This rule must guarantee that the S
credentials in a set are correlated: given any one of them, we can reversely derive a
small superset that includes all the S credentials.

BogusBiter attempts to meet both the correlation and indiscernibility requirements on
credential generation by using a simple substitution rule. While there are other ways to
meet the two requirements, we choose the substitution rule because of its simplicity and
efficiency for verification. Due to our empirical experience that if the set size S is not greater
than 10, no usability problem occurs and the delay overhead is small (see Section 3.5), the
substitution rule is tailored to have S < 10. Note that the exact value of S should be
publicly known.
To generate the S- 1 bogus usernamejpassword pairs, BogusBiter first computes an
integer position i between 1 and S inclusively.

This integer position determines which

set of S - 1 bogus credentials will be generated, and it also determines in which order
the S credentials will be sent out to a phishing site. BogusBiter uses Formula (3.3) to
deterministically compute this integer position i:

PRF(k, original_username) mod S

+

1,

(3.3)
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where k is a master secret that is randomly chosen when a BogusBiter is installed or
configured, and P RF is a secure pseudorandom function. The master secret k is securely
stored and used by BogusBiter. A user does not need to memorize the master secret, but
is allowed to export and use the same master secret on different computers. From a given
original credential, the same S - 1 bogus credentials will always be generated, and the S
credentials will always be submitted to a phishing site in the same order. Therefore, even
if a phisher can attack a victim multiple times, the phisher cannot find the real credential
by observing which credential over time appears most often. Meanwhile, since this formula
only securely hashes the original username, it is applicable both to websites that ask a user
to submit username/password pair at the same time, and to websites that require a user to
first submit a username and then submit a password.
Next, BogusBiter identifies the first digit in the original username as the username
replacement character, denoted as username-rc; if the original username does not contain a
digit, the first letter (upper or lower case) is identified as the username-rc. Using the same
method, BogusBiter identifies the password replacement character in the original password,
denoted as password-rc.
Then, for each integer position j from 1 to S inclusively where j =1- i, BogusBiter
generates a bogus usernamejpassword pair by substituting both the username-rc character
and the password-rc character in the original usernamejpassword pair using one of the
following two replacement methods:
(1) For the case of j - i

> 0: if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a letter, this

lower (or upper) case letter is replaced by another lower (or upper) case letter j - i
places further down the alphabet, wrapped around if needed, i.e., 'z' is followed by
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'a' (or 'Z' is followed by 'A'); if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a digit, this
digit is replaced by another digit j - i places further down the single digit sequence
"0123456789", wrapped around if needed, i.e., '9' is followed by '0'.
(2) For the case of j - i < 0: if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a letter, this lower
(or upper) case letter is replaced by another lower (or upper) case letter i - j places
further up the alphabet, wrapped around if needed, i.e., 'a' is followed by 'z' (or 'A' is
followed by 'Z'); if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a digit, this digit is replaced by
another digit i - j places further up the single digit sequence "0123456789", wrapped
around if needed, i.e., '0' is followed by '9'.

Position
j=l
j=2
--->i=3
j=4

Username/Password
(kcsmith/Fuzzycat95)
(lcsmith/Fuzzycat05)
( mcsmith/Fuzzycat 15)
(ncsmith/Fuzzycat25)

Table 3.1: Substitution from the original username/password pair (mcsmith/ Fuzzycatl5).

Username/Password
(icsmith/Fuzzycat75)
(jcsmith/Fuzzycat85)
(kcsmith/Fuzzycat95)
-+ (lcsmith/Fuzzycat05)
(mcsmith/Fuzzycat15)
(ncsmith/Fuzzycat25)
(ocsmith/Fuzzycat35)
Table 3.2:
Derivation from the username/password pair (lcsmith/ Fuzzycat05).

Table 3.1 illustrates an example of applying the substitution rule to the original username/password pair (mcsmith / Fuzzycat15). In this example, the username replacement
character username-rc is the first 'm' in the original username and the password replacement character password-rc is the digit '1' in the original password. These two alphanumeric
characters will be replaced to generate S - 1 bogus credentials. If S = 4 and the computed
integer position i is 3, three bogus usernamejpassword pairs are generated for j=1, 2, and
4, respectively.
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Algorithm: SCI (f-uname/f-pword)
1.
Initialize the result set as empty : R = 0;
2. Construct the set: D = {(d-uname/d-pword): (d-uname/d-pword)
is a credential derived from (f-uname,f-pword) };
3. for each (d-uname/d-pword) E D do
4.
if d-uname matches a valid account's username then
5.
if d-pword matches the valid account's password then
6.
R=R U {(d-uname/d-pword)};
7.
endif
8.
endif
9. endfor
10. return the result set R;

Figure 3.4: The Stolen Credential Identification (SCI) procedure.

Finally, BogusBiter submits the S usernamejpassword pairs to a suspected phishing site
following their corresponding position order. Using Formula (3.3) to compute the integer
position i and using their position order to send out the S credentials, BogusBiter makes
it hard for a phisher to narrow down a victim's real credential even if the victim visits a
phishing site twice from the same browser and enters the real credential twice. However,
we should note that the overall extent to which the indiscernibility requirement can be met
still depends on the characteristics (such as meaningfulness) of a victim's real credential.
We further discuss this limitation in Section 3.6.3.1.
Clearly the substitution rule above meets the correlation requirement. Given any one of
the S credentials, we can derive at most 2 * (S- 1) variations based on the substitution rule,
in which further down replacement produces S- 1 variations and further up replacement
produces otherS -1 variations. These 2 * (S- 1) + 1 credentials cover all the S credentials
submitted to the phishing site. Table 3.2 lists an example derivation from the credential
(lcsmith / Fuzzycat05).
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Now let us see how a legitimate website can take advantage of the correlation requirement
to identify the credentials stolen by phishing attacks. If a phisher is lucky enough (with ~
probability) to choose a victim's real credential as the first try to verify at the legitimate
website, this login attempt will succeed and the legitimate website cannot detect the fact
that a real credential has been stolen and verified. However, for any failed login attempt, the
legitimate website will trigger the procedure of Stolen Credential Identification (SCI), which
is illustrated in Figure 3.4. SCI takes the failed username/password pair (f-uname/f-pword)
as its input. It constructs the set D of derived credentials (line 2), and seeks a match
between a derived username/password pair and a valid account's username/password pair.
Then, it adds any derived username/password pair (d-uname/d-pword) that matches a valid
account's usernamejpassword pair to the result set R (line 6). SCI finally returns the result
set R as its output.
If the failure of a login attempt is caused by a phisher who is verifying any one of the S -1

bogus credentials generated from a victim's real credential, SCI must report a match since
the derived credential set D contains the victim's real credential. The matched credential
is the victim's real credential that has been revealed to the phisher, and is included in
the result set R. However, if the failure of a login attempt is due to any other reasons,
even if there is a chance that a derived username d-uname may match a valid account's
username (line 4), the probability that the correspondingly derived password d-pword also
happens to match this valid account's password (line 5) is extremely low. This probability
is equivalent to that of randomly guessing a valid account's password. As an example, if a
user accidentally mistypes the user's real password (or an attacker launches online password
guessing attacks against a user), the login attempts will fail but SCI will not report a match.
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Therefore, if the result set R is not empty, the usernamejpassword pair (the probability
of having two or more credential pairs in the result set R is also extremely low) contained in
R must have been stolen by a phisher. The legitimate website can take immediate actions to
protect the victim even before the phisher figures out the victim's real credential. Because
SCI is turned on only when a login attempt fails and it only needs a small number of
verifications (at most 2 * (S- 1) for our substitution rule), the overhead is very small for a
legitimate website. If necessary, this identification task can even be delegated to a separate
machine.

3.3.3.2

Deployment of Defensive Line

While BogusBiter is installed in a user's Web browser, the defensive line enabled by BogusBiter needs to be deployed only on those legitimate websites that are really targeted by
phishers. These phishing-targeted legitimate websites listed in the APWG database [138]
usually have properly registered domain names and well-designed webpages, and may even
be whitelisted by some phishing detection tools. None of their login pages will be misclassified as phishing pages by popular detection tools. The rare false positives [131, 151]
produced by phishing detection tools are mainly caused by some legitimate websites that
are almost never targeted by phishing attacks. We do not need to deploy the defensive line
of BogusBiter on them.
Moreover, the deployment work on phishing-targeted legitimate websites is very simple
because SCI only uses these websites' existing authentication information and does not
change their authentication mechanisms (no matter plaintext-equivalent mechanisms or
verifier-based mechanisms). This server-side deployment cost is minimal compared to that
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of Dynamic Security Skins [19], which changes authentication mechanisms via the SRP
protocol [116], and to that of BeamAuth

[1], which demands an extra secret token for every

user account.

3.3.3.3

Scale-Independency Properties

The defensive line enabled by BogusBiter also has two valuable scale-independency properties. First, the efficacy of the defensive line does not depend on the cheat-to-visit ratio,
that is, it does not require a large percentage of users to properly respond to anti-phishing
warnings. Second, the efficacy does not depend upon a massive installation of BogusBiter in
users' browsers, i.e., even a single vulnerable user who installs BogusBiter can benefit from
a deployed defensive line. These two scale-independency properties are not only valuable
by themselves, they also ensure that BogusBiter cannot be easily evaded by sophisticated
phishers, as will be discussed in Section 3.6.

3.4

Implementation

We have implemented BogusBiter as a Firefox extension in approximately 1700 lines of
JavaScript code and 100 lines of C++ code. Seamlessly integrated with the built-in phishing
protection feature of Firefox 2 [148], BogusBiter consists of four main modules: Information
Extraction, Bogus Credential Generation, Request Submission, and Response Process, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2. We detail these four modules in the remainder of this section.
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Figure 3.5: Implementation of BogusBiter as a Firefox 2 browser extension.

3.4.1

Information Extraction Module

The information extraction module extracts the username and password pair and its corresponding form element on a login page by analyzing Document Object Model (DOM)
objects. First, all the HTMLinputElement objects within the HTMLDocument object of
the login page are collected. Next, the password object is located by examining its special
attribute type= "password." A similar password locating method is also used in [31, 91].
Then, the HTMLFormElement object-the submission form object-associated with the
password object is directly extracted. Finally, based on object attributes, the username object is extracted from other HTMLinputElement objects included in the submission form.
Following this element extraction order combined with the attribute analysis of the visible
input fields, BogusBiter can accurately identify username, password, and form elements on
a login page. Note that phishers may use non-standard login pages to disrupt this automatic
information extraction procedure and evade BogusBiter. We discuss some solutions to this
kind of evasions in Section 3.6.3.2.
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The information extraction module also implements a protection mechanism to defend
against input-stealing attacks that use malicious J avaScript code on a phishing page to directly steal a victim's credential. Existing works such as AntiPhish [56] and PwdHash [91]
provide good technical guidance for implementing such a protection mechanism. In BogusBiter, we adopt the keystroke intercepting technique introduced in PwdHash and create
protectors on username and password elements. More precisely, username and password
keystrokes are intercepted by the registered event handlers and are masked to hide from the
JavaScript on a webpage. Therefore, a victim's real keystrokes are recorded by BogusBiter,
but are blocked from being received by various JavaScript attacks [91]. We choose the

keystroke intercepting technique because it is more generic than the temporary deactivating
technique used in AntiPhish's Firefox version.

3.4.2

Bogus Credential Generation Module

The bogus credential generation module generates S - 1 bogus credentials based on an
original credential. For a victim, the original credential is the victim's real credential. For a
security-conscious user, in our current implementation, this module will randomly generate
a username/password pair composed of upper/lower case letters and digits as the original
credential. Advanced original credential generation methods can also be incorporated into
BogusBiter, so that a randomly generated original credential will look more like a real user's
credential. The substitution rule of BogusBiter is implemented in JavaScript. The open
source HMAC_SHA256_MAC() JavaScript function implemented by Poettering [164] is used
as the secure pseudo-random function of Formula (3.3).
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3.4.3

Request Submission Module

The request submission module is responsible for spawning and submitting multiple HTTP
requests. Its implementation is guided by both the indiscernibility and usability requirements of BogusBiter. Since each HTTP request can only carry one credential, S requests
are needed to submit a set of S credentials to a phishing site. For a victim, once a credential
is entered and the submit button is clicked, the first HTTP request is initiated from the
current browser window. For a security-conscious user, the action of accepting a phishing
warning triggers BogusBiter to imitate a human's credential entering and button clicking
actions and initiate the first HTTP request from the current browser window.
Next, just before the first HTTP request is actually sent out, BogusBiter is notified by
Firefox's global notification service and intercepts this HTTP request. Then, BogusBiter
quickly spawns the other S -1 HTTP requests with each of them carrying a bogus credential.
The main challenge here lies in how to efficiently spawn S - 1 new HTTP requests and
schedule the submission of all the S requests. A few solutions are available, for example,
using multiple submission windows, or reusing the submission form on one browser window
to submit multiple times. However, they suffer from various usability drawbacks such as
multiple webpage refreshing and long interaction time.
BogusBiter, instead, creates and uses internal HTTP channels to submit requests behind
the screen. In order to make our extension code more portable, we choose to use XMLHttpRequest objects [192] to create internal HTTP channels. XMLHttpRequest objects are
supported by both Firefox 2 and IE 7, and they allow JavaScript to perform HTTP client
functionalities such as submitting form data or loading data from a server. The first HTTP
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request is also associated with an HTTP channel, which is created by the browser. For this
first HTTP request, all its contents, such as message header and message body [27] can be
extracted from its HTTP channel. Then, S - 1 XMLHttpRequest objects are created and
their corresponding HTTP channels are established based on the contents extracted from
the first HTTP channel. More specifically, BogusBiter executes the following four steps:
request initialization, message body replacement, header fields setting, and header fields
reordering:

(1) Request Initialization:

For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the same request

type and URL as those in the first HTTP request are used. Asynchronous mode is
used so that request sending is nonblocked and all the corresponding HTTP responses
can be handled in a specified callback function. Since HTML forms, especially login
forms, are in general submitted using POST instead of GET type of HTTP requests
for security reasons, we only consider POST type of HTTP requests in the following
discussion. Indeed, it is much simpler to process the GET type of HTTP requests.
(2) Message Body Replacement:

For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, BogusBiter

only needs to make a copy of the message body extracted from the first HTTP
request, and then replace the original usernamejpassword pair with a bogus username/password pair. Nothing else needs to be changed in the message body. Because
the bogus usernamejpassword pair and original usernamejpassword pair have the
same length, the message body length does not change. Meanwhile, since the first
HTTP request's message body is extracted before its HTTP channel is encrypted, this
message body replacement also works correctly for secured (HTTPS) connections.
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(3) Header Fields Setting:

For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the "Content-

Type" request header field is set as "applicationjx-www-form-urlencoded" to mimic
the case of submitting a form on a browser window. The "Content-Length" request
header field is set to the same value as that of the first HTTP request, because the
message body length is unchanged. The "Referer" request header field also needs to
be set as the same value as that of the first HTTP request. The "Cookie" request
header field is automatically set by the Firefox Web browser because the same URL
has been specified. For each of the S - 1 XMLHttpRequests, BogusBiter also makes
sure that "no-cache" is assigned to both the "Pragma" request header field and the
"Cache-Control" request header field so that the form submissions will not be cached,
and the "close" is assigned to the "Connection" request header field so that its TCP
connection will not be persisted and shared with any other requests. The first HTTP
request also needs to be adjusted to have the same values for these three request
header fields.
(4) Header Fields Reordering:

For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the request

header fields must be reordered so that the same order used in the first HTTP request
will be used. Since the order of request header fields is not significant as defined
in [27], this reordering will not cause any problem. In our implementation, only the
order of "Content-Type," "Content-Length," "Pragma," "Cache-Control," "Cookie,"
and "Referer" is adjusted by BogusBiter, due to some subtle implementation differences between an XMLHttpRequest and a regular HTTP request in Firefox. To
support this reordering, we actually introduced a new function switchHeaderField-
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sPosition(headerFieldA, headerFieldB) to Firefox's nsiXMLHttpRequest interface and
nsiHttpChannel interface and implemented this new function in C++. This new

function may also be useful for other applications that use XMLHttpRequest objects.
After the completion of these four steps, the S -1 XMLHttpRequests and the first HTTP
request all have the same request type, URL, header fields, and header field order. Their
message bodies are all the same except for carrying different username/password pairs.
As previously described in BogusBiter's substitution rule, the submission order of these S
requests is decided when the S- 1 bogus credentials are generated. If the ith position (I :::;
i :::; S) is computed for the original credential, BogusBiter first asynchronously transmits
i - 1 XMLHttpRequests, which carry the first i - 1 bogus credentials. Then, BogusBiter

transmits the first initiated HTTP

r~quest,

which carries the original credential. Finally,

BogusBiter asynchronously transmits the remaining S - i XMLHttpRequests, which carry
the last S - i bogus credentials. All the S requests are sent out within a few milliseconds,
and no timing clue can be observed on a Web server or proxy.

3.4.4

Response Process Module

After receiving and interpreting an HTTP request, a website replies with an HTTP response
message. For a legitimate website, if the credential carried in a request is valid, a successful
login page is returned in the response message; otherwise, a failed login page is returned
in the response message. Phishing sites may take different response actions after receiving credential submission requests (see Section 3.5.2). In every case, BogusBiter parses
and renders the response message of the first HTTP request on the browser window, and
processes the response messages of the S - 1 XMLHttpRequests behind the screen using
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a callback function. Therefore, BogusBiter can always correctly match responses to their
corresponding requests and work transparently to users.
Many times there are Web objects such as JavaScript and embedded images associated
with each response message. These objects will be downloaded by the Web browser if the
response message corresponds to an HTTP request initiated from the browser window, but
by default will not be downloaded if the response message corresponds to an XMLHttpRequest. Future phishers may want to discern which are XMLHttpRequests by exploiting this
fact and manipulating response contents. For example, a phisher may return a different
HTML page to each submission, which includes a slightly different named image. Later
on, by examining whether an image has ever been downloaded from the phishing site, the
phisher can identify bogus credentials submitted by XMLHttpRequests.
To defend against such rendering-based attacks, BogusBiter utilizes a set of hidden DOM
windows to render these asynchronously returned response pages for XMLHttpRequests,
thus leaving no clue to phishers. Because the same Web objects cached by a browser
will be directly used by different DOM windows, bandwidth-overhead incurred by this
mechanism is negligible, especially for legitimate websites. For a phishing site that returns
a different HTML page for each of BogusBiter's S submissions, the possible long delay due
to downloading different Web objects will only annoy a victim and encourage the victim to
leave the phishing site-a result that actually favors victims' interests.
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3.5

Evaluation

We conducted three sets of experiments to evaluate BogusBiter. In the first set of experiments, we built a testbed to verify the implementation correctness of BogusBiter with
respect to indiscernibility. In the second and third sets of experiments, we ran BogusBiter
against' 50 phishing sites and 20 legitimate websites to validate its efficacy, in terms of
attacking capability and usability.

3.5.1

Testbed Experiments

In the testbed experiments, we set up an Apache 2 Web server in a Linux machine and
hosted over twenty various phishing webpages on it. We used BogusBiter to send various
login requests to these phishing webpages either directly or through proxies. By examining
both request logs and request contents at the Web server, we verified that all the S requests
in a set are exactly the same, except for the credentials carried in the request bodies. In
addition, we placed an open-source tool, Tcpmon [185], in between the Web browser and
Web server to monitor TCP connections. We verified that the S submission requests are
transmitted over S independent non-persistent TCP connections; therefore, it is hard for a
phisher to differentiate these requests at the TCP connection level.

3.5.2

Phishing Site Experiments

In the phishing site experiments, we ran BogusBiter against 50 verified phishing sites chosen
from PhishTank [176]. PhishTank is a community based anti-phishing service and its data
have been widely used for evaluating phishing detection techniques [68, 131, 132, 146]. These
50 chosen phishing sites are diverse in terms of their locations, design styles, and targeted
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brand names. For each phishing site, when it was online, we tested BogusBiter with four
different set sizes of 4, 8, 12, and 16. Our major experiential findings are summarized as
follows.
First, BogusBiter is capable of attacking all the 50 phishing sites. Acting as either a
victim or a security-conscious user, BogusBiter always works correctly: it sends out all the

S requests within 10 milliseconds, and then processes all the responses properly. In rare
cases that phishing sites were not correctly detected by Firefox 2, we manually corrected
the detection results to trigger BogusBiter.
Second, the delay caused by BogusBiter is minimal when the set size S is 4 or 8. Here
the delay means the submission interaction time difference between using BogusBiter and
not using BogusBiter. The submission interaction time is the time elapsed between the
transmission of the first request and the reception of the last response. Figure 3.6(a) depicts
the percentage of phishing sites versus the delay caused by BogusBiter under four different
set sizes. We can see that if the set size S is 4 or 8, for over 85% of phishing sites, the delay
is less than 4 seconds. This delay measure is common to either a security-conscious user
or a victim, but the delay effect is different. A security-conscious user is unaware of such
a delay because the user is actually redirected to a default webpage by Firefox. A victim
may perceive this delay because the victim is waiting for the response from the phishing
site. Nevertheless, it is definitely worthwhile adding a small delay on revealing a victim's
credential, in order to make it less likely for phishers to succeed.
Third, phishing sites take three different response actions after receiving a user's credential submission request. Among 50 phishing sites, 38 of them simply redirect a user to
the invalid login pages of the targeted legitimate websites; 11 of them keep a user at their
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Figure 3.6: Delay caused by BogusBiter on: (a) phishing sites, (b) legitimate sites, under different
set sizeS.

local sites by using more faked webpages; and the last phishing site is very tricky because it
verifies the received credential in real time at the legitimate website and then sends back a
response based on the verification result. If a user submits a valid credential, the phishing
site steals the credential and then redirects the user to the legitimate website; otherwise,
it lets the user re-login on the phishing site. All three types of response actions attempt
to continue deceiving a victim and prevent the victim from realizing that an attack has
happened. But the third type of response action not only obtains and verifies a credential

in real time, it is also more deceptive to vulnerable users. The defensive line of BogusBiter
indeed provides an excellent opportunity for a legitimate website to defend against such
attacks in real time.

3.5.3

Legitimate Site Experiments

In the legitimate site experiments, we ran BogusBiter against 20 legitimate websites listed
in Table 3.3. None of these websites is classified as a phishing site by either Firefox 2 or
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paypal.com
ebay.com
citibank.com
53.com

amazon.com
buy. com
ecost.com
ubid.com

gmail.com
yahoo.com
msn.com
aol.com

cox.com
sprint. com
geico.com
aaa.com

myspace.com
walmart.com
career builder. com
my.wm.edu

Table 3.3: The 20 legitimate websites.

IE 7. We intentionally set the detection results as phishing to simulate false positive cases,
and used real accounts on these legitimate websites to evaluate the usability of BogusBiter.
We summarize the major experimental results as follows.
First, as we expected, none of these legitimate websites lock a real account during our
extensive tests. Second, if the set size S is 4 or 8, none of these legitimate websites require
CAPTCHA tests.

If the set size S is 12 or 16, only two websites ask a user to do a

CAPTCHA test after receiving S credentials. This test is a burden to a user but will not
block a user's further interactions with a Web server. Third, the delay caused by BogusBiter
is very small when the set size S is 4 or 8. Figure 3.6(b) depicts the percentage of legitimate
sites versus the delay caused by BogusBiter under four different set sizes. We can see that
if the set size S is 4 or 8, for all the 20 legitimate sites the delay is less than 3 seconds, and
for over 85% of legitimate sites the delay is less than one second. Therefore, BogusBiter
only induces a very small delay to users even if false positives really occur. The delay on
legitimate websites is much smaller than that on phishing sites, since the request processing
capability of legitimate websites is generally higher than that of phishing sites.

3.6

Discussions

In this section, we discuss the deployment scale of BogusBiter, the preparations that may
be needed for BogusBiter's massive deployment, and the limitations of BogusBiter.
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3.6.1

Deployment Scale

As discussed in Section 3.3.3.2, the defensive line (the SCI procedure) enabled by BogusBiter
needs to be deployed only on those legitimate websites that are really targeted by phishers.
So, here we only discuss the deployment of the BogusBiter browser extension. Like most
client-side protection mechanisms, BogusBiter protects only those users who install it. On
one hand, due to its scale-independency properties, the defensive line enabled by BogusBiter
can effectively identify the stolen credentials whose owners use BogusBiter, no matter how
many users install BogusBiter and what percentage of them are real victims.

On the

other hand, the power of BogusBiter's offensive line against a phishing site is scaled to the
number of users who install BogusBiter. With the increase of BogusBiter users, victims'
real credentials can be better hidden among bogus credentials.

Therefore, in order to

protect as many users as possible, BogusBiter should be deployed as widely as possible.
Ideally, if BogusBiter could be integrated into popular Web browsers as a built-in feature, a
ubiquitous deployment will be easily achieved and the benefits brought by BogusBiter will
be maximized.

3.6.2

Massive Deployment Preparation

When BogusBiter is integrated into popular Web browsers, it can be triggered with high
confidence for blacklisted phishing login pages; it can also be triggered for suspicious (but
not blacklisted) phishing login pages hosted on less popular websites. The main concern
about such a massive deployment of BogusBiter is that if the login page of a legitimate
site is wrongly flagged as a phishing page, the load on the site's authentication servers
will increase by a factor of S due to BogusBiter. However, the false positives produced by
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widely deployed phishing detection mechanisms such as used in IE 7 and Firefox 2 are rare,
especially for popular websites that have a large number of users. This is because otherwise
the false positives would have been noticed and corrected by these websites to prevent losing
users. As reported in [131], both IE 7 and Firefox 2 achieve a zero false positive rate for 516
representative legitimate websites. Thus, we expect that only few less popular and poorly
designed legitimate websites need to prepare for a massive deployment of BogusBiter.
We suggest two simple solutions for these websites to prepare. Let us assume that
BogusBiter's functionality is integrated into a new version of IE or Firefox Web browser.
Using the browser, the operator of a legitimate website can easily verify whether the site's
login page will be incorrectly classified as a phishing page. If a misclassification does occur,
two simple solutions exist. One solution is to report this misclassification and request the
Web browser vendor to either remove this legitimate site from the blacklist or add it to the
whitelist. The other solution is to revise the login page of this site, for example by removing
suspicious features, so that the page can pass heuristic-based tests [17, 35, 68, 132]. We
suggest these preparations not merely for the need of BogusBiter's massive deployment.
Indeed, legitimate websites may lose customers if they do not take active measures to
reduce their chances of being misclassified.

3.6.3

Limitations of BogusBiter

Should BogusBiter become widely deployed, phishers may explore its limitations to circumvent it. In general, the potential evasions can be divided into offline evasions and online
evasions.
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3.6.3.1

Offline Evasions

In offiine evasions, phishers analyze their collected credentials by using local username
filtering techniques, meaningful credential filtering techniques, or statistical filtering techniques.
(1) Local usemame filtering: In BogusBiter's design, we assume that a phisher does not

have a complete list of valid usernames for a targeted legitimate website, and cannot directly
query a targeted legitimate website for the validity of a specific username. Otherwise, a
phisher can simply conduct local username filtering without doing remote credential verification. Currently, this assumption may not be valid for some websites. For example, Bank
of America's website can tell a user whether a login is valid before a password is entered. For
these websites, we recommend them to hide their username validity information by using
some protection methods such as suggested in [12] and [32], thus not just to receive better
protection from BogusBiter, but also to provide a necessary defense against privacy leaking,
invasive advertising and phishing, password guessing, and even DoS attacks [12, 32].
(2) Meaningful credential filtering: Using current substitution rule, BogusBiter may

generate meaningless bogus credentials from users' meaningful credentials (e.g., credentials
containing dictionary words or human names), especially if an original username or original
password does not contain a digit. Thus, a phisher may only select meaningful credentials
to verify, while discarding the rest. Although this kind of meaningful credential filtering
is error-prone because a victim's real credential may be indeed meaningless and thus may
be directly thrown away by a phisher, it can still be used by phishers to evade BogusBiter.
Perhaps this is less of a concern for passwords, because the insecurity of low-entropy and
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guessable passwords has long been recognized [40, 59, 75, 78], and more and more high
security websites require users to choose passwords that contain at least one letter and one
number.

(3) Statistical filtering: A phisher may also analyze the variations of credentials and use
statistical language models such as bigrams or trigrams to identify victims' real credentials.
However, we argue that this type of statistical filtering is also error-prone for the same reasons as already mentioned in the meaningful credential filtering. Unfortunately, we cannot
obtain representative credential datasets to further analyze and support this argument. In
addition, we need to emphasize that other new rules (in addition to our substitution rule)
could also be designed to generate bogus credentials from an original credential. Especially,
if those new rules take into account the statistical characteristics of credentials in representative datasets, they could better hide victims' real credentials among generated bogus
credentials. It is worthy to design and apply such kinds of new rules, even if they may incur
the cost of increasing the derivable credentials (see Table 3.2).

3.6.3.2

Online Evasions

Unlike offline evasions, in online evasions, phishers have to redesign their phishing sites
and use special techniques to identify, in real time, which are real credentials submitted by
victims. However, some inherent drawbacks limit the application and effectiveness of online
evasion techniques. We now examine three representative classes of potential online evasion
techniques.

(1) JavaScript attacks: A phisher may use two basic forms of JavaScript attacks to evade
BogusBiter. One is an input-stealing attack that steals a user's credential using techniques
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such as keystroke monitoring, and then sends back the results to the phishing site at form
submission time or in real time. The other is a rendering-based attack that manipulates
response contents to discern which are bogus credentials submitted by XMLHttpRequests.
As discussed in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.4, BogusBiter defends against these two basic
forms of JavaScript attacks by using the keystroke intercepting technique and the hidden
DOM windows technique, respectively.

More sophisticated JavaScript attacks can be launched by phishers. For example, a
phisher can first have the phishing site code pause for a second or two to wait for BogusBiter
submitting all the S credentials. The phisher can then present all of the S credentials back
to a user, along with lines of a message "To improve our security process and defend your
account against automated attacks, please select your usernamefpassword from this list of
credentials." If a user is fooled by such an attack, the phisher obtains the user's credential.
However, such attacks contain obvious hallmarks to distinguish themselves as malicious
attacks that are specially fabricated to evade BogusBiter. Therefore, filtering functionalities
can be added to BogusBiter to confidently detect and disable malicious JavaScript code.
Note that detecting and filtering of malicious HTML content and JavaScript code is both
desirable and feasible, and generic solutions can be found in recent research work such as
SpyProxy [80] and BrowserShield [88].
{2} Nonstandard login page: A phisher may use nonstandard login pages to evade Bo-

gusBiter. A phisher may use a login form without the type= "password" HTML attribute,
may write the entire phishing page in Flash, and may even display a virtual keyboard to
users. For legitimate websites, using nonstandard login pages is not popular because it may
cause some problems. For example, non-HTML login forms may create accessibility and
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usability problems [112], and virtual keyboards are inconvenient to users and increase the
risk of shoulder surfing attacks [152, 144]. Meanwhile, for phishing sites, using non-HTML
login forms is also not popular because it makes a phishing attack more evident to users
or phishing detection tools if its surface-level or deep-level characteristics become deviated
from that of the targeted legitimate website. For these reasons, standard HTML pages
remain the central focus of most anti-phishing research work [17, 56, 91, 115, 132].
Indeed, BogusBiter can borrow some solutions proposed by other researchers to defend
against these attacks. For example, one solution can be borrowed from Dynamic Security
Skins [19]. More specifically, a customized "trusted window in the browser dedicated to
username and password entry" [19] can also be used by BogusBiter. A user is required
to copy the entered username and password from the trusted window and paste them to
the user recognized username and password fields in a login form. Using this solution,
BogusBiter can intercept an original credential before filling a phishing login form. Since
BogusBiter only needs to use a user's paste actions to more accurately determine which are
username and password fields, it can just paste a replaced bogus credential into a phishing
login form and then do further replacements and submissions behind the screen. It is
important to note that for BogusBiter, such a "trusted window" only needs to be triggered
when a login page is classified as a phishing page and its username and password fields
cannot be confidently identified. Also in such a case, BogusBiter will not be transparent to
security-conscious users. After a security-conscious user clicks the "Get me out of here!"
link on the phishing warning page, the user will be provided with the option to either
really leave the site, or use the "trusted window" to help battle phishers by filling a bogus
credential and identifying the username and password fields. The power of BogusBiter's
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offensive line may be reduced because some users may just choose to leave a phishing site,
but perhaps some security-conscious users are willing to intentionally do some volunteering
work to help strike back at the phishers.

(3} CAPTCHA testing attack: A phisher may use a CAPTCHA [3] test to evade BogusBiter. CAPTCHA tests are mainly used to prevent automated registrations, but are seldom
used in user authentication processes. As shown in our legitimate site experiments, none of
the legitimate sites asked a user to do a CAPTCHA test when the set size S is less than 10,
and we actually assumed that false positives happened on all those websites. Introducing
CAPTCHA testing attacks may decrease the number of phishing victims because the look
and feel of the phishing site becomes quite different from that of the targeted legitimate
website, and perhaps some users are unable or unwilling to solve CAPTCHAs [54, 158]. Ignoring these disadvantages, a phisher may still want to invoke a CAPTCHA testing attack
at either a login page or a login response page.
These attacks may reduce the power of BogusBiter's offensive line, but will not affect
the defensive line enabled by BogusBiter. If a phisher invokes the CAPTCHA testing at
the login page, the S - 1 requests generated by BogusBiter contain the same CAPTCHA
answer as that of the original request; therefore, it is difficult for a phisher to tell which
credential is entered by a human. If a phisher invokes the CAPTCHA testing at each of
the S response pages, we recommend letting BogusBiter to make a replacement so that the
CAPTCHA image on the first received response page is used on all the response pages.
Therefore, it is still difficult for a phisher to identify the credential entered by a human.
If there are legitimate websites that suffer from false positives and meanwhile want to use

CAPTCHA testing on each of their response pages after seeing a small set of credential
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submissions from BogusBiter, they can simply send back the same CAPTCHA image on
each of the S response pages thus will not be affected by this approach.

3. 7

Related Work

Basically the various client-side anti-phishing techniques can be classified into three different
approaches. The first approach focuses on building tools or toolbars to enhance the security
of a login process. Ye and Smith [118] designed a prototype of "Trusted Path" to convey
relevant trust signals from a Web browser to a human user.

Dhamija and Tygar [19]

proposed "Dynamic Security Skins" to allow a legitimate website to prove its identity in
a way that is easy for a user to verify but hard for a phisher to spoof. Ross et al. [91]
designed PwdHash to transparently produce different passwords for different domains, so
that passwords stolen at a phishing site are not useful at a legitimate website. Wu et al. [115]
introduced "Web Wallet" to direct an alternative safe path to a user if the user's intended
website does not match the current website.

Yee and Sitaker [119] developed Passpet

to combine the advantages of several previously devised techniques including petnames,
password strengthening, and UI customization. Adida [1] proposed BeamAuth to use a
secret token in a URL fragment identifier as a second factor for Web-based authentication.
These tools are very helpful, but users must be well trained to use them and must change
some of their login habits. Usability is critical to the success of anti-phishing tools [16].
The second approach focuses on improving the accuracy of automatic phishing detection
techniques. Chou et al. [17] built SpoofGuard to compute spoof indexes using heuristics
and to provide warnings for suspected phishing websites. Recent work by Zhang et al. [132]
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and Garera et al. [35] demonstrate that heuristic-based techniques can correctly identify
over 90% of phishing pages with about 1% false positives. Fette et al. [26] demonstrated
that their machine-learning based techniques can correctly identify over 96% of phishing
emails while mis-classifying only 0.1% of legitimate emails. Many other automatic phishing
detection tools or toolbars have been developed, and both Firefox 2 and IE 7 have automatic
phishing detection as a built-in feature. The evaluation of popular automatic phishing
detection tools, toolbars, and Web browser features can be found in [68, 131, 146, 151].
Researchers have also sought to develop nonpreventive anti-phishing approaches. Flor€mcio
and Herley [30] proposed a password rescue scheme that relies on client-side reporting and
server-side aggregation to detect and protect stolen credentials. However, this scheme can
only statistically make a detection decision after several users become victims, and it also
raises privacy concerns by using an extra server to collect user activity information. Parno
et al. [84] proposed a Phoolproof anti-phishing mechanism. Although their mechanism eliminates reliance on perfect user behavior, a trusted mobile device must be used to perform
mutual authentications. Birk et al. [11] introduced an "active phishing tracing" method,
which injects fingerprinted credentials into phishing sites to trace money laundering. Their
method can support forensic analyses and enforce judicial prosecutions, but it cannot directly protect phishing victims. Anti-phishing companies such as Cyota (acquired by RSA
Security) [179] and Markmonitor [167] have also experimented with injecting special credentials into a phishing site. However, these solutions are less effective than BogusBiter
because they neither take the browser integration approach nor enable legitimate websites
to detect victims' stolen credentials.
Finally, there is a related work in "spamming the spammers," and IBM actually offered
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a service to bounce unwanted email back to the computers that sent them [156]. The
objective of a spammer is to send junk emails, and IBM's approach intends to offend
spammers by consuming their resources. In contrast, the objective of a phisher is to collect
real credentials, and our approach intends to make it less likely for phishers to succeed by
building both an offensive line and a defensive line.

3.8

Summary

We introduced BogusBiter, a new client-side anti-phishing tool to automatically protect
vulnerable users by injecting a relatively large number of bogus credentials into phishing
sites. These bogus credentials hide victims' real credentials, and force phishers to verify their
collected credentials at legitimate websites. The credential verification actions initiated by
phishers, in turn, create opportunities for legitimate websites to detect stolen credentials in
a timely manner. BogusBiter is transparent to users and can be seamlessly integrated with
current phishing detection and warning mechanisms on Web browsers. We implemented
BogusBiter as a Firefox 2 extension and evaluated its effectiveness and usability.
Phishing is a serious security problem today, and phishers are smart, economically motivated, and adaptable. We must therefore actively pursue different approaches and promote
the cooperation of different solutions. The effectiveness of BogusBiter depends on many
factors, as we discussed in Section 3.6. But we believe its unique approach will make a
useful contribution to the anti-phishing research.

Chapter 4

Characterizing Insecure JavaScript
Practices on the Web

In this chapter, we present our work on characterizing insecure JavaScript practices.
Insecure JavaScript practices may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but
they could definitely cultivate the creation of new attack vectors and greatly increase the
risks of browser-based attacks. We present an execution-based measurement approach and
the first large-scale measurement study of the insecure JavaScript practices on the Web.
Our work sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and especially reveals the severity
and nature of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web.

4.1

Motivation

Security is an important aspect of Web engineering, and it should be taken into serious
consideration in the development of high quality Web-based systems [13, 55, 73, 81, 86]. In
103
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many cases, however, security does not receive sufficient attention due to the complexity
of Web-based systems, the ad hoc processes of system development, and even the fact that
many designers or developers lack security knowledge on Web development techniques. It is
not a surprise therefore, that website security breaches are common [22] and Web applications are more susceptible to malicious attacks than traditional computer applications [93].
Browser-based attacks have posed serious threats to the Web in recent years. Exploiting
the vulnerabilities in Web browsers [15, 88] or Web applications [41, 53], attackers may
directly harm a Web browser's host machine and user through various attacks such as driveby download [79, 87, 107], cross-site scripting [33, 193], cross-site request forgery [7, 181],
and Web privacy attacks [12, 44]. Attackers may even use browsers to indirectly launch
large-scale distributed attacks against Web servers [65] or propagate Internet worms [66].
Most of these browser-based attacks are closely tied with JavaScript, which is an interpreted programming language most often used for client-side scripting. JavaScript code
embedded or included in HTML pages runs locally in a user's Web browser, and it is mainly
used by websites to enhance the interactivity and functionality of their webpages. However, because JavaScript is equipped with a powerful and diverse set of capabilities in Web
browsers [28], it has also become the weapon of choice for attackers.
Modern Web browsers impose two restrictions to enforce JavaScript security: the sandbox mechanism and the same-origin policy. The former limits JavaScript to execute only

in a certain environment without risking damage to the rest of the system, while the latter
prevents JavaScript in a document of one origin from interacting with another document of
a different origin [28, 180]. Unfortunately, most JavaScript-related security vulnerabilities
are still the breaches of either of these two restrictions [160]. Some of these vulnerabilities
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are due to Web browser flaws, but the majority of them have been attributed to the flaws
and insecure practices of websites [181, 184].
A great deal of attention has been paid to the JavaScript-related security vulnerabilities
such as cross-site scripting [33, 109, 142, 181, 184] that could directly lead to security
breaches. However, little attention has been given to websites' insecure practices of using
JavaScript on their webpages. Similar to websites' other insecure practices such as using
the customers' social security numbers as their login IDs [24], insecure JavaScript practices
may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but they could definitely cultivate
the creation of new attack vectors.
In this work, we present the first measurement study on insecure practices of using
JavaScript at different websites. We mainly focus on two types of insecure practices: in-

secure JavaScript inclusion and insecure JavaScript dynamic generation. We define the
former as the practices of using the src attribute of a <script> tag to directly or indirectly include a JavaScript file from an external domain into the top-level document of a
webpage. A top-level document is the document loaded from the URL displayed in a Web
browser's address bar. By "directly", we mean that the <script> tag belongs to the toplevel document, and by "indirectly", we mean that the <script> tag belongs to a sub-level
frame or iframe document whose origin is the same as that of the top-level document. We
define the latter as the practices of using dangerous techniques such as the eval() function
to dynamically generate new scripts. Both types of insecure practices create new vectors
for attackers to inject malicious JavaScript code into webpages and launch attacks such as
cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery.
The primary objective of our work is to examine the severity and nature of these two
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types of insecure JavaScript practices on the Web. To achieve this goal, we devised an
execution-based measurement approach. More specifically, we instrumented the Mozilla
Firefox 2 Web browser and visited the homepages of 6,805 popular websites in 15 different
categories.

The instrumented Firefox non-intrusively monitors the JavaScript inclusion

and dynamic generation activities on those webpages, and it precisely records important
information for offline analysis.
Our measurement results reveal that insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices are widely prevalent among websites. At least 66.4% of the measured
websites have the insecure practices of including scripts from external domains into the
top-level documents of their homepages. Over 74.9% of the measured websites use one or
more types of JavaScript dynamic generation techniques, and insecure practices are quite
common. For example, eval() function calls exist at 44.4% of the measured websites. Using
the document.write() method and the innerHTML property is much more popular than
using the relatively secure method of creating JavaScript elements via DOM (Document
Object Model) [191] methods. Our results also show that around 94.9% of the measured
websites register various event handlers on their homepages, implying that the captured
insecure JavaScript practices in inclusion and dynamic generation are likely conservative
estimates.
The main contribution of our work is threefold. First, we introduce a browser instrumentation framework that enables us to capture essential JavaScript execution behavior
on webpages. Not only can this framework measure the insecure JavaScript practices, it
can also examine other JavaScript execution characteristics such as function call patterns
and code (de)obfuscation activities. Second, we present a classification method to analyze
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and classify different types of dynamically generated JavaScript code. By extracting the
AST (abstract syntax tree) trees of scripts and performing AST signature creation and
matching, our classification method can effectively assist us in understanding the structural
information of the hundreds of thousands of dynamically generated scripts. Third, our
measurement study sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and especially reveals
the severity of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web.
Our in-depth analysis further indicates that safe alternatives to these insecure practices do
exist in common cases. We therefore suggest website developers and administrators pay
serious attention to these insecure engineering practices and use safe alternatives to avoid
them.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains why the
two types of JavaScript practices are insecure. Section 4.3 introduces our measurement
and analysis methodologies. Section 4.4 describes the data set of this study. Section 4.5
presents and analyzes our measurement results.

Section 4.6 reviews related work, and

finally, Section 4.7 summarizes this work.

4.2

Background

In the same-origin policy, the origin of a document is defined using the protocol, domain
name, and port of the URL from which the document is loaded. It is important to realize
that this policy does not limit the origin of a script itself. Although JavaScript code cannot
access another document loaded from a different origin, it can fully access the document
in which it is embedded or included even when the code has a different origin than the
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document [28]. Including scripts from an external domain into the top-level document of a
webpage is very dangerous because it grants the scripts the maximum permissions allowed
to control the webpage and the browser window. Therefore, if the author of a script file or
the administrator of a script hosting site is insincere or irresponsible, insecure JavaScript
inclusion practices could lead to serious security and privacy breaches. Moreover, script
hosting sites could become attractive targets of attacks, especially when their JavaScript
files are included by multiple websites. To lower the potential risks, websites should avoid
external JavaScript inclusion by using internal JavaScript files from the same sites when
possible. Otherwise if external inclusion is really inevitable, for example some advertising
sites or traffic analysis sites may necessitate it [82], external included scripts should be
retrieved using HTTPS connections and should be restricted within a sub-level HTML
frame or iframe document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document.
The eval() function takes a string parameter and evaluates it as JavaScript code. This
function is dangerous because it executes the passed script code with the privileges of the
function's caller [145]. Therefore, attackers may endeavor to inject malicious code into the
evaluated string in order to take advantage of this capability. Meanwhile, since scripts
are dynamically generated and evaluated, it is very challenging to effectively filter out
maliciously injected code [51, 88, 120]. Eval() should be avoided

1

if at all possible, and its

safe alternatives should be used [133, 145]. Other JavaScript dynamic generation techniques
such as using the document.write() function and the innerHTML property also pose similar
security risks, as discussed in Section 4.5.
Once attackers have successfully exploited these insecure practices and injected their
1

Searching "eval is evil" on the Web for many discussions.
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malicious JavaScript code, they can easily launch severe attacks such as cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery. These attacks can be used to conduct many malicious
activities such as account hijacking, user behavior tracking, denial of service attacking,
and website defacing. Therefore, insecure engineering practices of using JavaScript should
be thoroughly investigated, their risks should be highlighted to Web developers, and safe
alternatives should be used to avoid them.

4.3

Methodology

We devised an execution-based measurement approach to study the insecure JavaScript
practices on the Web. Our strategy is to first use an instrumented Web browser to obtain
actual JavaScript execution trace information on different webpages, and then use offiine
analysis to characterize and understand various JavaScript practices. An alternative approach is to simply perform static analysis on web pages. However, this approach suffers
from the problem of undecidability and is unable to precisely determine which scripts will
be generated and executed. In contrast, our approach allows us to effectively capture the
dynamics of webpages and JavaScript code in their real runtime environments. Figure 4.1
gives an overview of our instrumentation framework and analysis toolkit.

4.3.1

Instrumentation Framework

To achieve an accurate and efficient measurement, we employed the source code instrumentation technique and instrumented the most popular open source Web browser-Mozilla
Firefox. Our instrumentation method is similar to program tracing, which is a well-known
approach for monitoring program behavior and measuring program performance. We fol-

110

r------------,
Web Browser

Web

I Pages>

1
I
.------,I
I
I
Instrumented I
SpiderMonkey
JavaScript
Engine

I
I
I
I

'----------'I

I

L ___________ _J

~-

--

-ruffin~

An-;1%i; io;;ikit- - -~

I

I

~~--------------------,1

I
II

JavaScript Code Classification Tools

I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
1
1
I
I:
I
I--------------------- I
II
II
I:

:I

Other Tools

:

~~---------------~

Figure 4.1: Overview of the instrumentation framework and analysis toolkit.

lowed a few rules suggested in [6] to minimize instrumentation overhead. More specifically,
we attempted to insert less instrumentation code and place the code only at necessary points
with low execution frequency.
We mainly instrumented three modules of Firefox 2 source code: the JavaScript engine,
the content module, and the DOM module. Firefox uses SpiderMonkey as its JavaScript
engine [183]. SpiderMonkey JavaScript engine is written in C programming language and
is a relatively independent module in Firefox. The major interface between SpiderMonkey
and other modules in Firefox is the SpiderMonkey JSAPI [161]. JSAPI facilitates other
modules in Firefox to use the core JavaScript data types and functions of SpiderMonkey,
and it also allows other modules to expose some of their objects and functions to JavaScript
code.
Inside the SpiderMonkey, our instrumented code written in C consists of three parts.
First, eight trace logging functions were integrated into the JSAPI interface. These functions facilitate the trace collection in a consistent manner, recording various information
such as script text, function calls, and event handler registrations. Second, we added code
to the byte-code interpreter of SpiderMonkey so that we can record the execution informa-
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tion of any global scripts and function scripts. Third, we instrumented the object system
implementation of SpiderMonkey to monitor the calls to the eval() function and collect both
the calling context information and the evaluated content information.
The trace files generated in the above instrumentation points enable us to analyze the
practices of JavaScript inclusion and the practices of JavaScript dynamic generation using
eval(). We also needed to monitor the practices of other JavaScript dynamic generation
techniques. Originally we attempted to fulfill this task by still instrumenting inside the
SpiderMonkey and monitoring the engine's native callbacks to the content and DOM modules. However, we found that this approach induces high overhead and could only record
partial information. Therefore, we decided to directly instrument the content module and
the DOM module of Firefox.
In the content module of Firefox, we integrated C++ code to measure the other three
types of JavaScript dynamic generation techniques. We instrumented the document.write()
method

2

and the method for setting the innerHTML property of an HTML element to track

their invocations. Both techniques can be used to add new content to an HTML document,
and the added content may contain new JavaScript code. We also added code to monitor the
method for replacing, inserting or appending a new DOM element, which could be created by
using DOM methods such as document.createElement() and document.createTextNode().
Our instrumentation code can identify the script type of elements and record their source
and text information. Other techniques such as the insertAdjacentHTML() method or the
outerHTML property are supported in the Internet Explorer Web browser only, and we
cannot measure them in Firefox.
2

In this work, it also include.s the document.writeln() method.
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In the DOM module and the content module, we added C++ code to measure various
event handler registration techniques supported in Firefox. Event handlers can be triggered
by user interaction or timer events. We collected event handler registration information
to show that further JavaScript inclusion and execution could happen and our captured
insecure practices are likely conservative estimates. Event handler registration and other
aspects of information described above are written into a set of six different trace files to
assist our offline analysis.
Since many internal user interface components of Firefox also heavily use JavaScript,
special care is needed to ensure that the above instrumentation code only records the
JavaScript execution activities of a visited webpage. Our code checks the JSPrincipals [163]
information of an object or script to guarantee this requirement. We also ensured that our
instrumentation code only monitors and records essential information and does not change
the execution logic of Firefox and Spider Monkey.

4.3.2

Analysis Toolkit

We took an offline analysis approach so that we can sufficiently analyze the trace information
without interfering with the actual measurement process. We developed an offline analysis
toolkit that consists of a set of tools written in approximately 5,000 lines of Java code, 200
lines o£ C code, 500 lines of Linux shell script code, and 300 lines of Matlab script code.
About half of the tools are used for classifying dynamically generated JavaScript code, and
the others are used for processing trace records and calculating statistical information. The
detailed description of the JavaScript code classification tools is as follows.
The motivation for developing these classification tools is to automate the challenging
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task of understanding a large number of dynamically generated JavaScript code. To achieve
this goal, we explored the concepts in software engineering and developed an AST (abstract
syntax tree)-based classification method. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the key idea is to first
extract the AST trees of scripts, then create and match AST signatures, and finally merge
signatures into different categories. We devised such an AST-based approach in that ASTs
have been demonstrated effective in program understanding [8, 110].
The AST tree extraction tool is a standalone C program that embeds the Spider Monkey
1.7 [183]. This is the same version of the SpiderMonkey as used in our instrumented Firefox
2 Web browser. Therefore, our extraction tool can create a token stream and parse the
stream into a syntax tree for a script in the same manner as in the instrumented Firefox.
The tool finally constructs the essential structure of a syntax tree as an AST tree and writes
the tree into an X1'4L file to facilitate further comparison.
We applied top-down tree matching techniques to perform AST signature creation and
matching, and the high-level procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.2. First, an empty AST
signature set S is initialized. Next, for each AST tree in the XML files, its top N level
structure is used to generate an AST signature, denoted as thisSig. Then, top-down tree
comparisons are made to seek a match between the thisSig and an existing signature in the
set S. If a match exists, this procedure keeps a record of the related information, otherwise,
the thisSig is added to the set S as a new AST signature. Finally, this procedure returns
the signature set S as its output.
To be accurate and representative, an AST signature keeps the name and type information of an operator node, but it only keeps the type information of an operand. Top-down
tree matching techniques can capture the key structural differences between trees, and they
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SigCreateMatch (XMLfiles, N)
1. Initialize an empty AST signature set S;
2. for each AST tree in the XML files do
3.
thisSig=the top N level structure of the AST tree;
4.
if thisSig matches an existing signature in S then
5.
Record the information of this matching;
6.
else
7.
S = S U {thisSig};
8.
endif
9. endfor
10. return the result set S;

Figure 4.2: High-level AST signature creation and matching procedure.

have been used in several Web-related projects [89, 126, 128]. The comparison algorithm
used in line 4 of this procedure is adapted from the STM (simple tree matching) algorithm
presented in [117]. STM is an efficient top-down tree distance comparison algorithm, and
our adaptation is to only compare the top N levels of trees. As shown in Section 4.5, such
an adaptation is effective in striking a good balance between retaining the accuracy and
reducing the total number of signatures.
The AST signature categorization tool was developed to further merge AST signatures
into different categories. We defined categories according to different types of JavaScript expressions and statements such as arithmetic expressions and assignment statements. Such
a categorization can help us to understand the use purposes of JavaScript code from a
programming language perspective. This tool is especially useful for analyzing dynamically generated scripts, most of which have specific use purposes in terms of programming
language functionality as revealed in our analysis.
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Category
arts
business
computers
games
health
home
news
recreation
reference
regional
science
shopping
society
sports
world
Total
Uniq-Total

com

org

gov

net

edu

cc

other

Total

417
430
432
428
277
415
412
409
116
292
209
479
302
403
199
5220
4727

16
7
29
13
107
28
24
19
17
23
96
2
84
13
15
493
445

0
10
1
0
41
22
6
12
11
21
68
0
34
0
1
227
170

27
4
21
43
8
14
12
19
4
6
8
2
11
21
23
223
212

1
0
1
0
33
2
3
0
192
3
47
0
3
0
0
285
276

39
49
15
14
30
18
43
40
158
152
64
17
58
62
262
1021
950

0
0
1
2
4
1
0
1
2
3
8
0
8
1
0
31
25

500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
7500
6805

Table 4.1: Category breakdown by top-level domain.

4.4

Data Set

To obtain a representative data set, we followed a similar method as used in [60] and
selected top websites listed by Alexa.com [136]. We chose 15 categories and then top 500
sites from each of these categories. Table 4.1 gives the breakdown of 15 categories by DNS
top-level domain (TLD). Since some sites appear in multiple categories, the total number
of unique sites is 6,805 in our study. This number is over five times larger than that in [60],
and we also only visited the homepages of those sites so that we can have a consistent
measurement. Meanwhile, measuring the insecure JavaScript practices on homepages is
sufficient to illustrate the severity of the problem. Table 4.1 shows that the majority of the
6,805 sites come from the .com TLD and the country code (denoted as the cc) TLD. The
former contributes 4, 727 unique sites and the latter contributes 950 unique sites.
The execution of JavaScript on a webpage can be roughly divided into two phases: the
document loading and parsing phase and the event-driven phase [28]. When the document
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loading and parsing phase ends, the event-driven phase starts and event handlers can be
asynchronously executed in response to various user interaction and timer events. In our
study, we developed a browser extension to automatically visit each of the 6,805 webpages
using our instrumented Firefox Web browser. On each page, our browser extension waits
for the end of the document loading and parsing phase and then stays in the event-driven
phase for 10 seconds. Our browser extension has no intention to trigger the execution of any
specific event handlers on a page. This is because the event handlers registered on different
webpages are very diverse, and it is difficult to trigger their executions in a consistent
manner. Therefore, the JavaScript execution data set collected in our measurement study
covers the whole document loading and parsing phase and 10 seconds of the event-driven
phase for each of the 6,805 homepages. The data set was collected in the second week of
July 2008.

4.5

Results and Analysis

We present and analyze our measurement results in this section. We first briefly present
the results on JavaScript presence. Then, we detail the results on the insecure practices
of JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Finally, we give a short summary of the
results on event handler registrations.

4.5.1

Overall JavaScript Presence

Table 4.2 lists the results of overall JavaScript presence for the 6,805 measured homepages.
We use JS to represent any JavaScript code, and we use DJS to represent the JavaScript
code that is dynamically generated by using one of the four dynamic generation techniques
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Category/
TLD
arts
business
computers
games
health
home
news
recreation
reference
regional
science
shopping
society
sports
world
com
org
gov
net
edu
cc
other

All

Pages with any JS
embedded JS included JS
Total
484(96.8%)
483(96.6%)
491(98.2%)
482(96.4%)
473(94.6%)
492(98.4%)
471(94.2%)
465(93.0%)
484(96.8%)
471(94.2%)
473(94.6%)
488(97.6%)
467(93.4%)
451(90.2%)
481(96.2%)
479(95.8%)
471(94.2%)
487(97.4%)
477(95.4%)
475(95.0%)
483(96.6%)
477(95.4%)
467(93.4%)
487(97.4%)
455(91.0%)
443(88.6%)
476(95.2%)
479(95.8%)
457(91.4%)
492(98.4%)
421(84.2%)
405(81.0%)
449(89.8%)
487(97.4%)
486(97.2%)
493(98.6%)
441(88.2%)
435(87.0%)
466(93.2%)
492(98.4%)
496(99.2%)
482(96.4%)
481(96.2%)
438(87.6%)
489(97.8%)
4551 (96.3%) 4504(95.3%) 4629(97.9%)
401(90.1%)
378(84.9%)
422(94.8%)
160(94.1%)
150(88.2%)
137(80.6%)
194{91.5%)
189(89.2%)
204{96.2%)
250{90.6%)
239{86.6%)
223(80.8%)
863(90.8%)
817(86.0%)
902(94.9%)
24{96.0%)
23(92.0%)
22(88.0%)
6421(94.4%) 6270{92.1%) 6591{96.9%)

Pages with
DJS
437(87.4%)
380(76.0%)
374(74.8%)
375(75.0%)
330(66.0%)
389(77.8%)
430(86.0%)
389(77.8%)
286(57.2%)
401(80.2%)
274(54.8%)
393(78.6%)
329(65.8%)
456(91.2%)
377(75.4%)
3838(81.2%)
247(55.5%)
75(44.1%)
153(72.2%)
122{44.2%)
654(68.8%)
9(36.0%)
5098{74.9%)

Table 4.2: JavaScript presence by category and top-level domain.

measured in our instrumented Firefox Web browser. The embedded JS indicates that the
executed JavaScript code is embedded within an HTML document, and the included JS
indicates that the executed JavaScript code is included from a separate file.
Overall, JavaScript execution has been widely observed on 6,591(96.9%) homepages.
Both the JS embedding and JS inclusion are very common, and they are practiced on 6,421
and 6,270 pages, respectively. The percentage of webpages containing JavaScript execution
within a category ranges from 89.8% for science to 99.2% for sports, and the percentage
of webpages containing JavaScript execution within a TLD ranges from 90.6% for .edu to
97.9% for .com. JavaScript dynamic generation is also very popular, and there are 5,098
(74.9%) sites containing DJS on their homepages. For the DJS presence within a category,
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the lowest percentage is 54.8% for science, and the highest percentage is 91.2% for sports.
For the DJS presence within a TLD, the highest percentage is 81.2% for .com, and the
lowest percentage is 36.0% for other domains such as .mil and .info.

4.5.2

Insecure JavaScript Inclusion

Among all the 6,270 webpages with the included JS, we identify and analyze insecure practices of JavaScript inclusion. Note that we defined the insecure JavaScript inclusion as the
practices of using the src attribute of a <script> tag to directly or indirectly include a
JavaScript file from an external domain into the top-level document of a webpage. Keeping JavaScript code separate from HTMLmarkups is actually a good engineering practice,
advocated especially in the unobtrusive JavaScript programming paradigm [28, 189]. Therefore, there is no need to analyze the good practices of including JavaScript files from the
same host or domain, and we only focus on the insecure inclusion practices.

4.5.2.1

Results and Analysis

To our surprise, insecure JavaScript inclusion is very prevalent. Around 66.4% (4,517 out
of 6,805) of websites directly or indirectly include JavaScript files from external domains
into the top-level documents of their homepages. Note that our analysis tool applies a
conservative standard to compare the domain name of a JavaScript file and that of its
including homepage. Two domain names are regarded as different only if, after discarding
their top-level domain names (e.g., .com) and the leading name "www" (if existing), they
do not have any common sub-domain name 3 . Therefore, this 66.4% result is basically an
3
For example, two domain names www.dlsub2.dlsubl.dltld and d2sub3.d2sub2.d2subl.d2tld are regarded as different only if the intersection of the two sets {dlsub2, dlsubl} and {d2sub3, d2sub2, d2subl}
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution of the 4,517 JavaScript file inclusion domains in terms of their
outdegree values.

objective estimate of the severity of insecure JavaScript inclusion practices.
After further analyzing the domain name relationship between JavaScript file inclusion
sites and JavaScript file hosting sites, we found that those 4,517 sites include JavaScript files
from a diverse set of 1,985 external domains. We can use a directed graph to characterize
the domain name relationship between these sites. Different vertices represent different
domain names, and a direct edge from vertex A to vertex B means that the homepage in
domain A includes at least one JavaScript file from domain B. Therefore, 4,517 vertices have
a greater than zero outdegree value, and 1,985 vertices have a greater than zero indegree
value.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the 4,517 JavaScript
file inclusion domains in terms of their outdegree values. We can see that approximately
43.6% of the 4,517 sites include JavaScript files from at least three external domains. While
the mean value of outdegree is 3.1, the maximum value of outdegree reaches 24. These
is empty.
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results indicate that not only 66.4% of measured sites are at the risk of having their homepages under the control of the included JavaScript code, but many of them also face higher
risks from multiple sources.
From a different perspective, Figure 4.4 depicts the CDF of the 1,985 JavaScript file
hosting domains in terms of their indegree values. We can observe two interesting phenomena. On the one hand, JavaScript files in approximately 60.6% of the hosting domains
are only included by one of our visited homepages. On the other hand, JavaScript files
in approximately 7.7% of the hosting domains are included by at least 10 of our visited
homepages, and JavaScript files in 14 sites are even included by at least 100 of our visited
homepages. The mean value of indegree is 7.2, but the maximum value of indegree reaches
a very high value of 2,606. After inspecting those 14 high-profile JavaScript file hosting
domains and many other low-profile domains, we found that a few of them are popular
traffic analysis service sites and advertising servers. However, most of them are the kind
of "hidden" sites that provide nothing on their root URLs but just point to some stored

121
JavaScript files using URL paths. Understanding the properties of those sites is beyond the
scope of this work, but what we need to emphasize is that external JavaScript file hosting
sites, especially those high-profile ones, create new vectors for large-scale browser-based
attacks. Even a single compromised JavaScript file could directly cause security breaches
on thousands of websites.
Among the 4,517 sites that include JavaScript files from external domains, we also
observed that 125 sites only use the HTTPS protocol to retrieve JavaScript files and 138
sites use both the HTTP protocol and the HTTPS protocol to retrieve different JavaScript
files. In total, there are 263 sites using HTTPS to include scripts from 72 JavaScript file
hosting sites. These observations imply that some JavaScript file hosting sites do provide
the secure transmission service for accessing their hosted JavaScript files, and some of our
measured sites do use this service. However, this secure JavaScript transmission service is
not popular. Only 3.6% (72 out of 1,985) of the JavaScript file hosting sites provide the
service, and only 5.8% (263 out of 4,517) of the JavaScript file inclusion sites use the service.
Also note that HTTPS protects data in transit, but it does not guarantee that a JavaScript
file is uncompromised in a hosting site.
In contrast to these 4,517 sites, we did find that there are 324 other sites, in which
an external included JavaScript file is always restricted within a sub-level HTML frame
or iframe document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document. This
observation implies that some sites do limit the control of external included JavaScript
code within sub-level documents and provide a protection to the top-level documents of
their homepages. However, such a relatively secure practice is exclusively followed by only
324 measured sites, and those 4,517 sites still use a very insecure way to include external
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JavaScript files.

4.5.2.2

Safe Alternatives to Insecure Inclusion

Our results show that insecure JavaScript inclusion is widely practiced by the majority
(66.4%) of our measured sites. Our in-depth analysis on the domain name relationship
between JavaScript file inclusion sites and hosting sites further reveals the severity and
nature of those insecure practices. Although HTTPS and sub-level documents are used
by a small portion of sites to enhance the security of external JavaScript file inclusion, we
believe that the majority of measured JavaScript file inclusion sites and hosting sites have
not paid sufficient attention to the potential risks of insecure JavaScript inclusion. For
JavaScript file inclusion sites, we suggest them (1) avoid external JavaScript inclusion by
using internal JavaScript files from the same sites, if at all possible; (2) restrict the permission of external included scripts by placing them within a sub-level HTML frame or iframe
document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document, if external inclusion
is really inevitable; and (3) retrieve external JavaScript files using HTTPS connections, if
the HTTPS service is available. The third suggestion needs a hosting site to provide the
HTTPS service for accessing its JavaScript files, but the first two suggestions can be easily
adopted by JavaScript file inclusion sites.

4.5.3

Insecure JavaScript Dynamic Generation

Since 74.9% of measured sites (5,098 out of 6,805) contain DJS scripts on their homepages,
we now characterize all the DJS scripts based on their generation techniques and analyze
insecure practices.
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Category/
TLD
arts
business
computers
games
health
home
news
recreation
reference
regional
science
shopping
society
sports
world
com
org
gov
net
edu
cc
other
All

eva!generated
258(51.6%)
253(50.6%)
205(41.0%)
203(40.6%)
190(38.0%)
240(48.0%)
314(62.8%)
229(45.8%)
144(28.8%)
258(51.6%)
137(27.4%)
245(49.0%)
163(32.6%)
322(64.4%)
212(42.4%)
2359(49.9%)
109(24.5%)
32(18.8%)
77(36.3%)
50(18.1%)
393(41.4%)
4(16.0%)
3024(44.4%)

writegenerated
403(80.6%)
295(59.0%)
307(61.4%)
327(65.4%)
276(55.2%)
357(71.4%)
412(82.4%)
310(62.0%)
214(42.8%)
337(67.4%)
234(46.8%)
307(61.4%)
283(56.6%)
424(84.8%)
341(68.2%)
3359(71.1%)
195(43.8%)
50(29.4%)
135(63.7%)
92(33.3%)
558(58.7%)
7(28.0%)
4396(64.6%)

innerHTMLgenerated
76(15.2%)
73(14.6%)
55(11.0%)
58(11.6%)
35(7.0%)
57(11.4%)
161(32.2%)
67(13.4%)
44(8.8%)
97(19.4%)
39(7.8%)
37(7.4%)
42(8.4%)
114(22.8%)
92(18.4%)
724(15.3%)
25(5.6%)
9(5.3%)
26(12.3%)
17(6.2%)
130(13.7%)
3(12.0%)
934(13.7%)

DOMgenerated
83(16.6%)
56(11.2%)
55(11.0%)
57(11.4%)
34(6.8%)
73(14.6%)
110(22.0%)
57(11.4%)
22(4.4%)
58(11.6%)
35(7.0%)
38(7.6%)
42(8.4%)
95(19.0%)
55(11.0%)
656(13.9%)
22(4.9%)
9(5.3%)
21(9.9%)
7(2.5%)
79(8.3%)
0(0.0%)
794(11.7%)

Table 4.3: DJS presence by category and top-level domain.

4.5.3.1

DJS Presence by Category and TLD

Table 4.3 lists the overall DJS presence by category and TLD for the four different DJS
generation techniques. We can see that the eval() function and the document. write() method
are widely used on 44.4% and 64.6% of webpages, respectively. In contrast, the innerHTML
property and the DOM methods (i.e., replacing, inserting or appending a new created script
element) are only used on 13.7% and 11.7% of web pages, respectively. It is also interesting
to notice that the categories with the highest DJS presence values are news and sports for all
the four generation techniques. The TLDs with the highest DJS presence values are .com,
.net, and country code domains. These results indicate that JavaScript dynamic generation
is more likely to be used on those sites that have more dynamic contents.
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4.5.3.2

DJS Instance Summary

We now examine the generated DJS instances on each webpage. A DJS instance is identified
in different ways for different generation techniques. For the eval() function, the whole
evaluated string content is regarded as a DJS instance. Within the written content of the
document.write() method and the value of the innerHTML property, a DJS instance can be
identified from three sources: (1) between a pair of <script> and </script> tags; (2) in an
event handler specified as the value of an HTML attribute such as onclick or onmouseover;
and (3) in a URL that uses the special j avascript: protocol specifier [28]. For the DOM
methods, each new script element is identified as a DJS instance.
Table 4.4 gives a summary of DJS instances for both the document loading and parsing
phase, denoted as the pre-onload phase, and the event-driven phase, denoted as the postonload phase. The two numbers in each table cell represent the data for the pre-onload
and post-onload phases, respectively. The data in the second row of the table gives the
total number of DJS instances identified in the two execution phases for the four different
techniques. The data in the third row of the table gives the total number of webpages on
which those DJS instances are identified. The IPP in the last three rows of the table stands
for the "Instance Per Page".
It is evident that the eval() function generates the largest number of DJS instances

in both phases (194,676 in the pre-onload phase and 22,632 in the post-onload phase).
The mean value of IPP for eval-generated DJS instances is 65.2 in the pre-onload phase
and 62.3 in the post-onload phase. The maximum value of IPP for eval-generated DJS
instances reaches 2,543 in the pre-onload phase and 6,350 in the post-onload phase. These
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Summary
total number
of DJS instances
total number
of pages
mean value
of IPP
maximum value
of IPP
standard deviation
of IPP

eva!generated
1946761
22632
29861
363
65.21
62.3
25431
6350
174.41
367.2

writegenerated
674461
519
43851
63
15.41
8.2
10531
160
41.61
20.9

innerHTMLgenerated
287171
6626
8441
187
34.01
35.4
50011
1403
184.31
134.1

DOMgenerated
13701
557
6801
260
2.01

2.1
131
25
1.1I

2.7

Table 4.4: DJS instance summary for pre-onloadlpost-onload phases.
numbers indicate that eva!() may be misused or abused. The document.write() method also
generates a large number of DJS instances in the pre-onload phase, but it only generates
519 DJS instances on 63 pages in the post-onload phase. Calling document.write() in postonload phase is usually not desirable because it will overwrite the current document with
the written content. In both phases, the innerHTML property also generates a large number
of DJS instances, while DOM methods generate much fewer DJS instances.
For the four JavaScript dynamic generation techniques, Figures 4.5(a) to 4.5(d) further
illustrate the cumulative distribution of the webpages in terms of IPP. In each of these four
figures, the "o" curve is for the pre-onload phase and the "*" curve is for the post-onload
phase. Note that the total number of pages is different for the two phases (as shown in the
third row of Table 4.4), and we present the two curves together for ease of comparison. We
can see that the indication of misuse or abuse is especially evident for the eval() function.
While the majority (about 60%) of webpages have 10 or less eval-generated DJS instances,
nearly 17% and 11% of webpages have 100 or more eval-generated DJS instances for the
pre-onload phase and the post-onload phase, respectively.
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(a) eval-generated, (b) write-generated, (c) innerHTML-generated, and (d) DOM-generated DJS
instances.

4.5.3.3

Structural Analysis of eval-generated DJS

The prevalence of DJS on various categories of webpages and the high IPP values motivate
us to further understand the use purposes of the large number of DJS instances. Using our
JavaScript code classification tools, we now uncover the use purposes of eval-generated DJS
instances in terms of programming language functionality.
From the total 217,308 (both the pre-onload phase and the post-onload phase) eva!generated DJS instances, 217,308 AST trees are extracted by our AST tree extraction tool.
The maximum height of these AST trees is 19. Figure 4.6 shows the cumulative distribution
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of the AST trees in terms of the height of an AST tree. Nearly 90% of AST trees have
a height less than or equal to 4. Therefore, we selected N

=

4 as the input parameter

(Figure 4.2) and used the top-four level structure of AST trees to create and match AST
signatures. A total number of 647 AST signatures are created and matched from the 217,308
AST trees. These 647 AST signatures capture the essential structural information of the
217,308 AST trees, and they greatly facilitate our further analysis. Using more levels of
AST tree structure is unnecessary because lower-level AST tree nodes only contain less
important structural information.
Finally, AST signatures with the same programming language functionality are merged
into the same category by using our AST signature categorization tool. For example, two
AST signatures representing two types of function calls with different number or type of
parameters are merged into the same function calls category. Table 4.5 lists the final 17
categories of DJS instances classified from the 647 AST signatures, and in turn from the
217,308 DJS instances.
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Category
parse error
empty content
simple expression
arithmetic expression
relational expression
logical expression
object/array literal
other expression
variable declarations
function declarations
assignment statements
function calls
method calls
object/array creations
conditional statements
try-catch statements
mixed statements

Presence
in Pages

Number of
DJS instances

Average
DJS length

20(0.7%)
124(4.1%)
1209(40.0%)
12(0.4%)
79(2.6%)
159(5.3%)
265(8.8%)
126(4.2%)
98(3.2%)
1157(38.3%)
1289( 42.6%)
527(17.4%)
561(18.6%)
29(1.0%)
181(6.0%)
1075(35.5%)
910(30.1%)

111(0.05%)
291(0.13%)
134251(61.8%)
158(0.1%)
3246(1.5%)
3249(1.5%)
4798(2.2%)
5789(2.7%)
411(0.2%)
1929(0.9%)
42015(19.3%)
2733(1.3%)
2062(0.9%)
212(0.1%)
9371(4.3%)
4127(1.9%)
2555(1.2%)

1175.5
0.0
13.9
67.9
31.7
75.8
623.0
18.5
586.0
13380.7
51.9
368.9
75.9
41.3
519.1
51.7
6884.1

Table 4.5: The 17 categories of eval-generated DJS instances.

We can see that 0.05% of the DJS instances have parse error when AST trees are extracted, and 0.13% of the DJS instances have empty content. The majority (around 98.6%)
of the eval-generated DJS instances are classified into the 14 categories from simple expres-

sian to try-catch statements. The DJS instances in these 14 categories all have specific use
purposes in terms of programming language functionality. Only 1.2% of the DJS instances
have mixed programming language functionalities, and they are classified into the last category of mixed statements. The generated DJS instances in the last 15 categories are either
various expressions (from simple expression to other expression) or various statements (from

variable declarations to mixed statements). In general, a JavaScript expression is used only
to produce a value, while a JavaScript statement normally has side effects and is often used
to accomplish some tasks.
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4.5.3.4

Safe Alternatives to eval()

To further understand whether using eval() is necessary in these different categories, we
randomly sampled and inspected both the content and the calling context of 700 DJS
instances. We sampled 200 DJS instances from the simple expression category and 200 DJS
instances from the assignment statements category. These two categories have the largest
numbers of DJS instances, accounting for 61.8% and 19.3%, respectively, of all the evalgenerated DJS instances. The remaining 300 DJS instances are sampled from the other 15
categories, with each of them contributing 20 instances.
In at least 70% of the sampled cases, the eval() function is misused or abused while
safe alternatives can be easily identified. Here we illustrate three representative sampled
cases. The first one is: this.homePos = eval("O" + this.dirType + this.dim), in which a
string simple expression "0-500" is generated. Indeed, such a kind of string concatenation
directly generates a string value, and using eval() is redundant. The second one is: var
ff_nav=eval("nav_"+tt[i][1]), in which a variable name "nav_20912" is dynamically accessed.
A safe alternative is using the JavaScript window object to directly access the variable: var
ff_nav=window["nav_"+tt[i][1]]. The third one is: var responses = eval(o.responseText),
in which the response content of an XMLHttpRequest [192] is directly evaluated. This
practice is used in many of our sampled cases to convert a responseText into a JSON
object. However, since malicious JavaScript code could be injected into the responseText,
it would be better to use a JSON parser rather than the eval() function to perform such
a transformation [162]. The other 30% of the sampled cases usually have complex calling
context, so we do not further identify their safe alternatives.
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Technique
and Type
jscode
eventhandler
write
jsprotocol
jscode
innerHTML eventhandler
jsprotocol
src
DOM
text

Presence
in Pages
4000
1773
501
120
747
336
779
33

Number of
DJS instances
26125
38650
3190
503
31267
3573
1866
61

Avg.
length

Main usage

77

JS inclusion
function call
function call
JS inclusion
function call
function call
JS inclusion
assignment

39
45
262
60
33
-

623

Table 4.6: Structural analysis of DJS instances generated by the document. write() method, innerHTML property, and DOM methods.
We suggest that eval() should be avoided if at all possible. In addition to the safe
alternatives exemplified above, DOM methods can be generally used to generate and execute
various JavaScript statements.

4.5.3.5

Structural Analysis of Other Types of DJS

As mentioned before, the DJS instances generated by the document.write method() and the
innerHTML property are identified from three different sources. We use jscode to present
a DJS instance identified between a pair of <script> and </script> tags, use eventhandler
to represent a DJS instance identified in an event handler, and use jsprotocol to represent a
DJS instance identified in a javascript: protocol URL. The DJS instances generated by
the DOM methods are specified in either the src attribute or the text attribute of a script
element. Table 4.6 gives the structural analysis results of the DJS instances generated by
these three dynamic generation techniques. The main usage of each type of DJS instance
is summarized in the last column of the Table 4.6.
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4.5.3.6

Safe Alternatives to jscode Generation via document.write() and innerHTML

For the eventhandler and jsprotocol DJS instances generated by document. write() and innerHTML, their usages are relatively safe. When new content is added to a document, event
handlers are directly specified on various elements of the newly-added content to respond to
various events. The j avascript: protocol scripts are often used on links to execute some
statements without loading a new document.
What we emphasize is that generating jscode using document.write() and innerHTML is
not desirable. For document.write(), the generated jscode is immediately executed. Multiple
document.write() calls can be used to construct a jscode, and document.write() calls can
be nested. All these factors make the filtering of write-generated malicious JavaScript code
a very challenging task [120]. However, our results show that 26,125 instances of writegenerated jscode are identified on a large number of 4,000 homepages. For innerHTML,
the generated jscode is recognized by a browser, but it is not necessarily executed. For
example, Firefox does not directly execute a jscode generated by innerHTML. In Internet
Explorer, the defer attribute and some tricks need to be used to execute an innerHTMLgenerated jscode, but this practice is also not recommended due to potential script-injection
attacks [173]. Fortunately, only 503 instances of this practice are identified on 120 pages as
shown in Table 4.6.
The best practice is to use DOM methods to dynamically generate JavaScript code.
Using DOM methods (such as createElement() and createTextNode()) to create JavaScript
elements explicitly declares that the new elements are scripts. This practice can enable
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potential Web content protection mechanisms such as those presented in [51, 88, 120] to
accurately define security policies and weed out potential malicious JavaScript code. Unfortunately, only 1,927(1,866 plus 61) instances of this practice are identified.
Our results show that the main usage of jscode generated by document.write() and
innerHTML is for including other JavaScript files (denoted as JS inclusion in Table 4.6).
Indeed, by specifying the src attribute of a script element, DOM methods fit well for
such a usage. By specifying the text attribute of a script element, DOM methods can
also be used to generate and execute various statements such as assignment statements or
function calls, thus safely replacing the relatively insecure practices of jscode generation via
document.write() and innerHTML.

4.5.4

Event Handler Registration

Our measurement results show that event handler registrations occurred on 6,451(94.9%)
pages in the pre-onload phase, with an average of 108.2 registrations per page and a maximum of 5,074 registrations per page. Event handler registration occurred on 1,767(26.0%)
pages in the post-onload phase, with an average of 61.4 registrations per page and a maximum of 2,229 registrations per page. These results include majority event types (e.g.,
event attributes of HTML tags, timer events, and XMLHttpRequest events) and event registration techniques supported in Firefox. The execution of event handlers may trigger
further JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation, implying that our captured insecure
JavaScript practices are likely conservative estimates.
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4.6

Related Work

To the best of our knowledge, there is no directly related work on characterizing the insecure
practices of JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Therefore, we only briefly review
some JavaScript related measurement studies. Krishnamurthy and Wills [60] measured the
homepages of 1,158 unique sites selected from Alexa.com [136] to study the content delivery
tradeoffs in Web access. The focus of their study is on the performance impact of extraneous
content, and their results show that JavaScript is often used on popular webpages to retrieve
extraneous content such as images and advertisements.
In the investigation of malware, several execution-based measurement studies [79, 87,
107] have been conducted to identify malicious webpages that contain code (in many cases,

JavaScript code) for exploiting Web browser vulnerabilities and installing malware. Instead
of targeting at malicious sites, our focus in this work is on legitimate websites' insecure
JavaScript practices.

4.7

Summary

In this work, we presented the first measurement study on insecure practices of using
JavaScript on the Web. We focused on investigating the severity and nature of insecure
JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Through an instrumented Mozilla Firefox 2
Web browser, we visited the homepages of 6,805 popular websites in 15, different categories.
We found that at least 66.4% of the measured websites have the insecure practices of including JavaScript files from external domains into the top-level documents of their homepages.
Our in-depth analysis on the domain name relationship between JavaScript file inclusion
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sites and hosting sites further reveals the severity and nature of those insecure practices.
Our measurement results on JavaScript dynamic generation show that the "evil" function
eval() was called on 44.4% of the measured homepages, and the document.write() method
and the innerHTML property were also used to generate JavaScript code. Our AST-based
structural analysis on various DJS instances further uncovers their usages with respect to
programming language functionality. Our analysis indicates that in common cases, safe
alternatives do exist for both the insecure JavaScript inclusion and insecure JavaScript
dynamic generation. Since Web-based attacks have become more common and damaging
in recent years, we suggest website developers and administrators pay serious attention to
these insecure JavaScript practices and use safe alternatives to avoid them. In the future, we
will measure insecure JavaScript practices on more specific types of websites and webpages.
We will also investigate whether other insecure J avaScript practices exist on the Web.

Chapter 5

Secure and Convenient Kiosk
Browsing

In this chapter, we present our work on secure and convenient kiosk browsing. Many
people use public computers provided in kiosk environments to browse the Web. Unfortunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own computers.
We present a simple approach that enables an extended browser on a mobile device and
a regular browser on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session. Using
this approach, a user can securely perform sensitive interactions on the mobile device and
conveniently perform other browsing interactions on the public computer.

5.1

Motivation

Web browsing has become such an integral part of our everyday lives that we use browsers
to perform many important tasks such as banking, shopping, and bill-paying. To facilitate
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ubiquitous Web access, many kiosk environments such as cafes, airport lounges, and hotel
business centers provide people with Internet-connected public computers. These public
computers often have high-speed network connections. They are also convenient to use
since they normally have full-size keyboards and large displays. People who do not own a
computer or carry a laptop with them frequently use these public computers to browse the
Web.
Unfortunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own computers. By "trustworthy", we mean that it is less likely that malware or spyware has been
installed on a computer to log user input, steal account information, and even secretly
hijack a secure (HTTPS) Web browsing session to make fraudulent transactions. Public
computers are used by many people to run different applications and visit various websites;
consequently, it is very likely for them to be infected with malware or spyware. Simply
searching "public computer security" online, we can find numerous articles suggesting that
people should not use public computers to perform sensitive activities. For example, Microsoft suggests that to be really safe, a user should not enter any sensitive information into
a public computer [134].
To secure kiosk computing environments, researchers have proposed a number of solutions [18, 29, 36, 49, 70, 71, 72, 83, 84, 92, 98, 99, 113]. Most of these solutions use a
trusted mobile device such as a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) or a mobile phone to
enhance the security of kiosk computing environments, and we refer to them as FDA-based
solutions. Mobile devices are favored by PDA-based solutions because (1) they are more
portable than desktop and laptop computers, and (2) they are generally more trustworthy
than public computers. Nevertheless, using small user interfaces on mobile handheld devices
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is inherently difficult [108].
Many of these PDA-based solutions focus on specific objectives such as securing application or data access [83, 99], securing user authentication or input [18, 70, 72, 84, 113], and
verifying software integrity [36], so they cannot be easily adopted to secure an entire Web
browsing session. Some solutions do have the objective of securing an entire kiosk browsing
session [49, 71, 92, 98], but they suffer from a few drawbacks that limit their practical use.
In this work, we propose SessionMagnifier, a simple approach to secure and convenient
kiosk browsing. SessionMagnifier also relies on a trusted mobile device and is a PDAbased solution. However, our position is that with the support of a trusted mobile device
(referred to as FDA), a solution to the problem of securing Web browsing on an untrusted

public computer (referred to as PC) should, in essence, strive to synthesize the usability
advantages of a PC and the security advantages of a PDA. Otherwise, a user can simply
take the security risks of only using a PC, or a user can simply tolerate the inconvenience
of only using a PDA with its small keyboard and display. Note that we use the term PDA
to represent either a mobile phone or a PDA in this chapter, and we expect people to
eventually use our solution on mobile phones which are more popular than PDAs.
SessionMagnifier is designed as a browser extension, and the key idea is to enable an
extended browser on a PDA and a regular browser on a PC to collaboratively support a
Web session. After a user types in the address of a website and initiates a Web session from
the PDA, the extended browser on the PDA accurately synchronizes a modified copy of its
latest webpage document to a regular browser on the PC. The copied webpage document
is modified to achieve accurate webpage rendering on the PC browser, to track a user's
interaction with the same webpage on the PC browser, and to prevent sensitive information
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from leaking to the PC.
This solution is simple and practical because a user only needs to carry a trusted mobile
device and install a SessionMagnifier extension to the device's Web browser - no thirdparty proxy is needed, no installation or configuration on an untrusted computer is needed,
no Web server modification is needed, and no extra cryptographic key exchange is needed.
SessionMagnifier provides a strong security guarantee because end-to-end security is directly
established between a trusted mobile device and a remote Web server; meanwhile, simple
and explicit communication interfaces are defined to enforce strong isolation between a
PDA and a PC. SessionMagnifier enables a user to fully take advantage of the convenience
of using a PC. This is because only very sensitive interactions such as entering username and
password need to be directly performed from the PDA while all other browsing interactions
can be conveniently performed from the PC.
We implemented SessionMagnifier for Mozilla's Fennec mobile browser [171]. We installed Fennec and SessionMagnifier on a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet and conducted evaluations on usability, performance, and feasibility. Our evaluation and analysis demonstrate
that the proposed simple solution can be practically used to support secure and convenient
Web browsing on untrusted public computers.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related work.
Section 5.3 details the design of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.4 describes the implementation
of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.5 analyzes the security of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.6
presents the usability, performance, and feasibility evaluation of SessionMagnifier. Finally,
Section 5.7 summarizes this work.
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5.2

Related Work

Balfanz and Felten [5] introduced a splitting-trust paradigm to divide an application between
a small trusted mobile device and a bigger, more powerful, but possibly untrusted computer.
SessionMagnifier is inspired by this paradigm; however, we do not split a browser but instead
enable an extended browser on a trusted mobile device and a regular browser on an untrusted
computer to collaboratively support a Web session. The splitting-trust paradigm has also
inspired many other kiosk computing solutions that rely on a trusted mobile device. We
classify these solutions into four categories based on their different objectives.

5.2.1

Securing Application or Data Access

Oprea et al. [83] proposed a three-party secure remote terminal architecture to enable users
to access their sensitive home computing environment via a trusted mobile device and an
untrusted terminal. This three-party architecture is based on a thin-client VNC (Virtual
Network Computing) remote display system [90], in which a VNC server can update the
framebuffer displayed on a VNC client. Sharp et al. [99] proposed a VNC-based thin-client
architecture to support secure access to unmodified applications. This architecture is similar
to the three-party architecture [83], but it provides additional mechanisms to obfuscate
the content displayed on an untrusted display. These VNC-based secure application or
data access solutions work at the framebuffer level with high overhead, so they cannot be
naturally adopted to support smooth Web interactions. In addition, trusted VNC servers
must be deployed in these solutions.
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5.2.2

Securing User Authentication or Input

Parno et al. [84] built a Phoolproof phishing prevention system that uses a trusted mobile device to perform mutual authentication between a user and a website. Mannan and
Oorschot [70] proposed the MP-Auth protocol, in which a trusted mobile device turns a
long-term password into a one-time password via the public key of an intended server;
therefore, a user's long-term password will not be revealed to phishing sites or untrusted
computers. McCune et al. [72] proposed a BitE framework that leverages the features
of TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [187] to establish an encrypted input tunnel from a
trusted mobile device to an application running on a TPM-equipped untrusted computer.
Clarke et al. [18] and Wu et al. [113] designed protocols that rely on both a trusted thirdparty proxy and a trusted mobile device to secure authentication on untrusted computers.
In addition, Florencio and Herley [29] proposed approaches to secure password input on
untrusted computers without using mobile devices. All these solutions focus on securing
user authentication or input, so they are not directly applicable for securing Web browsing
sessions.

5.2.3

Verifying Software Integrity

Garriss et al. [36] built a system that uses a mobile device to establish trust in a kiosk
computing environment. This system employs both a TPM [187] module equipped on a
kiosk computer and an integrity attestation server of the kiosk, and it focuses on verifying
the identity and integrity of software loaded on a public computer before revealing sensitive information to the computer. However, our SessionMagnifier focuses on securing Web
browsing sessions on potentially untrusted public computers.
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5.2.4

Securing Web Browsing Sessions

A few kiosk computing solutions share the same objective with our SessionMagnifier: securing Web browsing sessions. Ross et al. [92] proposed a composable secure proxy architecture
to provide secure multi-modal access to Web services from any device. A similar proxybased architecture called Delegate [49] was proposed to enable users to access Web services
from untrusted computers. In these solutions, essentially it is the browser on an untrusted
computer that accesses remote Web servers; meanwhile, secure proxies perform content and
control filtering functionalities. Two main obstacles impede the adoption of these proxybased solutions. First, secure third-party proxies must be widely deployed, well managed,
and fully trusted by users. Second, to secure Web browsing, a proxy must use very complicated and comprehensive rules to validate requests, remove sensitive content, maintain
user information, and manage session information such as HTTP cookies.
Margolin et al. [71] introduced a Guardian framework that uses a PDA as a proxy for
all interactions between an untrusted computer and remote Web servers. Guardian uses
LWP::UserAgent Perl module to interact with remote servers, and uses the HTTP::Daemon::SSL
module to interact with the untrusted public computer. This framework eliminates therequirement of using secure third-party proxies by moving their content and control filtering
functionalities to a PDA. However, since it is still the browser on the untrusted computer
that accesses remote Web servers, this solution does not reduce the inherent complexity of
proxy-based solutions. Our SessionMagnifier directly uses the Web browser on a trusted
mobile device to access remote Web servers, so it provides strong security assurances and
greatly reduces the complexity of content and control filtering.
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Recently, Sharp et al. [98] proposed a split-trust browsing architecture to explore splitting trust at the HTML level for Web applications. However, this architecture has three
drawbacks that limit its practical application. First, its critical component the RDC (Remote Device Communication) agent must be installed on an untrusted computer. Second,
its end-to-end security between a trusted mobile device and a remote Web server depends on
an extra authentication and key-exchange process coordinated by the RDC agent. Third,
it assumes that either Web applications are explicitly written or secure HTML-rewriting
proxies are used to support split-trust browsing. In contrast, our SessionMagnifier is much
simpler and more practically applicable - nothing needs to be installed or configured on
an untrusted computer, end-to-end security between a trusted mobile device and a remote
Web server is ensured by existing HTTPS connections, no third-party proxy is needed, and
no modification needs to be made to existing Web applications.

5.3

Design

In this section, we first use a motivating example to illustrate the use of SessionMagnifier in a
kiosk browsing environment. We then define the threat model and assumptions under which
SessionMagnifier operates. Finally, we present the architecture design of SessionMagnifier.

5.3.1

A Motivating Example

Alice goes on a trip without carrying her laptop, but she wants to bid an item at eBay.com.
During the last hours of the bidding, she needs to check the latest bidding status and make
appropriate adjustments as necessary. Alice takes a PDA (or a mobile phone) with her, but
she feels uncomfortable to continuously use the small keyboard and display of the PDA. She
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Figure 5.1: Kiosk browsing environment.

finds a public computer in an Internet cafe, but she has concerns about the security and
privacy of using this public computer to log into her online accounts. Figure 5.1 illustrates
such a kiosk browsing environment, and the problem here is how Alice can securely and
conveniently sign into her online accounts and make transactions.
Fortunately, Alice can use a simple SessionMagnifier extension installed on the PDA
browser to solve the problem. Alice first uses the PDA to connect to the Internet and signs
into her eBay account from the PDA browser. The Internet connection is established either
directly via Wi-Fi or indirectly via a USB-based or Bluetooth-based virtual network adapter
of the public computer. Next, Alice turns on the SessionMagnifier extension installed on
the PDA browser. She then types a URL address displayed by SessionMagnifier into the
address bar of a regular PC browser and enables the connection between the PDA browser
and the PC browser.
Starting from this point, SessionMagnifier synchronizes new webpage content from the
PDA browser to the PC browser, and Alice can conveniently view and interact with the
same webpage using the PC browser. Her interactions initiated from the PC browser will
be sent back to SessionMagnifier and then securely sent out to eBay.com. Alice can verify
and confirm any important interactions initiated from the PC browser, and she can also
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use an "Auto On" toolbar button to bypass this verification and confirmation step for less
important interactions. Meanwhile, using a "Sync On" toolbar button, Alice can switch on
or off the synchronization on each specific web page so that she can input and view sensitive
information only on the PDA browser. Alice may continue the bidding process until she
wins or loses the auction.

5.3.2

Threat Model and Assumptions

In a kiosk browsing environment, attackers are interested in stealing a user's sensitive information such as username and password to commit identity theft. They are also interested
in hijacking a user's browsing session to generate fraudulent transactions [43]. More specifically, attackers may use the following five types of attacks to achieve their goals.

• input stealing - acquire sensitive input information by using software or hardware
key loggers.
• output stealing - acquire sensitive output information by using screen or window
capture software.
• session information stealing - acquire sensitive session information such as HTTP
cookies and session IDs through malware or spyware.
• session hijacking - (secretly) control a session and make fraudulent transactions
through malware.
• network attacks- perform the above stealing and hijacking attacks at the networklevel.

We define the capabilities of an attacker at two different levels: host-level and networklevel. With host-level capabilities, an attacker can install malicious hardware and software
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on a public computer and perform the first four types of attacks listed above. With networklevel capabilities, an attacker can eavesdrop or tamper with network messages to perform
passive or active network attacks.
We consider three typical types of Web sessions: pure HTTPS sessions, pure HTTP
sessions, and hybrid sessions.

In a pure HTTPS session, a Web server uses SSL/TLS

cryptographic protocols to protect all important interactions with an authenticated user,
and a user can also authenticate the Web server by inspecting its certificate. In a pure
HTTP session, a Web server does not provide any transport layer security protection. In
a hybrid session, a Web server uses SSL/TLS cryptographic protocols to protect the user
authentication process, but it uses both HTTP and HTTPS to serve an authenticated user.
Pure HTTPS sessions are supported by high-security institutions such as banks and credit
card companies. Hybrid sessions are used by service providers such as Yahoo Mail. Pure
HTTP sessions are used by websites that provide less sensitive services. For pure HTTPS
sessions, we grant an attacker both the host-level and network-level capabilities. For hybrid
and pure HTTP sessions, we only grant an attacker the host-level capabilities. Recently,
solutions such as SessionLock [2] and ForceHTTPS [42] have been proposed to enhance the
security of hybrid sessions in potentially hostile network environments. For hybrid sessions,
assuming the success of these solutions, we may further grant an attacker the network-level
capabilities.
Like previous studies, we assume that a user's mobile device is a priori secure. In our
design, the simple and explicit communication interfaces between a PDA and a PC further
protect the security of the PDA. Given the prevalence of phishing attacks [20, 25], we also
assume that a user is security conscious and is able to discern phishing through, for example,
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Figure 5.2: SessionMagnifier high-level architecture.

inspecting a Web server's certificate validated by the PDA browser.

5.3.3

Architecture Design

Figure 5.2 illustrates the high-level architecture of SessionMagnifier. A user simply installs
the SessionMagnifier extension on a PDA browser; nothing needs to be installed or configured on a regular PC browser, and no third-party proxy is required. At the network layer,
the PC can access the PDA via TCP connections. At the application layer, the regular
PC browser communicates with the extended PDA browser using the HTTP protocol. A
user directly uses the PDA browser to establish a Web session with a remote Web server.
The SessionMagnifier extension is responsible for synchronizing the latest HTML webpage
document from the PDA browser to the PC browser, and it is also responsible for accepting
interactions initiated from the PC browser and securely performing these interactions on
the PDA browser.
The simple architecture of SessionMagnifier leverages two important features of modern Web browsers: end-user extensibility [147, 157] and Ajax (Asynchronous JavaScript

147
and XML) technology [135]. End-user extensibility allows the SessionMagnifier browser
extension to maximize its capabilities and seamlessly integrate its functionalities with modern browsers. Ajax technology enables a regular PC browser to periodically send HTTP
requests to SessionMagnifier and maintain the communication with the PDA browser. Enduser extensibility is well supported by popular browsers such as Firefox [147] and Internet
Explorer [157], and Ajax technology has received wide acceptance among all popular Web
browsers [135]. Therefore, SessionMagnifier can be practically implemented and deployed
on popular Web browsers.
In a kiosk browsing environment, establishing TCP connections between a PDA and a
PC is feasible, and having Internet access for a PDA is also feasible. Using Wi-Fi, a user
can easily establish both types of network connections. If Wi-Fi is not available, a user
can use USB or Bluetooth to enable TCP connections between a PDA and a PC; meanwhile, using various Internet access over USB or Internet access over Bluetooth techniques
(e.g., Microsoft ActiveSync [168]), a user can also easily obtain Internet access for a PDA.
Therefore, SessionMagnifier can be practically used in kiosks.
The SessionMagnifier extension consists of four main components: connection control,

request authentication, request processing, and response generation.

In addition, it also

contains an initial webpage, which is an HTML file to be sent to a regular PC browser. We
still use the previous motivating example to describe the roles played by the four components
and the initial webpage in a kiosk browsing session.
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5.3.3.1

Connection Control

When Alice turns on the SessionMagnifier extension installed on the PDA browser, the
connection control component starts to work.

This component uses a server socket to

listen for new incoming connections from a PC. The server socket is TCP-based so that
connections can be directly made from a regular PC browser. After the server socket binds
to the IP address (e.g., 192.168.1.3, assigned by the kiosk LAN network) and a TCP port
(e.g., 3000) of the PDA, the connection control component will display the URL address of
SessionMagnifier (e.g., http:/ /192.168.1.3:3000) to Alice.
Establishing the connection from a PC browser to the PDA browser is just like visiting
a regular website. Alice simply types the URL address of SessionMagnifier into the address
bar of the regular PC browser and sends out an initial HTTP request. When the connection
control component of SessionMagnifier receives this initial HTTP request, it displays the
source IP address of the request in a dialog box and asks Alice to confirm this connection.
This confirmation dialog box is employed to help Alice make sure that the initial connection
request does come from her PC.
If Alice accepts this initial connection request, the connection control component will

read the initial webpage and send it to the PC browser. In an analogy, the initial webpage
of SessionMagnifier is like the homepage of a regular website.
webpage is very simple.

The body of the initial

It provides a simple form to ask Alice to submit a one-time

password. The head of the initial page mainly contains Ajax-Snippet, which is a set of
XHR (XMLHttpRequest) [135] related objects and functions. After the initial webpage
is loaded on the PC browser, Ajax-Snippet will periodically send out "POST" type XHR
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polling requests to the connection control component of SessionMagnifier. Ajax-Snippet
sends an XHR polling request and the connection control component returns a response;
therefore, all further communication between the PC browser and the PDA browser can be
automatically carried out.
If Ajax-Snippet receives a response message that contains a new webpage document,

it will smoothly update the head and body of the initial webpage to keep the webpage
content on the PC browser synchronized with that on the PDA browser. Meanwhile, AjaxSnippet always resides in the head of the current webpage on the PC browser to maintain
the communication with the PDA browser. Ajax-Snippet uses "POST" type XHR polling
requests so that any interaction information such as link clicking or form filling on the PC
browser can be directly piggybacked onto an XHR polling request and sent to the PDA
browser.

5.3.3.2

Request Authentication

The one-time password mentioned above is generated and stored by SessionMagnifier on
the PDA browser. On the PC browser, the same password submitted by Alice will not
be transmitted to the PDA; it is just stored and used by Ajax-Snippet to compute the
HMAC (keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) [153] for each XHR polling request.
Before sending an XHR polling request, Ajax-Snippet computes an HMAC for the header
and content of the request and appends the HMAC as an additional parameter of the
request-URI [27].
When the connection control component of SessionMagnifier receives an XHR polling
request, it will forward the request to the request authentication component. The request
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authentication component will then compute a new HMAC for the received request (discarding the additional HMAC parameter) and compare the computed HMAC with the HMAC
embedded in the request-URI. If the two HMACs are identical, the XHR polling request is
regarded as valid and is further forwarded to the request processing component. We use
such a request authentication mechanism to protect the browsing session on the PDA and
to ensure that SessionMagnifier only processes the requests sent from Alice's PC browser.

5.3.3.3

Request Processing

When the request processing component receives a valid X:ijR polling request, it will perform
two tasks: new content checking and interaction information merging. The former is to
check whether new webpage document on the PDA browser needs to be synchronized to
the PC browser. The later is to check whether a user's interaction information on the PC
browser needs to be merged to the PDA browser.
SessionMagnifier keeps a timestamp for the latest webpage document on the PDA
browser. A timestamp used by SessionMagnifier is the number of milliseconds since midnight of January 1st, 1970. Whenever a new webpage document is synchronized to the
PC browser, the timestamp of the document is also sent to Ajax-Snippet using the same
response message. Whenever Ajax-Snippet sends an XHR polling request to SessionMagnifier, it carries back the timestamp of the current webpage document on the PC browser
using the same request message.
The request processing component compares the two timestamp values to determine
whether the webpage document on the PC browser is outdated. If the timestamp of the
webpage document on the PC browser is older than that on the PDA browser, the request
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processing component informs the response generation component to synchronize the new
webpage document on the PDA browser to the PC browser. Otherwise, it simply informs the
response generation component to send back an empty response message to Ajax-Snippet.
The request processing component also examines the content of this "POST " type
XHR polling request to see whether any interaction information is carried back from the
PC browser. If new interaction information is carried in the XHR polling request, the
request processing component will further execute the following four steps to merge the
interaction information to the PDA browser. First, it will accurately reflect the interaction
information (e.g., form filling information) to the corresponding webpage elements on the
PDA browser. Second, it will highlight these webpage elements and scroll them into the
view window of the PDA browser. Third, it will display a modal dialog box to ask Alice
to verify the highlighted webpage elements. Finally, if Alice confirms that the interaction
information reflected on the PDA browser is what she did on the PC browser, the request
processing component will actually perform the interaction (e.g., submitting a form) on the
PDA browser; otherwise, the request processing component will undo the changes made
in the first two steps and ignore the interaction information carried in this XHR polling
request. By only performing confirmed interaction information on the PDA browser, the
request processing component assures a user that important interaction information is not
tampered with or injected by attackers.

5.3.3.4

Response Generation

The response generation component is the most critical component of SessionMagnifier, and
it poses three main design challenges: (1) how to enable high-quality webpage document
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synchronization from the PDA browser to the PC browser, (2) how to enable accurate
user interaction on the PC browser, and (3) how to prevent sensitive information from
leaking out of the PDA. When a new webpage document is loaded on the PDA browser,
the response generation component uses the procedure shown in Figure 5.3 to generate a
response message for the PC browser. This procedure consists of four main steps: tagging,
cloning, modifying, and generating. We now detail these four steps to explain how we
addressed the design challenges of the response generation component.
(1} Tagging:

In the tagging step, the response generation component adds id at-

tributes [154] to the interested actionable elements of the latest webpage document on the
PDA browser. We define interested actionable elements as the elements on which keyboard
or mouse interactions will trigger the loading of a new webpage document. For example,
links, forms, and clickable input elements outside of the forms are all regarded as interested
actionable elements.
Tagging allows SessionMagnifier to simply use unique element identifiers to accurately
track interested actionable elements on both the PC browser and the PDA browser. By
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directly tagging the web page document on the PDA browser, the response generation component saves memory space and avoids the complexity of using any additional mapping
mechanisms. Note that the response generation component only tags those interested actionable elements that do not have an id attribute, so it will not affect the behavior of the
webpage document on the PDA browser.
(2) Cloning: In the cloning step, the response generation component uses the standard
cloneNode DOM (Document Object Model) [191] method to clone a complete copy of the
above tagged webpage document. Using a cloned webpage document has two advantages.
One is that standard DOM methods can still be handily used to modify the webpage. The
other is that any further modification is only made to this cloned copy without polluting
the web page document on the PDA browser.
(3) Modifying:

In the modifying step, the response generation component makes three

main modifications to the cloned webpage document: URL address modification, event
handler modification, and sensitive information filtering.
In general, each HTML webpage document has a set of associated supplementary objects
such as stylesheets, images, and scripts. After loading a webpage document synchronized
from the PDA browser, the PC browser must also download the associated supplementary
objects in order to accurately render the webpage. To support the downloading of supplementary objects, the response generation component changes all the relative URL addresses
contained in the cloned webpage document to the absolute URL addresses of the original
Web servers. Without such a modification, the PC browser will send all relative URL
requests to the PDA browser because it actually always connects to the SessionMagnifier
browser extension on the PDA browser.
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To track Alice's interaction with the same web page on the PC browser, the response generation component must change the event handlers of those interested actionable elements.
For form elements, the response generation component changes their onsubmit event handlers by adding a call to a specific JavaScript function residing in Ajax-Snippet. Therefore,
later on when Alice submits a form on the PC browser, the id attribute value and element
values of the form will be passed to Ajax-Snippet and then sent back to SessionMagnifier
via an XHR polling request. In a similar way, the response generation component changes
onclick event handlers of links and other clickable input elements outside of the forms to
track click interactions performed on the PC browser.
Filtering sensitive information is much simpler in SessionMagnifier than in existing solutions [49, 71, 92, 98]. The main reason is that SessionMagnifier only synchronizes webpage
documents to the PC browser, and no session control information such as HTTP cookies
will be leaked to the PC. Therefore, the response generation component only needs to filter
out sensitive information contained in a webpage document itself. To achieve this goal, the
response generation component mainly uses the following two strategies.
One is to remove any possibly sensitive information that is useless to the interaction and
display of the webpage on the PC browser. For example, webpages often contain sensitive
information such as session IDs in their URL links and form action attributes. The response
generation component simply sets all form action attribute values to empty, and it also sets
all link href attribute values to empty. Note that tracking form submitting and link clicking
is enabled by the above event handler modifications; therefore, the original action and href
attribute values are useless to the interaction of a webpage on the PC browser.
The second strategy is to obfuscate personalized sensitive information. The basic idea
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is to replace user-specified sensitive information with information that is meaningless to
attackers. For example, many websites display username information on their webpages
for a logged-in user.

Preventing the leakage of username information is important for

protecting against attacks such as invasive advertising, password guessing, and even denialof-service [12, 32]. SessionMagnifier maintains a rule table, in which simple filtering rules
are defined by a user to specify which information should be obfuscated for each specific
website. These rules could be defined for stable values (e.g., username), and they could also
be defined for dynamic values (e.g., online banking balance) if the corresponding HTML
elements of those values have stable IDs. The response generation component simply applies
the rules to remove sensitive information contained in the cloned webpage document.

(4) Generating: In the last step, the response generation component extracts information from the modified webpage document and generates an XML-format response message.
The response message is in XML-format so that later Ajax-Snippet can accurately extract
structured response information from the responseXML attribute of an XHR object. The
modified webpage document is an HTML document, but an XHR object expects to receive
a valid XML document. Since HTML webpages are often malformed, directly sending a
modified webpage document to Ajax-Snippet will often result in parsing errors. Therefore,
the response generation component will extract essential head and body information from
a modified webpage document, encapsulate the extracted information in an XML-format
response message, and finally send out the response message to Ajax-Snippet.
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5.3.3.5

Initial Webpage

We mentioned that after the initial webpage is loaded on the PC browser, Ajax-Snippet will
always keep itself within the head of the current web page on the PC browser and periodically
send out "POST" type XHR polling requests to communicate with SessionMagnifier.
Whenever Ajax-Snippet receives an XML-format response message that contains a new
webpage document, it will first use the head information contained in the response message
to replace the head of the current webpage on the PC browser. To support proper rendering
on different browsers such as Internet Explorer and Firefox, Ajax-Snippet detects the type of
the PC browser and performs this replacement for each top-level child of the head element.
Ajax-Snippet will then use the body information contained in the response message to
replace the body of the current webpage on the PC browser. By combining the structural
advantages of using DOM methods and the simplicity advantages of using the innerHTML
property of HTML elements, Ajax-Snippet can smoothly and accurately keep the webpage
content on the PC browser synchronized with that on the PDA browser.
Meanwhile, whenever Alice interacts with an interested actionable element of the synchronized webpage on the PC browser, a call to a specific JavaScript function is made to
extract the interaction information. The extracted information will be carried in the content
of the next XHR polling request and synchronized to SessionMagnifier.

5.4

Implementation

The SessionMagnifier browser extension is designed to be implementable on different Web
browsers. Indeed, only the connection control component is browser-specific; the request
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authentication, request processing, and response generation components and the initial
webpage can all be implemented using standard JavaScript and HTML that are supported
by modern Web browsers.
We implemented a full-fledged SessionMagnifier browser extension for Mozilla's Fennec
browser [171], which is the mobile version of Firefox and is currently in alpha release.
Similar to Firefox, Fennec provides full support for add-ons and rich Internet applications.
Our SessionMagnifier extension for Fennec is purely written in JavaScript and HTML. Due
to the space limit, we only briefly describe the implementation of the connection control
component that is specific to Fennec, and delineate the webpage content and interaction
synchronization capabilities of SessionMagnifier in our current implementation.
We implemented the connection control component of SessionMagnifier as a server socket
object of Mozilla's nsiServerSocket interface [172]. For this server socket object, we created a
socket listener object of Mozilla's nsiServerSocketListener interface [172] to asynchronously
accept incoming TCP connections, and we also associated a data listener object of Mozilla's
nsiStreamListener interface [172] to a connected socket transport to asynchronously accept
HTTP requests. In a Fennec browser extension, these objects can be easily created and
manipulated using JavaScript code to realize the functionality of the connection control
component. Our preliminary investigation indicates that Internet Explorer also supports
the creation of a server socket through its BHO (Browser Helper Object) extension mechanism [157].
For webpage content synchronization, SessionMagnifier supports various webpages including dynamic webpages (e.g., Google Maps) that use Ajax, CSS, or other DHTML
techniques. SessionMagnifier detects dynamic webpage changes on a PDA browser and
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synchronizes the new content to a PC browser. In principle, any type of webpage content
could be synchronized by SessionMagnifier. However, the current version of SessionMagnifier cannot properly synchronize some webpages such as Gmail webpages due to the unfinished implementation on iframe elements. For interaction synchronization, our current
implementation supports interactions on those interested actionable elements as defined in
our design. However, SessionMagnifier can also easily synchronize any other interactions
(e.g., those altering document elements without calling for new data) as long as their corresponding HTML elements support event handlers (which could be onsubmit, onclick, or
any other handlers). We will provide support for other necessary interactions in our future
implementation.

5.5

Security Analysis

The security assurances provided by SessionMagnifier can be attributed to three factors:
using a trusted PDA, accessing a remote Web server directly from a PDA browser, and
enforcing strong isolation between a PDA and a PC. We now analyze the security of SessionMagnifier based on the threat model and assumptions defined in our design. We must
emphasize that SessionMagnifier aims to enhance the security of using an untrusted public
computer for Web browsing, but it does not attempt to secure a kiosk environment itself.
In other words, the security upper-bound of using SessionMagnifier is equivalent to that of
using a user's own laptop computer in a kiosk environment.
Using a trusted PDA, SessionMagnifier is robust against input stealing attacks and
output stealing attacks. A user simply enters sensitive information such as username and
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password on the PDA browser, so the keyloggers installed on the PC cannot acquire sensitive input information. Meanwhile, user-specified information is obfuscated by the response
generation component of SessionMagnifier, so it is very hard for screen or window capture
software installed on the PC to acquire sensitive output information. The ability of SessionMagnifier to provide these two types of security assurances is the same as that of other
solutions to securing kiosk browsing sessions [49, 71, 92, 98].
Accessing a remote Web server directly from the PDA browser is a unique feature of
SessionMagnifier because other solutions [49, 71, 92, 98] all use the browser on an untrusted
computer to establish a Web session with a remote Web server. Besides, SessionMagnifier
enforces a strong isolation between a PDA and a PC by only allowing HTTP communications. Combining these two factors, SessionMagnifier provides high security assurances to
protect against other three types of attacks: session information stealing attacks, session
hijacking attacks, and network attacks.
SessionMagnifier is robust against session information stealing attacks. Since SessionMagnifier only synchronizes the content of a modified HTML document from the PDA
browser to the PC browser, session information such as HTTP cookies will never be leaked
to the PC. Meanwhile, since all useless values such as form action attribute values and
link href attribute values are simply set to empty by the response generation component
of SessionMagnifier, no session IDs contained in these values will be revealed to the PC.
Preventing the leakage of HTTP cookies and session IDs is important because an attacker
can use them to further steal other sensitive user data or hijack browsing sessions. Unfortunately, this type of security assurance is not considered in [98], and it is considered
in [49, 71, 92] by employing very complex filtering rules and mapping mechanisms.
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SessionMagnifier is robust against session hijacking attacks.

Since a Web session is

established between the PDA browser and a remote Web server, malware installed on the
PC cannot directly seize the control of a session to make fraudulent transactions. The
only possible way for an attacker to hijack a session is to tamper with or inject interaction
information in an XHR polling request. SessionMagnifier defends against such attacks by
using its request processing component to accurately reflect interaction information on the
PDA browser and only perform user-confirmed interactions.

Protection against session

hijacking is also considered in [49, 71, 92, 98]. However, because these solutions use the
PC browser to establish a Web session with a remote Web server, they must perform
very complex request validations but still cannot achieve the same security level as that of
SessionMagnifier.
In terms of network attacks, SessionMagnifier ensures end-to-end security between a
trusted mobile device and a remote Web server by directly using existing HTTPS connections. For pure HTTPS sessions, SessionMagnifier is robust against network attacks. For
hybrid sessions, SessionMagnifier is robust against network attacks for HTTPS webpages.
For pure HTTP sessions, there is no strong incentive to defend against network attacks because in general Web servers that do not use SSL/TLS only provide less sensitive services.
Existing solutions [49, 71, 92, 98] provide similar security guarantees against network attacks
as provided by SessionMagnifier; however, they often necessitate an additional SSL/TLS
connection or encryption channel still mainly because they use the PC browser to establish
a Web session with a remote Web server.
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5.6

Evaluation

In this section, we focus on evaluating the usability of SessionMagnifier. We also briefly
present the performance and feasibility evaluation results.

5.6.1

Usability Evaluation

Our primary goal is to measure whether using SessionMagnifier is more convenient than
merely using a PDA browser. To achieve this goal, we conducted a usability study based
on a real eBay bidding scenario.

5.6.1.1

Participants

Twenty-two adults, 11 females and 11 males, participated in this study. Nineteen participants were between ages of 18 and 30, and three participants were over 30 years old. We
did not screen participants based on experiences using different Web browsers, using mobile
devices, or using eBay services.

5.6.1.2

Scenario and Procedure

We presented such a scenario to each participant: "Suppose you want to bid a book titled

'Xbox 360 games in a nutshell' at eBay.com. You visit www.ebay.com and sign into an
eBay testing account. You search the book using its title and find the item. You place a
higher bid by adding one dollar and get confirmation that you are currently the highest
bidder. Finally you sign out of the eBay website.". Note that the book item was added to
eBay using a seller's account created by us, and the eBay testing account was also created
by us.
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TAl: On PDA, type the address www.ebay.com into the address bar of Fennec
TA2: On the "homepage" of eBay, click on the "Sign in" link
TA3: On the "welcome page" of eBay, sign into the testing account
TA4: On the "logined page", type "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find" input
field
TA5: On the "logined page", click on the "Search" button
TA6: On the "search result page", click on the link item "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell"
TA7: On the "item page", type a higher amount into the "Your maximum bid" input field
TA8: On the "item page", click on the "Place Bid" button
TA9: On the "review and confirm bid page", click on the "Confirm Bid" button
TAIO: On the "bid confirmation page", click on the "Sign out" link
Table 5.1: The 10 tasks in procedure A.

We asked each participant to perform this eBay bidding scenario using two procedures
A and B. In procedure A, a participant only uses a PDA; in procedure B, a participant
uses both a PDA and a PC. We used a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet as the PDA, and
we pre-installed a Fennec browser [171 J and our SessionMagnifier browser extension on it.
In procedure A, each participant used the Fennec browser (with SessionMagnifier turned
off) on the PDA to perform the bidding scenario. In procedure B, each participant used
the Fennec browser (with SessionMagnifier turned on) on the PDA and a regular browser
on a PC to perform the bidding scenario. We randomly assigned 11 participants to first
perform procedure A and the other 11 participants to first perform procedure B. Before a
test, we trained each participant on the use of the PDA and the Fennec browser. We also
explained the purpose of SessionMagnifier, and it seems that all the participants understood
the threats addressed by SessionMagnifier.
The step-by-step tasks for the two procedures are listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and we presented these two task lists to each participant. Procedure A has 10 tasks
and procedure B has 18 tasks. Each task is a specific browsing action such as clicking on
the "Sign in" link or typing "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find" input field.
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TB1: On PDA, type the address www.ebay.com into the address bar of Fennec
TB2: On PDA, on the "homepage" of eBay, click on the "Sign in" link
TB3: On PDA, on the "welcome page" of eBay, sign into the testing account
TB4: On PDA, click on the "Sync On" toolbar button
TB5: On PC, type the address http:f/192.168.1.3:3000 into the address bar of a browser
TB6: On PC, submit the one-time password to synchronize browsers
TB7: On PC, on the "logined page", type "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find"
input field
TB8: On PC, on the "logined page", click on the "Search" button
TB9: On PDA, verify the highlighted form on the "logined page" and confirm the form
submission action
TB10: On PC, on the "search result page", click on the link item "Xbox 360 games in a
nutshell"
TB11: On PDA, verify the highlighted link on the "search result page" and confirm the
click action
TB12: On PC, on the "item page", type a higher amount into the "Your maximum bid"
input field
TB13: On PC, on the "item page", click on the "Place Bid" button
TB14: On PDA, verify the highlighted input field on the "item page" and confirm the input
action
TB15: On PC, on the "review and confirm bid page", click on the "Confirm Bid" button
TB16: On PDA, verify the highlighted button on the "review and confirm bid page" and
confirm the click action
TB17: On PC, on the "bid confirmation page", click on the "Sign out" link
TB18: On PDA, verify the highlighted link on the "bid confirmation page" and confirm the
click action
Table 5.2: The 18 tasks in procedure B.

Procedure B has more tasks because we asked each participant to verify and confirm all
the interaction information sent back to the PDA browser. For example, Figure 5.4 shows
a picture of performing the task TB9 on Fennec. After the search of "Xbox 360 games in a
nutshell'' performed on the PC browser is reflected on Fennec, SessionMagnifier highlights
the border of the search form with red color and displays a modal dialog box on the PDA.
Using this dialog box, a participant can either confirm this form submission by clicking on
the "OK" button or ignore this form submission by clicking on the "Cancel" button.
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Figure 5.4: Performing the task TB9 on Fennec.

5.6.1.3

Data Collection

We collected data through observation and obtaining feedback from participants. When
a participant was performing the two procedures, we observed the progress of the tasks.
After a participant finished the two procedures, we asked the participant to answer 16
close-ended five-point Likert-scale (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree nor disagree,
Agree, Strongly Agree) [166] questions. These 16 questions are listed in Table 5.3 (Q1 to
Q6 were asked for both procedures). We also asked participants to write down open-ended
comments on using SessionMagnifier.

5.6.1.4

Results and Analysis

We observed that all the 22 participants successfully finished the two procedures. We converted the responses to the Likert-scale questions to numeric values (1=Strongly disagree,
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The six questions common to both procedures A and B
(replacing the 'X' in the questions with 'A' or 'B')
Ql: Typing into input fields of a webpage in procedure X is easy
Q2: Clicking links of a webpage in procedure X is easy
Q3: Clicking buttons of a webpage in procedure X is easy
Q4: Scrolling a webpage in procedure X is easy
Q5: Viewing webpage content in procedure X is easy
Q6: Overall, performing procedure X is easy
The four questions specific to procedure B
QB1: Typing the URL address http:f/192.168.1.3:3000 of SessionMagnifier into the address
bar of a PC browser in procedure B is easy
QB2: Clicking the "Sync On" toolbar button in procedure B is easy
QB3: Verifying a highlighted element (form, link, button) in procedure B is easy
QB4: Confirming an action (form, link, button) using the dialog box in procedure B is easy
Table 5.3: The 16 close-ended questions.

2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree) and compared the
responses to procedures A and B using t-tests. Strictly speaking, since the responses are
ordinal data, they do not necessarily have interval scales. However, in practice this type of
analysis is acceptable [16].
Figure 5.5 illustrates the mean ratings to questions Q1 to Q6 for the two procedures.
We can see that for all the six questions the mean ratings to procedure B are much higher
than those to procedure A. The t-tests (with 95% confidence interval) further reveal that
the mean rating differences between the two procedures are significant for each of the six
questions. These results clearly indicate that SessionMagnifier enables users to exploit the
usability advantages of using the large keyboard and display of a PC.
Using a similar method, we analyzed the responses to the four questions specific to
procedure B. The mean ratings to questions QB1 to QB4 are: 3.96, 4.09, 3.64, and 3.86,
respectively. One-sample t-test (with 95% confidence interval) against the test value of
three shows that the mean ratings to these questions are higher than three with statistical
significance. These results indicate that performing the specific interactions introduced in
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Figure 5.5: Mean ratings to questions Ql to Q6.

procedure B is not difficult to users.
We further analyzed participants' open-ended comments on using SessionMagnifier. We
found that 14 participants clearly mentioned that typing into input fields and viewing webpages are very convenient in procedure B. We also found that nine participants mentioned
that it would be better if the number of verifying and confirming steps could be reduced.
We should note that verification and confirmation are necessary steps for important interactions, and they were or should be considered in other splitting-trust based solutions.
Moreover, SessionMagnifier allows a user to bypass this verification and confirmation step
using the "Auto On" toolbar button. In procedure B, we disabled the "Auto On" feature
to measure the worst case usability, but we believe that a user can actually be trained to
use this feature to confidently bypass less important interactions.

5.6.2

Performance and Feasibility Evaluation

In our performance evaluation, we mainly measured the speed of SessionMagnifier in response generation (i.e., the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.3) and response transmission.
We used Fennec to visit five homepages. The page size and response generation time (average of five runs) of these homepages are listed in Table 5.4. We can see that the larger
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Site Name
google.com
ebay.com
bestbuy.com
weather.com
amazon.com

Page Size (KB)

Generation Time (second)

8.9
49.5
80.2
148.7
201.1

0.36
1.37
2.64
2.71
3.03

Table 5.4: Page size and response generation time of five homepages.

and more complex the HTML page is, the more generation time is needed. Response generation is not very efficient for large webpages, but we believe that the main reason is the
poor memory management in the current alpha release of Fennec. Using the Linux top
command, we observed that even without SessionMagnifier, Fennec requires over 107% of
memory (128MB RAM) on Nokia N810 Internet Tablet by just loading the google.com
homepage; however, the built-in browser on Nokia N810 only requires less than 78% of
memory even when loading the amazon.com homepage. We believe that increasing memory
or an improved Fennec can help reduce the response generation time of SessionMagnifier.
In terms of the response transmission speed, since the PDA and the PC are located in the
same LAN, the generated response message can normally be transmitted from the PDA to
the PC within a second.
In our feasibility evaluation, we mainly tested whether TCP connections between a PDA
and a PC can be established via Wi-Fi in kiosk environments. We conducted experiments
at 20 public places (seven hotels, seven restaurants, three libraries, two gyms, and one
coffee shop) that offer free Wi-Fi Internet access. Since some places do not provide public
computers, we used a laptop to act as a public PC. At each place, we did not do any
special configuration on either the PDA (the Nokia N810 Internet Tablet) or the PC, but
just connected them to the same Wi-Fi access point to acquire IP addresses. We observed
that TCP connections between the PDA and the PC are blocked (perhaps due to strict
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security restrictions) at three hotels and two restaurants. At the other fifteen places, the
PC can connect to the PDA using a TCP port (e.g. 3000), and we successfully performed
Web browsing using SessionMagnifier. These results indicate that it is practical to use
SessionMagnifier at many free Wi-Fi hotspots. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the design
section, a kiosk environment that plans to enable SessionMagnifier can also use USB or
Bluetooth, in addition to Wi-Fi.

5.7

Summary

We presented SessionMagnifier, a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk browsing. Leveraging the end-user extensibility and Ajax technology of modern Web browsers,
SessionMagnifier enables an extended browser on a mobile device and a regular browser
on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session. SessionMagnifier strives to
synthesize the usability advantages of a public computer and the security advantages of a
mobile device. Since a Web session is directly established between the PDA browser and a
remote Web server, SessionMagnifier provides a strong end-to-end security guarantee and
greatly reduces the complexity of content and control filtering. Since a user can perform the
majority of browsing interactions from the PC and only perform very sensitive interactions
from the PDA, SessionMagnifier enables a user to fully take advantage of the convenience
of using a PC. We presented the design of SessionMagnifier in detail and analyzed the security of SessionMagnifier using a rigorous threat model. We implemented SessionMagnifier
for Mozilla's Fennec browser and evaluated its usability, performance, and feasibility. Our
evaluation and analysis demonstrate that SessionMagnifier is simple, secure, and usable.
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In future work, we will enhance the implementation and evaluation of SessionMagnifier.
In particular, we will improve our usability evaluation, for example, by gathering information about participants' experience with mobile devices, by allowing participants to use our
tool with only basic instead of step-by-step instructions, by collecting data illustrating participants' thoughts on security aspects of using our tool, and by incorporating some security
attack scenarios.

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work

In the previous chapters, we have introduced this dissertation and detailed its four
main contributions in enhancing Web browsing security. In this final chapter, we make
conclusions and outline the future work.

6.1

Conclusions

Traditionally, attackers mainly focused on directly breaking into Web servers to acquire
sensitive information or damage the systems. However, in recent years, Web browsers have
gained increasing popularity as new attack vectors for launching various severe attacks such
as drive-by download, cross-site scripting, phishing, privacy, and even large-scale denial
of service attacks. Browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Enhancing Web browsing
security is therefore of great need and importance, and it has also become much more
challenging than before.
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This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through exploring and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have
systematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie
management, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public
computers. We have proposed new approaches to address these problems, and built unique
systems to validate our approaches. Our contributions include an automatic HTTP cookie
management system, a transparent phishing protection system, a large-scale measurement
of insecure JavaScript practices on the Web, and a simple approach to secure and convenient
kiosk browsing. The four Web browsing security problems studied in this dissertation are
real-world important problems, and our solutions presented in this dissertation are unique,
meaningful, and useful.

6.2

Future Work

As malicious activities have increasingly become Web-based and as attackers have become
more and more economically motivated and adaptable, enhancing Web browsing security
will continue to be of critical importance. In the near future, I will keep the focus of my research on security, especially Web browsing security. For one example, based on the insecure
JavaScript practice characterization work presented in Chapter 4, I will study JavaScript obfuscation and de-obfuscation activities to build browser-based anomaly intrusion detection
systems. For another example, based on my experience in building CookiePicker (Chapter 2), BogusBiter (Chapter 3), and SessionMagnifier (Chapter 5), I will propose other
new approaches to protect users' username and password credentials against various iden-
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tity theft malware. In addition to enhancing Web browsing security, I will continue to do
research on collaborative browsing and mobile browsing, and I also plan to study cloud
computing. Web browsers have increasingly become the dominant platform for both current and future end-user applications, and I believe that there are many interesting Web
browsing research problems worth investigating in the future.
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